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I. INTRODUCTION
A new concept recently entered the international legal and political discourse:
that of disintegrating, collapsed, or failed nation-states.' Scholars allege two types
of disintegration: the breakup of nation-states into smaller nation-states2 and the
implosion of states This article focuses upon the latter situation and specifically
examines the contours of this phenomenon within the African context-where
scholars most often propose trusteeship as a solution.4 Africa is also the continent
I. See COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITMATE
AuTHoRrrY (I. William Zartman ed., 1993) [hereinafter COLLAPSED STATES]; Gerald B.
Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POL'Y 3 (1992); Robert D.
Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1994, at 44; Jon H. Sylvester,
Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic Stagnation, Political Disintegration and the Specter of
Recolonization, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1299 (1994); William Pfaff, A New Colonialism, 74
FOREiGN AFF. 2 (1995); Ruth Gordon, Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship, 28 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 301 (1995); Jennifer Widner, States and Statelessness in Late Twentieth Century
Africa, 124 DAEDALUS 129 (Summer 1995); Paul Johnson, Colonialism's Back-and Not a
Moment Too Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at 22; Ali Mazrui, The Message of Rwanda:
Recolonize Africa?, NEW PERSP. Q., Fall 1994, at 18; A. Peter Mutharika, The Role of In-
ternational Law in the Twenty-First Century: An African Perspective, 18 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1706, 1709-1711 (1995); Yogesh K. Tyagi, The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention
Revisited, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 883, 886 (1995); Charles Krauthammer, Rwanda: Ifthe U.N.
Can't Help, Ask South Africa, INT'L HERALD TRiB., May 28, 1994; cf Henry Richardson,
III, Failed States, Self-Determination, and Preventive Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia
and Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1996).
2. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 491 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1996)
[hereinafter WORLD ALMANAC] (noting that examples include the break-up of the former
Soviet Union into eleven sovereign states: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tejikstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). Disinte-
gration may be accompanied by violence and leave the surviving state(s) in a state of war
and chaos. The most recent prominent example of a violent scenario is the break-up of the
former Yugoslavia into the states of Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and
Slovenia. On the African continent, the only example of this type of disintegration is Eritrea
and Ethiopia. Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia after a prolonged and bloody civil
war against the Emperor and the then Marxists. See I. William Zartman, Introduction:
Posing the Problem of State Collapse, in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 1, at 3.
3. See Peter Vale, Engaging the World's Marginalized and Promoting Global
Change: Challenges for the United Nations at Fifty, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 283, 288 (1995).
Professor Vale notes a quiescence in both theoretical and practical debates on the systematic
break-down of the nation-state. See id. Vale suggests that this silence "reveals more about
the dominant discourses in international relations than it does about the state of the world."
Id. Thus, he urges, it is crucial that we understand the declining confidence in state struc-
tures, and that we question concepts such as democracy, nations, sovereignty, and capital-
ism which despite their tangible manifestations, are only human constructs subject to
change. See id. Vale believes that "world orders can be overturned." Id. at 288.
4. See Pfaff, supra note 1, at 4; Johnson, supra note 1, at 22; Mazrui, supra note 1, at
18. Dr. Mazrui proposes African controlled trusteeships with the Organization of African
Unity, larger African states, or some regional African group acting as the trustee. See id.
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where failure or collapse is alleged most often.'
An expanding number of African governments face increasing difficulties per-
forming basic governmental functions and delivering essential services to their
populations, resulting in severe societal dislocations and inordinate human misery
Commentators, often under the banner of humanitarian intervention, beseech the
international community, and more specifically the U.N., to restore crumbling
governmental and civil structures.7 The U.N. Security Council has sponsored com-
Helman & Ratner propose "governance assistance" for states that are failing, but not yet
failed. Helman & Ratner, supra note 1, at 13. Georgia, Zaire, and selected states in Africa
and Asia would be eligible for this type of assistance. See id The authors cite Bosnia, Cam-
bodia, Liberia, and Somalia as states with governmental structures overwhelmed by circum-
stances and, therefore, candidates for trusteeship. See id at 14-15.
5. States with questionable viability include Zaire, Nigeria, Burundi, Sudan, Angola,
Mozambique, Ethiopia, Kenya, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Togo, Algeria and Chad. Makau
wa Mutua, Putting Humply Dumply Back Together Again. The Dilemma of the Post-
Colonial African State, 21 BROoK. J. INT'L L. 505 (1995); Zartman. supra note 2, at I (cit-
ing NORMA YOFFEE & GEORGE L. CO'?GuL, THE COLLAPSE OF ANCIENT STATES AND
CIVILIZATIONS (1988) and J. A. TAumNER, THE COLLAPSE OF COMPLEX SOCIETIES (1988)).
The authors describe Rwanda, Somalia, and Liberia as "failed" or "collapsed," while other
commentators note that at least ten other African nations are on the brink of collapse. While
these commentators often cite or include lists of states they believe have failed or are in the
process of failing, many do not pinpoint why they consider these particular states poten-
tially unviable. See, e.g., Helman & Ratner, supra note I. Specific countries are discussed
in some detail in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 1 (identifying Angola, Mozambique, Su-
dan, Zaire, Burundi, and Algeria as potentially collapsed states); Zartman, supra note I, at
3-5 (classifying Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda as collapsed states and Chad,
Uganda, and Ghana as reconstituted states); I. William Zartman, Putting Things Back To-
gether, in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 1, at 267, 267.
6. See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of government
failure to provide essential services in African countries); see also Jon H. Sylvester, Im-
practicability, Mutual Mistake and Related Contractual Bases for Equitably Adjusting the
External Debt of Sub-Saharan Africa, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 258, 259 (1992) (citing
A.W. Clausen Financing Development in the Third World, BANKERS MAG., May-June
1985, at 12) (describing the situation in Africa as desperate). Living standards declined for
nearly a decade and continue to do so. See Dominick Salvatore, The African Crisis, in
AFRICAN DEVELOP ,NT PROSPECTS: A POLICY MODELING APPROACH 15 (Dominick Salva-
tore ed., 1989). This dire situation is attributed to drought, famine, external debt and an
overall financial crises. See id. A little over one third of the population has access to safe
drinkable water, there is one doctor for every 23,000 people; and only fifteen percent of all
secondary school age children enroll in school. See id at 16. Basic needs include improved
housing, increased nutritional levels, access to drinking water, clothing, basic health care,
and rudimentary education. See Massimo D'Angelo, Economic Policies and Social Dev-
opment, in AFRICAN DEVELOPMIENT PROSPECTS: A POLICY MODELING APPROACH 222, 225
(Dominick Salvatore ed., 1989).
7. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 1, at 330; Francis Mading Deng, State Collapse: The
Humanitarian Challenge to the United Nations, in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 1, at
217,218.
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prehensive projects in Somalia, Cambodia, and elsewhere.' The Secretary General
advocates post-conflict peace-building by the U.N.,9 and scholars propose para-
digms to "save failed states," " assist disintegrating states, or simply bring back
colonialism."
The trusteeship proposals presume some form of governmental breakdown. The
first and most difficult question is to determine exactly what is meant by state
"collapse" or "failure," and where, or if, this is indeed the state of events in any
particular situation. Second, if it can be ascertained that there are specific instances
of state collapse, is there some responsibility on the part of the international com-
munity to render assistance in certain defined circumstances.'2 Finally, one must
8. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., Supp No. I, at 80-87, U.N. Doc. A/48/1 (1993). These projects could be termed
peace-keeping, peace enforcement, peace-building or some combination thereof. See
Botrn'os BouTRos-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREVENTATIVE DIPLOMACY,
PEACEMAKING AND PEACE-KEEPING, Report of the Secretary General pursuant to the state-
ment adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council (1992) (defining the terms
"peace-keeping," "peace enforcement," and "peace-building").
9. See BouTRos-GHALI, supra note 8; see Jarat Chopra, Peace-Maintenance: The Last
Stage of Development (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
10. See Helman & Ratner, supra note 1, at 12. According to Helman and Ratner, con-
servatorship fulfills the U.N. Charter objective of "international cooperation in solving in-
ternational problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights." Id. Conservatorship and trusteeship
are used interchangeably in this article.
11. See Pfaff, supra note 1, at 2; Johnson, supra note 1, at 22; Charles Krauthammer,
Trusteeship for Somalia; An Old-Colonial- Idea Whose Time has Come Again. WASH.
POST, Oct. 9, 1992, at A27; Mazrui, supra note 1, at 18.
12. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 327 (noting that the obligation to assist is based on
several theories). Humanitarian and human rights considerations may make intervention
desirable and may create the most likely scenario for intervention. Francis Deng notes the:
[H]umanitarian concern of the international community with state collapse and other causes of
domestic violence that inflict hardship and suffering on masses of people.... [and] a new world
order in which human dignity for all people at all levels will become a matter of cooperative se-
curity for the international community.
Deng, supra note 7, at 217.
Thus, human rights violations are viewed as a "legitimate area of concern for the inter-
national community and a basis for scrutinizing the performance of governments and other
domestic actors." Id.; see also Gordon, supra note 1, at 332. The West bears at least some
responsibility for the current state of affairs in Africa. Colonialism wreaked havoc on Afri-
can political, social, and economic institutions and the continent may never recover from
this domination. For example, the international community exploited Africa's primary re-
sources and in the process left African states with narrowly based economies heavily de-
pendent on primary resources. See Darryl C. Thomas & Ali A. Mazrui, Africa's Post-Cold
War Demilitarization: Domestic and Global Causes, 46 J. INT'L AFF. 157, 171 (1992);
David P. O'Brien, Structural Adjustment Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 19 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFr. 115, 121 (1995). Professor Richardson notes that Northern Tier States con-
tinue to control the resources that Southern Tier States need. See Richardson, supra note I,
at 8. He explains that "imposed and invited intrusion relative to Southern Tier [S]tates...
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determine what strategy to utilize in providing the necessary assistance.
This article contends that a possible method of assistance, trusteeship, is and has
always been a highly questionable concept. The very fact that scholars and com-
mentators are seriously advocating this approach is an indication of how nega-
tively we view certain communities. From this critical vantagepoint, the article will
examine the trusteeship model and its desirability as an approach to an admittedly
complex and difficult problem. 3 This article proposes that, rather than returning to
a theory and system of subjugation, whose sub-text was racial and cultural inferi-
ority, the international community should explore a more inclusive bottom-up ap-
proach that would genuinely attempt to take into account the first words of the
United Nations Charter: "We the peoples of the United Nations... [dJeterrained.
. . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights"' 4 and make intervention more
legitimate in the eyes of a rightly suspicious Third World. 1
is an international fact of life" and should incorporate a human rights component. Id. Fi-
nally, international peace and security concerns may be a factor in international interven-
tion. To the extent state failure generates a threat to international peace and security, the
Security Council would have jurisdiction to intervene and restore the peace. See Gordon.
supra note 1, at 326.
13. I have examined the many legal obstacles to imposing trusteeship in Gordon. supra
note 1.
14. See U.N. CHARTER, PREAMBLE (continuing".., in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.").
"We the peoples of the United Nations" was used in the Preamble "to emphasize that the
Charter is an expression of the will of the people of the world and primarily concerned with
their welfare." See LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NAnoNs: CoNENTrrARY AND Doctrmusf 55 (1946). My goal is to construct a more inclu-
sive approach, which the Preamble of the Charter espoused. Umozurike believes that the
Preamble applies to "all peoples, dependent or independent." See U.O. UMoztRWIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COLONIALmsM n AFRICA 82 (1979) (noting that dependent peo-
ples surely did not represent themselves at the San Francisco conference). Ruth Russell,
who has chronicled the Charter's creation notes that the founding states had:
LThe impossible task of expressing high aspirations for the future in terms of sometimes con-
flicting spiritual concepts; ofreaffirming the basic principles and purposes of the Organization as
embodied in the Charter, and doing all this in words that would appeal to the peoples of at least
fifty countries, representing different systems of political, metaphysical, and ethical thought, and
speaking a large variety of languages.
RuTH RUsSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 914 (1953) (emphasis
added). Africa vas almost entirely colonized at this time and its peoples were not citizens of
these fifty states. At best, they were represented by their colonial masters, who were present
at the negotiation and signing of the Charter. Moreover, the U.N. was viewed as an organi-
zation of states and its goals were to be achieved through the actions of states. Thus, Good-
rich and Hambro opine: "It is difficult to think of a single matter within the sphere of inter-
national relations or affecting relations betiveen states which cannot be brought within the
scope of the Organization's activities in the achievement of these comprehensive pur-
poses." See GOODRICH & HATMBRO, supra, at 21 (emphasis added).
15. See Marc Trachtenberg, Intervention in Historical Perspective, in E.IEuRGINO
NORMs OF JusTFED INTERvENTIoN 15, 32 (Laura W. Reed & Carl Koysen eds., 1993) (ex-
plaining that intervention is a suspect doctrine for the Third World because it "arouses
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Critical Race Theory 6 suggests a paradigm for listening to, and hearing, out-
sider voices 7 as well as for recognizing and questioning our own biases and as-
sumptions about "the other." This article will attempt to utilize these theories in
constructing an alternative paradigm. 8 This admittedly more complex and difficult
memories of imperialism, colonialism, racism and national degradation"). Third World
countries, that were the target of intervention, even humanitarian intervention, were stigma-
tized as inferior because Western countries historically used intervention either to degrade
and intimidate or to bring countries up to European standards. See id. at 24. During the
nineteenth century, intervention was proscribed only with respect to other European coun-
tries that were deemed sovereign, intervention in other parts of the world was common-
place, and non-intervention was not even an issue when it came to European expansion in
sub-Saharan Africa or Russian expansion in Central Asia. By the end of the ninetcenh cen-
tury a double standard was firmly in place. The "civilized" nations of Europe and the
United States had the right to control their own destinies free of foreign intrusion. The less
civilized Asian and Latin American States, however, were fair targets of intervention. See
id. at 23-24. While this view has partially dissipated in this century, "the power of inter-
vention remains the power to stigmatize and political meaning is in large measure rooted in
historical memory." Id.
16. See John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Secur-
ing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2141
(1992) (noting that critical theory is not "wedded to one overriding doctrine or unified
world view but rather is a set of basic insights and perspectives which undermine existing
truths even as they foster the need for a theory of society which remains to be completed").
Mari Matsuda notes:
Critical Race Theory (CRT) refers to the work of progressive legal scholars of color who are at-
tempting to develop ajurisprudence that accounts for the role of racism in American law and that
works towards the elimination of racism as part of a larger goal of eliminating all forms of op-
pression.
Mar J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1763 n.3 (1990).
17. See Man J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repara-
tions, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987). Professor Matsuda argues that furthermore,
those who have experienced discrimination speak with a special voice to which we should listen.
Looking to the bottom-adopting the perspective of those who have seen and felt the falsity of
the liberal promise--can assist critical scholars in the task of fathoming the phenomenology of
law and defining elements ofjustice.
Id. at 324. She suggests a "new epistomological source for critical scholars: the actual ex-
periences, history, culture, and the intellectual tradition of people of color in America." Id.
This article suggests that we seldom listen to certain voices and that by doing so now we
could assist people in constructing their societies, rather than imposing our view of how
such societies should be configured. It would mean taking into account and centering solu-
tions on the experiences, history, and culture of the peoples that we are purportedly trying
to help. As Professor Trachtenberg suggests, with respect to making intervention viable and
legitimate, "it means listening to people we are not used to listening to, and understanding
the limits of our own power and, especially on our own wisdom." See Trachtenberg, supra
note 15, at 32.
18. It is acknowledged that this will be a Western model, meaning a variant on West-
em, albeit outsider Western, thought. Transferring Critical Race Theory (CRT) to the inter-
national level adds an additional and very complex layer making it more difficult to situate
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approach directly contradicts the trusteeship model because the fundamental phi-
losophy underpinning colonialism 9 -mandates and trusts-was that certain hu-
man beings, who were predominately black and brown peoples, were inferior to
Europeans and simply incapable of governing themselves. Colonialism assumed
that Western models of governance and organization were superior and that Euro-
pean precepts on these matters provided the universal definition of civilization?
As such, colonialism encouraged the adoption and utilization of Western models
and precepts by all peoples. Thus, the non-European "other" was to be civilized
and forced to adopt European principles, ideas, and institutions?'
It appears that the same assumptions, to varying degrees, underlie current para-
digms to utilize forms of conservatorship." Legitimizing trusteeship would con-
"the other." However, attempts to do so have been made. See Henry J. Richardson, II, The
Gulf Crisis and African-American Interests Under International Law. 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 42
(1993) (considering how African-American perspectives differed from those of the majority
population during the Gulf War); Adrien K. Wing & Sylke Merchan, Rape, Ethnictj, and
Culture: Spirit Injury from Bosnia to Black America, 25 CoLuM. HUL Rrs. L. REv. I
(1993). A number of scholars have applied feminist legal theory to international law. See
Hillary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Lav, 85 A1. J. INT'L L.
613 (1991); Barbara Stark, Postmodern Rhetoric, Economic Rights and an International
Text: A Miracle for Breakfast, 33 VA. L INT'L L. 433 (1993); RECONCE.IVnG REALITY:
WOMEN AND INTERNATiONAL LAW (Dorinda B. Dallmeyer ed., 1993); see also Isabelle R.
Gunning, Arrogant Perception. World-Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of
Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLuM. Htmi. RTs. L. REv. 189 (1992) (providing guidance
because the author attempts to situate herself in the reality of the "other" and acknowledges
the profound difficulties involved).
19. See infra notes 187-256 and accompanying text (explaining that colonialism in-
cludes mandates and trusts).
20. See Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of "Civilization" in INTERNArIOAL SociEt 22
(1984) (explaining that the nineteenth century standard of "civilization" was a European
standard equated with European civilization). Moreover, "the European standard of 'civili-
zation' came genuinely to be emulated, albeit often grudgingly or fearfully, by many non-
European countries. Each non-European country had to reconcile itself with, to adapt to, to
imbibe, or to develop a syncretic compromise with, the European international society and
its standard." Id at 99.
21. See id at 22.
22. This is despite what might be the best of intentions on the part of many who ar-
ticulate these theories. The intent here is not to brand anyone as racist or to ascribe nefari-
ous motives or purposes. In fact, it seems that many people writing about these matters
honestly want to devise mechanisms that will assist human beings who appear to be under-
going a very difficult transition; they are addressing these difficult issues in an effort to de-
vise solutions.
This article suggests that "we," meaning those grounded in the Western tradition, are
accustomed to viewing certain peoples as "them," as "different," as "the other", who is
incapable and who we must civilize, develop, and raise to our level. We ascribe our solu-
tions to problems rather than listening to "their" story or view of their own situation. The
Western view is seen as "universal," obviously correct, and to be imposed with basic as-
sumptions that are unquestioned. The notion that those who do not support re-colonization
are being "politically correct," Krauthammer, supra note 11, effectively crystallizes this
1997]
AM UJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y
tinue the international law tradition of objectifying and viewing non-Europeans as
"the other." 2 It then becomes not only possible, but also perfectly reasonable, to
prescribe solutions that "we," the civilized West,' perceive will best address
problems. Consequently, the concerns, ideas, culture, politics, and indigenous
economies of certain peoples are largely ignored or dismissed.25
Utilizing the trusteeship model presupposes that Western modes of governance,
politics, and social thought should triumph.26 Once again the law will have
changed in a direction that favors the institutions, interests, and philosophy of the
West.27 Moreover, the discourse is framed in a manner that makes this result seem
logical and in the interest of both the peoples of the Third World and their kind-
hearted patrons in the West.
view. "Politically correct" folks simply will not acknowledge how incompetent these peo-
ple really are, nor how superior we in fact are. On labeling people "politically correct," see
Jamin B. Raskin, The Great PC Cover-Up, CAL. LAW. 68 (Feb. 1994).
23. See infra notes 313-328 and accompanying text. For an excellent discussion of
colonized non-Europeans as the "other," see Antony Anghie, "The Heart of My Home":
Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 445, 499-
504 (1993); see also EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 197, 190 (1993) (sug-
gesting that studying the relationship between the "West" and its dominated cultural
"other" is "a point of entry into studying the formation and meaning of Western cultural
practices themselves").
24. For a discussion of cultural differences and duality that make defining "the West"
a difficult concept, see Gunning, supra note 18; see also W. E. B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF
BLACK FOLK, (1903) reprinted in W.E.B. DuBois, WRITINGS 364-65 (Nathan Huggins ed.,
1986) (noting the duality that is part of being Black in the United States has been addressed
by a number of black scholars); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and the River: Peda-
gogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2239 (1992); Judy Scales-Trent,
Black Women and the Constitution: Finding our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989) (discussing the special isolation of Black women). On the inter-
national level, this duality is multiplied.
25. See Ian Brownlie, The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for
the Law of Nations, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (Hedley Bull & Adam
Watson eds., 1984) (noting that in the immediate post-colonial era, European ideas of na-
tionhood and self-determination were adopted and eventually resulted in statehood for for-
mer colonies, as opposed to restoration of the status quo ante); see also BASIL DAVIDSON,
THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF THE NATION STATE 111-116, 197-
209 (1993) (describing the tendency of nationalist leaders, who absorbed and implemented
policies in the wave of decolonization in the fifties and sixties, to discard most indigenous
political formations); Mutua, supra note 5, at 519-523 (noting the arbitrary division of Af-
rica by European powers and the resilience of colonial boundaries as one of the few suc-
cessful undertakings of the post-colonial state).
26. The entire notion of conservatorship assumes that the incompetent must be cared
for, educated, and taught the proper manner in which to conduct their affairs.
27. See James Boyle, Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the
Prison-house of Language, 26 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 327 (1985); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The




This article urges that we not repeat the past by reviving colonialism but instead
challenge and attempt to modify our assumptions, biases, and the presumption that
we know what is best for others. Furthermore, we must modify the belief that our
ideas and means of social organization are the only true legitimate forms.2 There
may be various ways to perceive a particular situation. Some views are roundly
dismissed, however, and we often ignore or dismiss those we believe to be differ-
ent and, by implication, inferior. These alternative accounts should be part, if not
at the center, of the discussion on how to define and address the problem of disin-
tegrating states. This article proposes that the models ultimately utilized include
and respect diverse cultures and ideas. This approach disqualifies trusteeship,
which beckons us to ultimately return to a racist tradition that found "others" infe-
rior. It implores that we adopt international law and institutions to accommodate
and respect these differences.'
Part I explores the hypothesis of" failed" or "collapsed" states and the imagery
these terms invoke. It also examines some of the difficulties African states are ex-
periencing at this particular historical juncture and the extent to which these adver-
sities should be characterized as state "failure." Part II turns to contemporary pro-
posals to utilize the trusteeship model and other forms of colonialism, as a solution
to the problem of failed states. Part I examines international law and the colonial
enterprise; the evolution toward varying degrees of international supervision, in-
cluding how the U.N. trusteeship system functioned during its zenith and the de-
colonization/development discourse. It demonstrates that the underlying sub-
context for all of these systems was a belief in racial and cultural inferiority and
that these systems where supported and justified by a framework of international
law, which rested upon similar assumptions." Part IV critically appraises the use
of the trusteeship model in contemporary international discourse, in light of its
historical antecedents. It utilizes Critical Race Theory to assess the underlying as-
28. It is not simplistically suggested that the West is a monolithic whole, nor that eve-
rything it brings to the discourse is faulty, worthless, or erroneous. Nor am I suggesting
some romantic idealized view of indigenous peoples, cultures, or political formations. Cul-
tures are complex social constructs that change over time for a variety of reasons. Indeed, as
Said notes, "the history of all cultures is the history of cultural borrowing; cultures are not
impermeable." SAID, supra note 23, at 217. For example, just as Western science borrowed
from the Arabs, the Arabs had borrowed from India and Greece. "Culture is never just a
matter of ownership, of borrowing and lending with absolute debtors and creditors, but
rather of appropriations, common experiences and interdependencies of all kinds among
different cultures." Md
29. International law operates in a cultural context, yet under a guise of neutrality.
Some critical race theorists have examined this phenomena in the domestic context. The
challenge here is to expose and then deconstruct international law's supposed neutrality. It
is grounded in the Western liberal tradition and proceeds from that framework
30. See Anthony Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International
Law (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author)(maintaining that international
law was created because of the issues generated by Spain's encounter with the Indians).
Thus, the very roots of international lawv are mired in the heritage of colonialism.
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sumptions that often accompany views of "the other."'" It investigates why we
might be tempted to turn to colonialism when determining how to approach the
problem of failing states in Africa and in examining the continuing pervasiveness
of racism underlying contemporary calls to reinstate trusteeship. It will consider
the confidence in the superiority of Western culture and its institutional structures,
which support the belief that these structures are the only acceptable models for all
peoples, thereby validating Western modes of governance and assistance as the
only acceptable approaches to these problems.
Finally, Part V will utilize critical theory to begin to germinate fresh approaches
to assistance. It will contemplate how the international community might assist
peoples in determining their future, while simultaneously avoiding high imperial-
ism.32 It will focus on an alternative approach to the crisis of disintegrating states,
which involves making space for, listening to, and hearing the voices of the people
actually affected by the decisions being made. Part V will recommend that these
human beings become active participants and the actual decision-makers in this
process.33 Moreover, it will argue for solutions firmly grounded in the culture, be-
liefs, and systems of the people we are seeking to help, solutions which are firmly
anchored in their "imagined communities,"34 not ours.
31. See Vale, supra note 3, at 288 (noting that Critical analysis has the potential to as-
sist us in "reconceptualizing the nature of international society and the structures support-
ing it"). Professor Vale also explains that "the structures which dominate our lives are only
as permanent as we make them." See id. An example in the present context might be revis-
iting the entire concept of the state if state structures are no longer relevant to the populace
living under those formations.
32. See SAID, supra note 23, at 166-8. High imperialism might be defined as a pro-
nouncement "on the reality of native peoples as from an invisible point of sub-objective
perception that displaces indigenous points of view. It insists on its scientific disinterested-
ness and on the steady improvement in the condition, character, and custom of primitives as
a result of their contact with European civilization." Id.
33. "Peoples" as the central actors in the dialogue, in and of itself, may be at variance
with the international system. Professor Richardson has called for a more people-centered
focus on the part of the international system. He notes:
Doubtless the "failed states" labels and proposals can be seen as a cry for something to be done.
But the invocation of such labels and the content of"failed states" proposals only reinforce the
same state-centric deficiencies reflected in present international law, including theU.N. Charter,
reflect the prejudices that now accompany post-Cold war nationalism, and ignore the comprehen-
sive imperative for international law to effectively protect the rights of peoples and other non-
government people-representative entities in the global tide of interdependence and communica-
tions simultaneity.
Richardson, supra note 1 at 11 (citing W. Michael Reisman, International Law After the
Cold War, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 859 (1990)); Vale, supra note 3, at 290; Maivan Clech Lam,
Making Room for Peoples at the U.N.: Thoughts Provoked by Indigenous Claims to Self-
Determination, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 603, 605, 621 (1992).
34. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMuNrriis 6 (rev. ed. 1991).
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II. DISINTEGRATING STATES: THE PROBLE 3 s
A. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Our discussion proceeds from the premise of the existence and legitimacy of the
state. The assumption is that the state is a division of territories and populations
into political jurisdictions that determine the identity, order, and authority within
their boundaries' Yet, as one commentator has noted, "[t]he state as analytical
quarry is an elusive and complex prey."3 Numerous definitions have been put
forth and a number of critical elements identified?8 The seeds of the modem state,
however, can be found in fifteenth-century Europe, 9 and its traits have evolved to
include territory, population, sovereignty, power, law, nationhood, and the ability
to act intemationally.
The state is the "authoritative political institution," 4t which possesses sover-
eignty over a defined territory.42 Sovereignty has both internal and external dimen-
35. A discussion of this topic can also be found in Gordon, supra note 1, at 306-11.
36. See Zartman, supra note 2, at 2.
37. See CRAWFORD YOUNG, THE AFRICAN COLONIAL STATE IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 13 (1994).
38. See Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1993, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097,
3100, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention] (prescribing four qualifi-
cations for statehood: "a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government;
and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states").
39. See YOUNG, supra note 37, at 15. It spread to the rest of the world over the next
four centuries through the globalization of imperialism and the responses to it. See id States
that escaped colonialism had to adopt European images and ideologies of the state in order
to survive. Europe's stance at the center of contemporary theorists and philosophies on the
state also accounts for the virtual eclipse of alternative visions of the state, which evolved
over the last six thousand years. See id at 14-16. Thus, although other intellectual traditions
contain a rich body of theory on the state, all the main theories lead to Britain, the United
States, France, Germany and Sweden. See id.
40. See YOUNG, THE AFmCAAN COLONiAL STATE, supra note 37, at 25-35. Professor
Young's discussion of these attributes not only illustrates their evolution, but also demon-
strates how recent the very idea of the nation-state is. For example, with respect to territory,
he notes that while states have alvays had "spatial dimensions," their demarcation vwas
fluid and only well-defined at the center, territory often fluctuated at the periphery. See Id
at 26. Only in the twentieth century were defined boundaries universally imposed over most
of the globe. See id at 26-27. Moreover, the concept of"nation" is a recent addition to the
idea of the state, although it is now universally absorbed into the doctrine of the state. See
id at 32. Nationhood began to emerge at the time of the French revolution, which combined
such concepts as popular sovereignty, and "an organic view of the human collectivity con-
stituted by common culture and language." Id Today, of course, the reasoning flows in re-
verse. Once a population is under the authority of a particular state, whose territory is sacro-
sanct, it is necessarily unified even if there is no common cultural identity. See Id
41. See Zartman, supra note 2, at 5.
42. See id at 5. This definition centers on three functions: the state as the sovereign
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sions. Internally, it gives the state dominion over its citizens. Externally, the state
is an international legal person that is formally equal to every other state4 and has
the capacity to engage in international relations." In this latter international sphere,
the international community has not recognized state failure,4" and indeed, many
states deemed failures by commentators perform governmental functions vis-a-vis
the outside world."' Rather, the problem seems to be in the internal sphere, where
collapse means that the basic functions of the state vis-a-vis its populace are no
longer performed.47
Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner describe failed nation-states; 4" Robert Kaplan
warns of a coming anarchy;49 Robert Jackson maintains that in many sub-Saharan
African nations, statehood exists only in legal terms or what should be character-
ized as juridical statehood;"0 Jon Sylvester describes a widespread deterioration of
conditions in specific countries and regions;"' and I. William Zartman refers to a
phenomenon where the structure, authority, law, and political order have fallen
apart.5 2 Various authors have described state collapse in Liberia, Somalia, Mozam-
bique, and Ethiopia, 3 and the risk of collapse in at least a dozen other states. 
4
authority-the accepted source of identity and in the arena of politics; the state as an insti-
tution and thus a tangible organization of decisionmaking and an intangible symbol of
identity; and the state as the security guarantor for a populated territory. Because these
functions are so intertwined, it becomes difficult to perform them separately. A weakening
of one function drags the others. See id.
43. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, sec. 1; YOUNG, THE AFRIcAN COLONIAL STATE, supra
note 37, at 28. Professor Young notes that the this formal equality of states may explain
why it has found such "universal and enthusiastic acceptance." See id. This immediately
vested newly independent states with international standing and "an authority, supreme by
virtue of its power." See id. at 29. This is also the aspect of juridical statehood that Profes-
sor Jackson discusses. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
44. See Montevideo Convention, supra note 38, art. 1.
45. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 336.
46. See Maxwell Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding, and Serving
Palm Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 167 (1997). The State continues to determine is-
sues of naturalization, raise and maintain a standing army, regulate external trade and tar-
iffs, license and control foreign investment and immigration, levy and collect taxes on
trades and manufactures, regulate money supply and credit, and enter into foreign or inter-
national agreements, treaties, and conventions with foreign governments, institutions, indi-
viduals, and international bodies.
47. See Zartman, supra note 2, at 5.
48. See Helman & Ratner, supra note 1, at 3.
49. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 44.
50. See Robert Jackson, Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa, 46 J. INT'L
AFFAIRs 1 (1992).
51. See Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1301, 1305-12.
52. See Zartman, supra note 2, at 1.
53. See Barry Schutz, The Heritage of Revolution and the Struggle for Governmental
Legitimacy in Mozambique, in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 1, 109-110 (noting Mozam-
bique is alleged to suffer from a lack of internal legitimacy). Although the international
community recognizes the government, the citizens of the state do not. See id. Schutz be-
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The common theme involves overwhelmed governments that are almost, if not
completely, unable to discharge basic governmental functions. The state is judged
unable to perform six crucial functions of statehood:
[To] exercise sovereign control over territory; have sovereign oversight and su-
pervision of the nation's resources; exercise the effective and rational collection
of revenue; maintain adequate national infrastructure, such as roads and telephone
systems; [and] have the capacity to govern and maintain law and order.P
As the decision-making center of government, the state is paralyzed and inop-
erative; laws are not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not en-
hanced. As a symbol of identity, it has lost its power of conferring a name on its
people and a meaning to their social action.5" State territory, is no longer assured
security by a central sovereign organization."
One commentator asserts that mounting evidence suggests that the African
post-colonial state may soon disappear and that its implosion is progressing stead-
ily. 8 He notes, "In virtually every statistical category, the state is in a downward
spiral. Corrupt and dictatorial elites, unbridled militaries, ethnic tensions and eco-
nomic misery have arrested---and in many cases reversed-almost all positive de-
velopment" 59
lieves this lack of legitimacy stems partially from a lack of civil society, rising crime, and
an incompetent bureaucracy bogged down in red tape. See id at 113, 122. Libarian society
has been shattered by civil war. See Martin Lowenkopf, Liberia: Putting the State Back To-
gether, in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 1, at 91. The "nation [is] fragmented, the popula-
tion dispersed, and the economy ruined." Id After President Tolbert was deposed, his suc-
cessor Samuel Doe ruled the state in a manner that introduced and then exacerbated inter-
ethnic rivalry. See id at 99. It is maintained that Ethiopia failed to address the "national
question," and, instead, tried to downplay ethnicity. See Edmond Keller, Remaking the
Ethiopian State, in COuLAPSED STATES, supra note I, at 125, 128, 130. Later attempts to
reorganize the regions were unsuccessful. See id. at 130-31. A major drought and later a
coup further weakened the state. See id. at 131.
54. See Mutua, supra note 5, at 507.
55. See Dr. Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Afrlca: A Moral and Legal In-
quiry, 16 MIC J. INT'L L. 1113, 1144 (1995) (citing Ali Mazrui, African State as a Politi-
cal Refugee: Institutional Collapse and Human Displacement, INT"L J. REFUGEE L. 21, 23
(Special Issue 1995)).
56. See Zartman, supra note 2, at 5.
57. See id at 6 (describing civil society as the social, economic, and political groupings
that "structure the demographic tissue"). It is distinct and independent of the state but po-
tentially under its control and performs demand and support functions that influence, le-
gitimize, andfor replace the state.. See id Whether pervasive state collapse occurs because
the state as the authoritative political institution collapses or because the society beneath it
has become incapable of providing the supports and demands the state needs, is difficult to
determine. See id Societal collapse is the extended breakdown of social coherence and
maintenance. See id
58. See id. at 506.
59. See id
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An even more dire view depicts rampant demographic, environmental, and so-
cietal stress in which criminal anarchy thrives.' This journalist predicts an implo-
sion of the underdeveloped world that will entail the break-down of the nation-
state, governments unable to provide such elementary services as policing, and an
increasing inability to control national territory.6'
B. WHY DISINTEGRATION
Various theories have been postulated regarding the cause of state collapse,
some more complex than others. Disintegration has been attributed to prolonged
civil strife, 2 which has disrupted essential governmental services, destroyed food
supplies and distribution networks, and brought economies to a standstill.' Two
cases of apparent central government collapse are found in Somalia' and Liberia. 5
60. Kaplan writes:
Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the In-
creasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private ar-
mies, security firms and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a
West African prism.
Kaplan, supra note 1, at 46. Kaplan believes this scenario may portend what is in store for
much of the developing world. See id.
61. See id. at 46. This view has been criticized as perhaps too apocalyptic. See
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, Black-Power Dream Barbie, THE ROOSTER'S EG : ON TE
PERSISTENCE OF PREJUDICE 182, 203-08 (1995); Mutua, supra note 55, at 1115 n. 10 (char-
acterizing Kaplan's article as being written "in an idiom so revolting that it is searing in its
absolute pessimism."); Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1323-25 (noting that Kaplan "writes off
Africa").
62. See Zartman, supra note 2, at 7 (explaining that the origins of state collapse may
also be found in some cases of state tyranny). The state may be so tyrannical that it results
in a rebellion where the opposition is unable to fill the vacuum.. Prior to its collapse, the
state may be very effective in destroying the regulative and regenerative capacities of soci-
ety through repression and neglect. See id. As the collapsing state implodes, it saps the vital
functions of society resulting not only in the disintegration of the governmental super-
structure, but also the societal infrastructure. See id.
63. See Helman & Ratner, supra note 1, at 4-5. Powerful insurgencies in a number of
states, including Liberia and Somalia, led to the described devastation. This devastation was
compounded by natural disasters in several states including Somalia and Sudan. See id. at 5.
64. See Hussein M. Adam, Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?, In COLLAPSED
STATES, supra note 1, at 69, 71. Adam lists internal factors which contributed to Somalia's
collapse including: personal rule (Siyad Barre's rule evolved from scientific socialism
(1970-1977), to autocracy (1978-1986), and finally to tyrant (1987-1991), which damaged
and distorted state-civil relations); military rule (the size of the Somali army increased from
3,000 men soon after independence to 120,000 and was characterized as repressive); "clan-
klatura" (which entailed appointing trusted clansmen to positions of power and control);
"nomenklatura" which resulted in appointing loyal political agents to control state institu-
tions; the replacement of class rule by clan rule which encouraged regionalism and separa-
tism and poisoned clan relations; state-sponsored terror; and a neo-fascist campaign against
the north designed to punish the region for opposition to Barre's regime. See id. at 72-73.
External factors contributing to Somalia's collapse included military, technical, and finan-
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Rwanda presents a deadly variation of the civil war scenario where ethnic rivalries
and tensions led to genocide and chaos in its aftermath.' Thus Rwanda, where
massive genocide took place, is often cited as a collapsed state and Burundi is
viewed as being at risk for collapse.'
Professor Sylvesters maintains that widespread poverty,69 a heavy dependence
cial foreign assistance from the USSR, armaments, and economic aid provided by the
United States. See id at 75.
65. See Lowenkopf, supra note 53, at 91. After 1990, Liberian President Samuel Doe
consolidated power in his hands for the benefit of his ethnic group and alienated the rest of
the country. Other groups arose to grasp for power as it fell from Doe to Taylor. See id.
More than 20,000 people have died and over half of the population of 2.5 million has been
displaced since the beginning of the civil war in December 1989. See id. at 92. "Not only is
'the state as a legitimate functioning order' absent, but society in general has been shattered,
the nation fragmented, the population dispersed, and the economy ruined." Id. at 91.
66. See Donatella Lorch, Rwanda Forces Shell Stadium Full of Refigees, N.Y. TIEs,
Apr. 20, 1994, at A8 (explaining 400,000 Kigali residents were displaced within 12 days of
fighting); Julia Preston & Thomas IV. Lippmann, Refugee Flood Overwhelms Relief Ef-
forts; U.N. Appeals for Supplies to Aid 2 Million Refugees, WASH. PoST, July 21, 1994, at
Al (noting U.N. estimates that of a total Rwandan population of 7.8 million, approximately
500,000 people were killed in ethnic massacres, 2.6 million were displaced within Rwanda,
and another 2.6 million fled to Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi); Julia Preston, Rwandans
Confound U.N. Security Council; Humanitarian Impulse as Mission Impossible, VASH.
PosT, May 8, 1994, at A25 (reporting U.N. estimates of a three-week death toll near
200,000 and describing civilian murders as organized, government-led vendettas); UNICEF
Tending to the Children Who Survived War in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1994, at A6
(explaining United Nations Children's Fund estimates of 250,000 children killed and more
than 150,000 orphaned).
67. See Burundi-Edging Nearer Genocide, JANE'S INTELLINCE RE vI-POINRM,
May 1, 1995, at 8; see also Nomi Morris with Luke Fisher, Burundi on the Brink,
MAcLEAN's, Feb. 12, 1996 (noting that U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright on returning
from a visit to Burundi claimed that the country is "on the verge of national suicide");
Ogata Arrives in Burundi on Mission to Prevent Bloodbath, Agence France Presse, Jan. 7,
1996 (A Burundian journalist commented that "if we are not careful, our country risks col-
lapsing").
68. See Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1299-1305. Professor Sylvester traveled through
parts of East and West Africa, while he was a Fulbright Teaching Scholar.
69. See Tandeka Nkiwane Muzenda, The Role of Social and Economic Factors and
Natural Disasters in Forced Population Displacements in Africa, INL'L J. REFuGEE L. 46,
48 (Special Issue 1995). Muzenda maintains that poverty levels have dramatically mounted
in Africa with "ever-swelling numbers of people caught in a widening spiral of destitution,
unemployment and distress. This pervasive sense of injustice and distress threatens the very
social fabric of African societies." Id.
An estimated two-thirds of Africa's population lives below the poverty line. "[Thirty]
of the poorest 40 countries in the world are in Africa. Exclude South Africa and the gross
domestic product of sub-Saharan Africa, with a population of over 600 million, is roughly
equal to that of tiny Belgium, with a population of about 10 million." Makau va Mutua,
The Interaction Between Human Rights, Democracy and Governance and the Displacement
of Populations, INT'L J. REFuGEE L., 37, 37-38 (Special Issue 1995). "African countries
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on foreign aid,7" and stalled national economies7 have resulted in some sub-
Saharan economies being unable to furnish their populations with a rudimentary
standard of living in such fundamental areas as nutrition,' housing," medical
care,74 and education.7" Failing economies almost inevitably lead to failing gov-
ernments, according to Sylvester.76 Moreover, there is also a general lack of public
account for only [two] per cent of world trade. [Moreover], Africa's external debt rose from
$56 billion in 1980 to $143 billion in 1989." Id.; see also Victoria Brittain, African Debt
Payments 'Imperil 21M Children', TBE GuARDIAN, Feb. 20, 1996, at 16, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws File (noting that "[b]y the end of the decade more than half
the population of Africa-300 million people-will be living in poverty. Only half the
population has the most basic of health care, and less than 50 per cent of the children com-
plete primary school-and in contrast to other developing regions, these basic indicators are
worsening.").
70. See Africa-Development: The "If-the-Donors" Syndrome, Inter Press Service, April
10, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws File (describing sub-Saharan Africa's
receipt of the most official development aid of all the regions in the developing world,
amounting to $16.4 billion in 1993); Edward V.K. Jaycox, Sub-Saharan Africa: Develop-
ment Performance and Prospects, 46 J. INT'L Arr. 81, 83, 85 (1992) (noting that while Af-
rica has been continually losing its market share to other developing regions, development
assistance to sub-Saharan Africa is now three times as great as that to other low- and mid-
dle-income countries); Tony Hawkins, Opinion- Weaning Africa Off Aid, REUTER EUR.
Bus. REP., Apr. 29, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws File (explaining that
while Sub-Saharan Africa receives 36% of the global aid budget, the nations most depend-
ent on development assistance in sub-Saharan Africa are Mozambique with aid constituting
88% of the GNP, Somalia with aid as 85% of the GNP, 38% in Tanzania, and in Rwanda,
36%); Ahmad Mardini, Development-UNDP: Fund for Fight Against Poverty in Arab
World, Inter Press Service, Mar. 14, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws File
(explaining that 60% of UNDP resources go to the states the U.N. describes as least devel-
oped, including sub-Saharan Africa).
71. See Angeline Oyog, Development-Debt: Burden Heaviest on Sub-Saharan Africa,
Inter Press Service, March 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws File (" Ex-
cept for sub-Saharan Africa, the [World] Bank noted that all other regions have recorded
growths in export earnings that kept pace with the increase in their foreign debts. In its
World Debt Tables. . . , the World Bank said that 33 out of the 40 countries classified as
heavily indebted are in sub-Saharan Africa. The total debt stock of the region rose by five
per cent, or to $223 billion in 1995.").
72. See Human Development Report 1994, U.N. Development Programme 27, 29
(1994).
73. See Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1318.
74. See WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 2, at 838-40 (noting that cumulative reported
AIDS cases at midyear 1995 were estimated at 418,051 cases in Africa, whereas the esti-
mate world-wide was 1,169,811 cases; and reporting the estimated total HIV cases at mid-
year 1995 for sub-Saharan Africa were at more than 11,000,000 cases whereas the estimate
world-wide was more than 18,500,000 cases).
75. See Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1311; see also Federico Mayor et al., Education:
The Best Investment, INr'L HERALD T'muNE, May 11, 1996 (describing education in sub-
Saharan Africa where secondary education is available to only 17% of the children and
"$2.5 billion is needed annually to provide universal primary education.").
76. See Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1311.
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confidence that any of these problems will be dealt with effectively. " The conti-
nent has also faced natural disasters such as drought, floods, famine, AIDS, and
rampant and unsustainable population growth?8 Yet these obstacles are not new,
and "disengagement from the state by the citizenry at large" I has been a topic of
discussion for quite some time.8" Clearly, more is at issue here.8
Other theories rely on more elusive, and perhaps more questionable, rationales.
Zartman maintains that state collapse in Africa has actually occurred in two
waves.' The first came toward the end of the second decade of independence
when the regimes that replaced the original nationalist generation were overthrown
and entire state structures were destroyed in the process.' The second surge began
a decade later and continues today. Collapses in this second wave are characterized
77. See id at 1307; see also Mutua, supra note 55, at 1165 (noting that the inability of
the post-colonial state to serve its citizens has diminished its sovereignty in the eyes of its
populace. Social and ethnic groups are beginning to question why loyalty should be owed
to bankrupt, abusive, and illegitimate entities). People are aware that the government is in-
capable of assisting them. This is evidenced by the lack of any safety net. Sylvester, supra
note 1, at 1302 n.6; see also Thomas & Mazrui, supra note 12, at 161. Some of the eco-
nomic difficulties African states are experiencing may be rooted in their colonial inheri-
tance. For example, the focus on exporting primary commodities left emerging African na-
tions with a narrow resource base that has made them vulnerable to plummeting commodity
prices. O'Brien, supra note 12, at 121. Most countries were encouraged by development
organizations to continue to support and expand such exports and were not successful in
expanding this narrow base. See id
78. See Michael Chege, Remembering Africa, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 146, 147 (1992); see
also Donald H. Minkler, The 1993 National Conference on Sustainable Solutions-Popu-
lation, Consumption, and Culture, 21 ENVTL AFF. 271, 273-74 (1994) (describing the ten-
dency for desired family size to decline even in Africa, "where contraceptive prevalence is
still the lowest in the world"); Kenneth J. Bartschi, Legislative Responses to HIVIAIDS in
Africa, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 169, 170-71 (1995) citing CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, GLOBAL HIV/AIDS: A STRATEGY FOR U.S. LEADERSHI 21-22
(1994) (noting that "a family in some of the hardest hit parts of Africa may lose almost
75% of its income because of AIDS" and describing the tendency of young adults to be-
come infected with AIDS, further hindering productivity and economic growth).
79. See Julius E. Nyang'oro, The Evolving Role of the African State Under Structural
Adjustment, in BEYOND STRUCTURMAL ADJUSTMIENT 11, 21 (Julius E. Nyang'oro & Timothy
Shaw eds., 1992).
80. See id
81. See Thomas & Mazrui, supra note 12, at 166. Of course, one major change has
been the demise of the cold war, which has decreased interest in Africa by the major pow-
ers.
82. See Zartman, supra note 2, at 2.
83. See id at 2-3. Zartman cites state collapse in Chad between 1980-82 as a result of
civil war that destroyed all branches of the central government; the fall of Idi Amin Dada in
1979-81, which left a power vacuum; and the lesser case of Ghana in 1979-SO, where the
center lost its control over the countryside, and its ability to perform government functions
even in the cities. See id at 3. These states ultimately rebuilt themselves. See Mutua. supra
note 5, at 267.
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by the overthrow of authoritarian regimes by new forces that destroy, but cannot
replace, the previous government.' In such situations, government functioning and
legitimacy recede. Professor Robert Jackson postulates that the current difficulties
are rooted in the rush toward decolonization, which has resulted in a proliferation
of weak nation-states in Africa and Asia.85 These governments are now barely
functioning. 6 He posits that many Sub-Saharan African states must be termed ju-
ridical states that exist only because of international recognition, rather than their
capacity to govern. 7 As decolonization progressed, statehood was bestowed upon
former colonies without regard to their capacity to govern or to the configuration
of nationalities contained within their borders. 8 The primary objective was to have
African, rather than colonial, rulers. 9 Once in place, the international community
has generally supported the preservation of existing states"° and, by intervening to
prevent any regional dismantling of Sub-Saharan states, has maintained the artifi-
cial boundaries of the colonial period.9'
A related theory that also centers on the decolonization process questions the
nature of the entities created in the wake of decolonization.' Professor Mutua
maintains that Africa was decolonized by the colonial powers rather than by Afri-
cans. Thus, decolonization and the creation of post-colonial states was as imposed
by the West as colonial domination had been.93 Newly independent states were not
84. See Marina Ottaway, Democratization in Collapsed States, in COLLAPSED STATES,
supra note 1, at 235. The ultimate cause may also be mismanagement, abuses, and the pil-
lage of resources by authoritarian regimes that often leaves most of the population without a
stake in the existing system. As long as the authoritarian regime held power, the state held
together, and thus state collapse can result from an authoritarian regime being unable to
continue imposing control.
85. See Jackson, supra note 50, at 4-5.
86. See id. at 5-6.
87. See id. at 2. He believes their governing capacity is severely limited. See id at 7-8.
88. See Jackson, supra note 50, at 2, 4-5. Jackson focuses on states and governments as
being incapable of governing and explores juridical statehood as an obstacle to state build-
ing. See id. at 8-11. He discusses the incompetence of post-colonial governments in gov-
erning.
89. See id. at 4-5. According to Jackson, the international community granted juridical
statehood to former colonies, with colonial elites in leadership positions, and validated
states without regard to their methods of governing. See id. at 5-6.
90. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 336.
91. See Jackson, supra note 50, at 5-8. In general, foreign aid is given to states as long
as the government controls the army, central bank, central government, et cetera. See id. at
8. Thus the government will be recognized as the state although its control may not reach
beyond the capital city. See id.
92. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1116. Professor Mutua does not seem to believe there
was a rush toward decolonization.
93. See id. The post-colonial state was based on the boundaries drawn by the colonial-
ists to preserve order among themselves, without regard to pre-colonial societies. See id. at
1118, 1134-1135. Thus, Mutua believes, as does Jackson, that the juridical state exists to




connected to the indigenous communities that were in place before the advent of
colonialism,' and therefore, the contours of the resulting political entities were
based on arbitrarily drawn colonial constructs.95 According to Professor Mutua, it
is "[t ]he contrived and artificial citizenry of the African state [that] is at the center
of this crisis."' One result of juridical statehood has been to maintain govern-
ments with little connection to their citizens. By assisting current governments, the
international community may be keeping governments in power that do not effec-
tively control the state.'
While the struggle against colonial rule within the confines of the colonial state
created unity among different communities, it may not have been sufficient to
form a national identity once independence was achieved.3 Moreover, the process
of nation building was hampered by an inability to dissolve loyalties to pre-
colonial structures and formations and, more particularly, to ethno-political soci-
ety.' Thus Professor Mutua questions whether African states are nation-states at
all, given that "ethnicity and sub-nationalism have been correctly identified as
some of the most inflammatory elements in nation-building.'
If we define a nation as a "group that shares a common history and identity and
94. See id at 1118-19. Thomas and Mazrui attribute the insecurity of African states in
part to their arbitrary creation. Thomas & Mazrui, supra note 12, at 159. These authors sug-
gest that because these states are not nations, the citizens suffer from an insecurity dilemma.
See id
95. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1114-15, 1134-36; see also IAN BROWvLIE, AFRICAN
BOUNDARIES: A LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 9 (1979) (noting the persistence of
colonial boundaries and that the "political map of Africa in 1914 is not very different"
from the current political map). Independence movements adopted the divisions "of colo-
nial administration as units for self-determination." Id Yet in most instances, African fron-
tiers divided tribes or groups and boundaries were drawn under circumstances that "mili-
tated against reference to tribal or ethnological considerations.... [Rather there was] liberal
resort to straight lines and general features such as drainage basins and watersheds....
[A]ccidents of prior exploration and military penetration were often [used] to determine de-
limitations between [the possessions of] Britain, France, and Germany. See id at 6. Moreo-
ver "lines were commonly drawn on maps at a stage when there was not very great knowl-
edge of the region concerned." Id In only a minority of cases were tribal distributions
considered in the delimitation of frontiers. See id.
96. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1144. It is ironic that the struggle against apartheid
may have forged such a national identity in South Africa and Namibia. See Nyang'oro, su-
pra note 79, at 23.
97. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1160-61.
98. See id at 1144. This also led to authoritarianism in emergent states, which was of-
ten exemplified by ethnic based favoritism for jobs, services, and other state-controlled re-
sources. The new rulers viewed their power as an instrument of personal gain to be shared
with elites from their ethnic group. See id; GEORGE B.N. AyrirEY, INDIGenous AFRICAN
INSTrrIONS xviv, xviii-xx (1991).
99. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1144. Loyalty in most pre-colonial societies was cen-
tered on lineage and tribe.
100. See id at 1144-45.
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is aware of [the fact that its citizens] are a people and not just a population," '
perhaps none of the post-colonial African states emerged as nation-states because
none possessed the element of "nation."' 0 2 Rather, each of the new states con-
tamined more than one nation, and thus the newly designated nation had to be cre-
ated. 3 This lack of national identity, coupled with weak state systems or struc-
tures destroyed in the wake of civil strife, may exacerbate and accelerate state
collapse.
In summary, state disintegration is attributed to the destruction of state struc-
tures by civil war and the destruction of such structures is so extensive that the
emerging power structure finds it difficult, if not impossible to rebuild these bod-
ies. In the absence of widespread and purposeful physical destruction, state col-
lapse is found in weak states that cannot provide for the basic needs of their citi-
zens and, thus, gradually become irrelevant and useless to the citizenry. The debate
is whether this state of events is rooted in an authoritarianism that is no longer able
to function, a disconnection or lack of a "nation" within these nation-states, or
simply an unpreparedness or inability to govern."
101. See id. at 1145 (quoting Art Hansen, African Refugees: Defining and Defending
Their Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA (Ronald Cohen et al.,
eds., 1993)). Benedict Anderson defines the nation as:
[A]n imagined political community--and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is
imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members.... It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which En-
lightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical
dynastic realm.... [I]t is imagined as a community, because ... the nation is always conceived as
a deep, horizontal comradeship.
Anderson, supra note 34, at 6-7.
Hobsbawrn, on the other hand, postulates that it is impossible to define "nation." See E.
J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 PROGRAMME, MYTH, REALrry 5-7
(1990). He notes that "the nation" is a recent newcomer in human history. Id. at 5.
Attempts to establish criteria for nationhood... [include] criteria such as language or ethnicity or
a combination of criteria such as language, common territory, common history, cultural traits or
whatever else.... [But] objective definitions have failed ... [because] exceptions can always be
found. Either cases corresponding to the definition are patently not (or not yety'nations" or pos-
sessed of national aspirations, or undoubted" nations" do not correspond to the criterion or com-
bination of criteria. How indeed could it be otherwise, given that we are trying to fit historically
novel, emerging, changing and, even today, far from universal entities into a framework of per-
manence and universality?
Id. at 5-6.
102. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1145-46 (quoting Art Hansen, African Refugees: De-
fining and Defending Their Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA
(Ronald Cohen et al., eds., 1993)).
103. See id. This effort may have failed.
104. See Chibundu, supra note 46 (questioning how and whether this differs from other
temporary difficulties in various European historical periods). This is a complex question
whose answer is beyond the scope of this article.
[12:6
SAVING FAILED STATES
I. TRUSTEESHIP: THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
Several writers have advocated various forms of recolonization as a solution to
the disintegrating state problem. The most detailed proposal is by Helman and
Ratner who recommend conservatorship as the conceptual paradigm for U.N. as-
sistance"°5 and suggest direct U.N. trusteeship when there is a total breakdown of
governmental authority. They find the theoretical basis for conservatorship in the
domestic analogue of the polity helping those who are utterly incapable of func-
tioning on their own, thereby necessitating a legal regime where the community
itself manages the affairs of the victim.' The authors see a parallel incapacity in
the international system and believe the U.N., as the polity, should consider a
similar response to the plight of failed states. Their proposal would resurrect the
old trusteeship system and apply it to states, a solution the authors admit is cur-
rently precluded under the Charter."07 States would voluntarily relinquish control
105. See Helman & Ratner, supra note 1, at 13 (proposing three models: governance
assistance, the delegation of governmental authority to the U.N., and direct U.N. trustee-
ship). Governance assistance assumes that a government that maintains some control over
the instruments of the state still exists. Examples include Georgia, Zaire, and possibly a
handful of states in Africa and Asia. See id Governance assistance builds on existing tech-
nical assistance, but would be far more expansive. U.N. personnel would help administer
the state, but final governmental authority would remain with the government. The U.N.
might require economic changes, modify political structures and processes, and foster
democratic institutions by drafting constitutions, organizing free elections, or strengthening
civic institutions such as political parties and judicial systems. See id at 14. Thus even at
the least intrusive level, Helman and Ratner contemplate numerous measures to remake
these entities in our image. Jeffrey Herbst offers a variation on this theme. See Jeffrey
Herbst, Challenges to Africa's Boundaries in the New World Order, 46 J. INtr'L AFF. 17
(1992) (noting that the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and bilateral donors have
and will continue to play an important role in economic decisions, and therefore will and
should condition aid on political changes and other reforms). Micro-management should be
expanded. See id The delegation of governmental authority to the U.N. allows it to make
governmental decisions. In Cambodia, for example, governmental authority was delegated
by warring factions that exercised final authority, provided they could agree. Helman &
Ratner, supra note 1, at 14-15.
106. See Helman & Ratner, supra note 1, at 12. For an explanation of the analogy of in-
ternational mandate and trust systems with domestic trusts in British and American law, see
International Status of South Vest Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 148-50 (separate opinion of Sir
Arnold McNair) (explaining that "[n]early every legal system possesses some institution
whereby the property (and sometimes the person) of those who are not sui juris, such as a
minor or lunatic, can be entrusted to some responsible person as a trustee."); see also
AARON M. MARGAL1TH, THE INIMNATIONAL MANtDATES 42-44 (1930).
107. See U.N. CHARTER art. 77. The trusteeship system applied to territories currently
held under Mandates, territories detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World
War, and territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their ad-
ministration. The inapplicability of the Trusteeship system to original or subsequent Mem-
bers of the U.N. is made explicit in Article 78. See U.N. CHARTER art. 78. The authors rec-
ommend amending the Charter. Helman & Ratner, supra note I, at 17. For a full discussion
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over their internal and external affairs for a defined period." 3 Local authorities
would turn over their powers to the U.N. and follow its orders. Thus, the U.N., or a
group of states, would act as the administering authority."° Once it is determined
that particular states have "failed," these states would be deemed victims and in-
capable of managing their own affairs in much the same way we view children as
being incapable of managing their own affairs. The international community
would then be designated to act on their behalf.
According to Helman and Ratner, conservatorship logically follows historic
U.N. efforts in Non-Self-Governing Territories and the tradition of conditioning
aid and credits on certain behavior."0 They maintain that fully independent states
might require protection and oversight and, thus, trusteeship should no longer be
limited to territories that are not fully independent."'
Historian Paul Johnson" 2 notes the past benefits of colonialism, the mistake of
eradicating it quickly, and the current breakdown of normal government in several
African states." 3 He believes the Security Council should commit a territory in
which government authority has irretrievably broken down to one or more states
empowered to impose order by force and assume political functions; trustees
would possess such powers." 4 The mandate would be of limited duration but
should last until there is effective self-government, which could take up to one
hundred years."5 These trusts would be subject to supervision by the Security
of the inapplicability of the trusteeship system to Members of the United Nations, see
Gordon, supra note 1, at 311.
108. See Helman & Ratner, supra note 1, at 16. Helman & Ratner believe that no state
should be the unwilling object of the trusteeship system and that states would voluntarily
relinquish authority. The U.N. and the affected state would negotiate a trusteeship agree-
ment, which would contain the essential elements upon which state authorities would agree.
See id. at 16-17. On the doubtful legality of this proposition, see Gordon, supra note 1, at
324.
109. See Helman & Ratner, supra note 1, at 16-17. The Security Council is suggested as
the most efficient organ available, but given its limited experience with economic and social
matters, a subgroup might be established in the UN Secretariat to oversee each conservator-
ship. See id.
110. Seeid. at 12.
11l. The authors assert that extending this system to independent states would promote
central Charter values such as human rights and stability in international relations. Moreo-
ver, the Charter entrusts the U.N. with achieving international cooperation in solving inter-
national problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character and in pro-
moting and encouraging respect for human rights. They believe conservatorship would
fulfill these goals. See id. at 12.
112. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 22. Johnson does not address the legal problems his
proposals would entail and primarily focuses on reversing conventional political wisdom.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 22. Johnson maintains that the ultimate objective would be to take con-
stitutional measures to insure a return to effective self-government. He believes that the
mistakes of the 1960s should not be repeated. Trustees should not plan to withdraw until




Johnson concludes that the West must abandon the conventional wisdom that
all peoples are ready for independence since some states are simply not fit to gov-
ern themselves. He believes their "continued existence and the violence and deg-
radation they breed is a threat to the stability of their neighbors and an affront to
our consciences.""' 6 Johnson sees a moral issue that "the civilized world has a
mission to go to these desperate places and govern." n1 A variation on this theme is
a supposedly benign form of colonialism under the auspices of former colonial
powers." s
Finally, it has been suggested that larger African states, the Organization of Af-
rican Unity, or a group of African states might act as the trustee for a collapsed
state."9 Behind this proposal is the belief that by utilizing African or Asian trus-
tees, the system would be less Western and presumably more in the interests of the
new trust tenitories. 20
The next section demonstrates, however, that colonialism in all of its guises
rested on notions of paternalism and a presumption of racial and cultural superior-
ity on the part of the colonizers. Moreover, colonialism was built upon views of a
116. See icL
117. Johnson, supra note 1, at 22. I must agree with Professor Sylvester on the deroga-
tory tone of this article. It is written in such disparaging terms, with respect to people of
color and especially African people, that one wonders if the intent was to shock. See
Sylvester, supra note 1. Yet it was initially published in a highly respected newspaper, the
NEw YoRK TIMES, and was apparently meant to be a serious piece. Moreover, given the
proliferation of proposals to bring back colonialism, presumably it has been taken seriously.
118. SeePfaff supranote 1, at5.
119. See Ali Mazrui, The African State as a Political Refugee: Institutional Collapse
and Human Displacement, INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 21, 34-36 (Special Issue 1995). Mazrui
suggests several solutions to state failure and political collapse. One is "unilateral interven-
tion by a single neighboring power in order to restore order." I at 34. He also suggests
unilateral intervention "with the blessing of a regional organization." Id. Another possible
solution is self-colonization where segments of Africa colonize and annex other portions of
Africa. See id Mazrui also proposes regional integration, the establishment of an African
Security Council, and the establishment of a Pan-African Emergency Force to handle crises.
See id at 35. In The Message of Rwanda, supra note 1, at 19 Mazrui contends:
[W]hat I propose as a longer-term solution to the problems exposed by today's crises is the estab-
lishment of an African Security Council composed of five pivotal regional states, or potential
pivot states, that would oversee the continent. This Council would have a Pan African Emergency
Force, an army for intervention and peacekeeping, at its disposal. And there would also be an Af-
rican High Commissioner for Refugees linked to the UN High Commission.
Id The five states proposed as anchors are: Egypt (in the north), South Africa (in the
south), Nigeria (in West Africa), Ethiopia or Kenya (in East Africa), and Zaire (in Central
Africa).
120. See Ali Mazrui, The Bondage of Boundaries: WhyV Africa's Maps Will Be Redrman,
ECONOMusT, Sept. 11, 1993, at 28. Mazrui states, "a future trusteeship system will be more
genuinely international and less [WVestem than it was under the old guise. Administering
powers for the trusteeship territories could come from Africa and Asia, as well as from the
rest of the membership of the U.N."
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separate and distinct "other" that was viewed as being incompetent and, thus,
subject to rule by those who were superior. These views also underlie current pro-
posals to bring back colonialism.'' One must ask why a system that has been
deemed odious in the modem era is presently viewed as conceivably appropriate
for some communities. Notions of cultural and racial superiority are tied up in the
West's view of "the other," which have always undergirded colonialism however
it has been constituted, and underlies any new colonial paradigm.
When commentators currently advocate trusteeship, they essentially consider
what has been at the heart of the trusteeship system: how to bring "backwards"
people to self-government.' This assumption is inherent in the very idea of con-
servatorship, which applies to those the law deems unable and incapable of caring
for themselves, such as infants and the mentally ill." This goal is implicit in the
very language utilized. Terms such as "incompetence," "incapable," "not fit to
govern," and "the duty of the civilized world to govern" abound.
Can such a system be rehabilitated to apply to states where central authority has
deteriorated, and more importantly, should it be? Can the inherent inequality in-
volved in one party deciding the proper course for the well being of another party
be ameliorated by the international community as a whole (through the U.N.) un-
dertaking the role formerly assumed by States?' In other words, can any form of
colonialism truly be benign, rather than paternalistic and exploitative? Clearly we
have come full circle, warranting a closer examination and analysis of a system
most were overjoyed to discard,' but a system which has, nonetheless, become a
model a number of scholars are arguing should be resuscitated.
IV. INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION THROUGH TRUSTEESHIP
This Part will demonstrate that trusteeship was rooted in colonialism and al-
121. It explains why a dialogue that asserts the desirability of bringing back one of the
most undemocratic systems to ever dominate the face of the earth can co-exist with a paral-
lel dialogue asserting an emerging right to democratic governance. See Thomas Franck, The
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992); Gregory H. Fox
& Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 69 (1995); Lois E. Fielding,
Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: The Emerging Right of
Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 329 (1995).
122. Some commentators explicitly support this idea. See Pfaff, supra note I, at 2; John-
son, supra note 1, at 22.
123. See MARGALrTH, supra note 55, at 42-44 (comparing the concept of mandates to its
domestic construct, conservatorship).
124. See Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1318 (discussing inherent inequality entailed in such
a system when undertaken by states). It is clear that the system was used to further exploit
the inhabitants of the territories and the fact that they had more protection in Non-Self Gov-
erning Territories does not belie this fact. See R.N. CHOWDHURI, INTERNATIONAL
MANDATES AND TRUSTEEsHIP SYsTEMs 277 (1955).
125. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1114 (explaining the rejection, normatively and prac-
tically, of colonialism and other forms of foreign occupation and control).
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ways rationalized by notions of cultural superiority, if not pure and simple racism.
Moreover, colonialism, in all of its forms, was fully supported and rationalized by
international law. It is a system that has been rejected by the international commu-
nity and it should not be accorded legitimacy by international law as we prepare to
enter the twenty-first century.
The idea that racial inequality justified the superior race's subjugation of the in-
ferior race was explicit and one of the most pronounced aspects of colonial rule.'
Racist doctrines legitimized European dominance and buttressed the idea of cul-
tural superiority.127 European administration was "a trust for all mankind"1t de-
spite arguments against discrimination that were derived from anthropology and
the rights of man."2 European racialization of the world led to color conscious-
ness,130 and this underlying racial and cultural sub-context helped form the views
126. See R.J. Vincent, Racial Equality, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
248 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds., 1984). "Not merely was there a God-given man-
date to rule, but the Europeans were to appear God-like in the eyes of the natives; and if not
quite God-like, then at least in the relationship of masters to servants, or... parents to chil-
dren." Id at 251. The parents to children metaphor confirmed that Europeans were to gov-
ern, and non-Europeans were to remain deferential. See id "Africans were believed to be..
. culturally retrograde and racially inferior." H mY S. WSON, THE IftEIUAIm ExpatmrcE
IN SuB-SAHARAN AFwCA SINcE 1870, 116 (1977).
Imperialist talk of this period was thoroughly imbued with the notion that the ruled were pcuma-
nently inferior to their new European rulers. It was therefore taken for granted that a position of
subordination was desirable for Africans, even if some of them were too benighted to appreciate it
as yet.
Id
127. See Vincent, supra note 126, at 248. "The orthodox attitude [among the British]
was to despise the natives and those who failed to do so were regarded as eccentric, or
worse." Id Standards were to be kept up "for the benefit of the natives, and the social hier-
archy intricately constructed and maintained." Id For instance, Indians could not advance
beyond a certain point in an imposed hierarchy. See id Amazingly, Indians often accepted
this hierarchy, and aspired merely "to prosper so well as they could within it. ... This psy-
chological achievement of getting the slave to think as a slave.., for Nehru, was the tri-
umph of the British in India." Id "The argument for European rule in India applied the
more strongly to Africa," since "it was the Negro who stood most in need of civilization,
for he was the lowest of human types. European intervention would liberate the African
from the cruel and irrational system which bound him." Id
128. See id. This "was a gloss on [the doctrine] that 'all political power which is set over
men... in derogation from the natural equality of mankind at large, ought to be some way
or other exercised for their benefit.'" Id, (omission in original) (citation omitted).
129. See id. at 249.
130. See iL at 241. Thus, for example, white workers who in Europe had been regarded
as part of the lower class "were delighted on arrival" in the Cape Colony to find themselves
at the apex of an aristocracy of color. Terence Ranger, The Imention of Tradition in Colo-
nial Africa, in THE INVENTON OF TRADrION 211, 213 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger
eds., 1983). " IMhe racist law of conquest and colonization brought to the New World by
Columbus and the Europeans who followed him continues to serve as an instrument of ra-
cial discrimination against indigenous peoples' rights of self-determination." Robert A.
Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial Discrimination against
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of Africans that continue to this day. Notions of cultural and racial superiority al-
ways undergird colonialism and are necessary to contemplate colonialism.
Critical Race Theory (CRT) may assist in analyzing colonialism in its historical
and modem forms. This project, however, must be approached with some cau-
tion' so as to avoid yet another American experience, albeit one marked by op-
pression,'32 being universalized.' 3 CRT is part of the oppositional quality found in
the work of many third world scholars and intellectuals. 3 4 It is:
Indigenous People's Rights of Self-Determination, 8 ARIz. J. INT'L & Cow. L. 51, 67
(1991).
131. See Trina Grillo & Stephanie Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The
Implications of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other-isms), 1991
DuKE L.J. 397, 397 (observing "to people of color, who are victims of racism/white su-
premacy, race is the filter through which they see the world"). Thus it is not surprising that
I, as an American and especially as an African-American, would see race as a defining
paradigm internationally. I suspect it is more complex than this, however, and have tried to
be conscious of the risks entailed in this exercise.
132. See SAID, supra note 23, at 229. Professor Said notes that there is also some merit
in:
[N]ot remaining trapped in the emotional self-indulgence of celebrating one's own identity. There
is first of all the possibility of discovering a world not constructed ofwarring essences ... there Is
the possibility ofuniversalism that is not limited or coercive .... and most important, moving be-
yond nativism ... means thinking of local identity as not exhaustive, and therefore, not being
anxious to confine oneself to one's own sphere, with its ceremonies of belonging, its built-In
chauvinism, and its limited sense of security.
Id.
133. See id. at 55 (noting the almost unquestioned assumption by Americans that it is
our destiny to rule and lead the world). Said believes we assigned this destiny to ourselves
and as a nation we face the deep and perturbing question of our relationship to others-
other cultures, states, histories, experiences, traditions, peoples, and destinies. "[Tihere is
no vantage outside the actuality of relationships among cultures, among unequal imperial
and non-imperial powers, among us and others; no one has the epistemological privilege of
somehow judging, evaluating and interpreting the world free from the encumbering inter-
ests and engagements of the ongoing relationships themselves." Id. This belief in our des-
tiny to lead appears to stem from our position as a world power and powerful cultural myths
of America somehow being special and different from all other nations. Our economic and
political dominance only confirm these myths.
134. See id. at 54 (discussing the oppositional quality in the work of many Third World
scholars, especially those who are exiles, expatriates, or refugees living in the West). Said
notes the work of these scholars in "trying to connect experiences across the imperial di-
vide, in re-examining the great canons, in producing what in effect is a critical literature."
Id.
Moreover, their work should be seen as sharing important concerns with minority and"sup-
pressed" voices within the metropolis itself: feminists, African-American writers, intellectuals,
artists, among others. But here, too, vigilance and self-criticism are crucial, since there is an In-
herent danger to oppositional effort of becoming institutionalized, marginality turning into sepa-
ratism, and resistance hardening into dogma... [Tihere is always a need to keep community be-
fore coercion, criticism before mere solidarity, and vigilance ahead of assent.
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a form of oppositional scholarship; Critical Race Theory challenges the univer-
sality of white experiencejudgment as the authoritative standard that binds people
of color and normatively measures, directs, controls, and regulates the terms of
proper thought, expression, presentment, and behavior."'
CRT seeks to identify values and norms that have been disguised and subordi-
nated in the law, and to demonstrate that our experiences as people of color are le-
gitimate, appropriate, and effective bases for analyzing the legal system and racial
subordination.'36 Thus, Critical Race Theorists attempt to integrate their experien-
tial knowledge, drawn from a shared history as "other," 37 with ongoing struggles
against racial hegemony.'
One strand of Critical Race thought examines and attempts to understand the
underpinnings of race and culture and their impact on legal concepts.'3 9 In the in-
ternational context, the additional layer of cultural inferiority and superiority,
which is often, but not necessarily, shaped by race must be added to this paradigm.
Colonialism and international law, which justified and supported colonialism, were
constructs that embodied concepts of racial and cultural inferiority and superiority
and justified domination and subjugation. This Part examines that history in some
detail, arguing that to reconfigure trusteeship would, in many respects, repeat this
135. Camore, supra note 16, at 2160.
136. See id at 2161. CRT is eclectic, "incorporating what appears to be helpful from
various disciplines, doctrines, styles and methods." Id at 2165. It embraces a number of
broad concepts. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Anno-
tated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REv. 461 (1993). Professor Delgado identified ten themes
that fall within critical race analysis:
[Ciritiques of liberalism, which are implicit or explicit; (2)story telling/counter story telling and
naming one's own reality, where writers employ parables, chronicles, anecdotes and countersto-
ies to reveal the contingency and self-serving nature of the majoritarian mind set -that bundle of
presuppositions, received wisdom, and shared cultural understandings persons in the dominant
group bring to discussions of race; (3)revisionist interpretations of American chiil rights law and
progress; (4) a greater understanding of the underpinnings of race and raclsm(5) structural de-
terminism, which focuses on ways in which the structure of legal thought or culture influences
CRT's content, frequently maintaining the status quo; (6)race, (7) sex, (8) class and their inter-
sections; (9) essentialism and anti-essentialism, which is concerned with the appropriate unit for
analysis, such as whether the black community is one or many communities; and (lO)cultural
nationalismfseparatism, which examines whether people of color can best promote their interests
through separation from the American mainstream.
Id
137. See Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Dis-
tinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1864 (1990) (distinguishing
that the consciousness of racial minorities requires knowledge of the feelings and intangible
modes of perception unique to those who have historically been socially, structurally, and
intellectually marginalized in the U.S.).
138. See id at 1864-65. According to Professor Barnes, the central elements include
dual consciousness, a keen awareness of the value of theory to enhance practice, and an ex-
planation of how differentiating characteristics usually compound, rather than explain or
mitigate, racial oppression. See id at 1865-66.
139. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 136, at 462-63.
1997]
AM U J INT'L L. & POL [
process.
Structural determinism, another strand of Critical Race thought, focuses on the
ways in which the structure of legal thought or culture influences its content and
frequently contributes to maintaining the status quo.'40 International law's focus on
the state as the central international actor, defining the state as to exclude certain
people from that definition, is germane in this sphere. Moreover, the manner in
which former colonies were finally incorporated into the international system dis-
missed, and may have then undermined, the political and civil formations within
these communities.
A. THE COLONIAL ENTERPRISE
1. The Rise of Colonialism and Its Rationalizations
Professor Edward Said has defined imperialism as "the practice, the theory, and
the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory; 'coloni-
alism,' which is almost always a consequence of imperialism, is the implanting of
settlements on distant territory." 4' Alien domination and exploitation characterize
colonialism; relations are inherently unequal and the domination is from foreign
sources.'42 "After the 1880s colonialism emerged as the preferred system for ex-
ploiting Africa,"' 43 and European powers proceeded to carve up the continent. 4'
140. See id at 463.
141. See SAID, supra note 23, at 9. Said notes:
Empire is a relationship, formal or informal, in which one [S]tate controls the effective political
sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by
economic, social or cultural dependence. Imperialism is simply the process or policy of estab-
lishing or maintaining an empire.
Id. (quoting MICHAEL W. DOYLE, EmPIREs 45 (1986)).
Colonialism is also defined as "the political control of an underdeveloped people whose
social and economic life is directed by the dominant power." YASSIN EL-AYouTY, UNrrED
NATIONS AND DECOLONIZATION 3 (1971) (quoting T.R. ADAM, MODERN COLONIALISM:
INSTrTUTIONS AND POLICIES 3 (1955)). In Africa, European settlement began in the Cape of
Good Hope in the later half of the 17th century "and gradually pushed northwards to the
highlands of Zimbabwe and Kenya." UMOZURu<E, supra note 14, at 18.
142. See Raymond Ranjeva, Peoples and National Liberation Movements, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTs AND PROSPECTS 101, 103 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed.,
1991).
143. See Sylvester, supra note 6, at 279 (explaining that the slave trade, extensive during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was the principal resource that initially attracted
Europeans to Africa). The British Empire and the United States banned the slave trade in
1807 and 1808, respectively, followed by European efforts to suppress the slave trade alto-
gether. Mutua, supra note 55, at 1126. Suppressing the slave trade, however, led to the im-
position of political control and eventually proved more destructive to the independence of
African political communities than the slave trade itself. See id. Stamping out the slave
trade formed part of the motivation and rationale for imperial expansion. See Hedley Bull,
European States and African Political Communities, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL
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By 1914, Europe held roughly 85 percent of the entire earth in some form of de-
pendency, be it as colonies, protectorates, or dominions.1
45
SocIETY 99, 107 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds., 1984). The decline of the slave trade
was also accompanied by the rise of legitimate trade in palm oil, gold, groundnuts and later
in the century, minerals. Moreover, geographic exploration of the interior promoted new-
found knowledge and concern by Europeans. See id
For an extended discussion of international law and the slave trade, see UMOZURIKE, su-
pra note 14, at 6-16 (noting that the slave trade had a severely debilitating effect on Africa,
resulting in instability, a sense of inferiority, guilt and subservience on the part of Africans).
This made Africans easy prey for colonialism, which followed. See id at 5. Moreover, co-
lonialism seriously disrupted the economic and social fabric of the societies affected and
made it "much more difficult to acquire the attributes required to participate in the process
of modem economic growth." NASSAU A. ADAMS, WoRLDs APART. THE NORTH-SOtm
DriVDE AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 4 (1993).
Previous colonial empires in South and Central America were extinguished earlier in the
nineteenth century. See JAMEs CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 249-52 (1979); 21 ALFRED J. DEBERLE, HIsTORY OF NATIONS 54, (Phillip P. Wells ed,
1928); 22 BRANTZ MAYER, HISTORY OF NATIONS 437-40 (Frederick A. Ober ed., 1928);
R.L. WOODWARD, JR., CNRAL A.?mIcA SIN'cE INDEPENDNqcE 1-8 (Leslie Bethell ed.,
1991).
144. See UMOzURiKE, supra note 14, at 17 (stating that numerous exploring expeditions
were funded by governments, commercial companies, and learned societies). These expedi-
tions began in the late eighteenth century, as the slave trade became less profitable. See id
Colonialism followed soon thereafter. See it at 18. The European struggle for Africa, how-
ever, arose suddenly. "[l ] t was precipitated by rivalries among the most powerful of the
established colonial powers, France and Britain, [and] by the arrival of newcomers: Leopold
I[ [in the Congo] ... and Bismarck's Germany, whose whirlwind annexation of territory...
between 1883 and 1885 .... presented an unprecedented challenge to existing arrange-
ments." Bull, supra note 143, at 109. Bilateral agreements and guidelines established dur-
ing the Concert of Europe were used to partition Africa. See id The Berlin Conference of
1884-45 established guidelines to minimize friction between the participating powers. See
id The Berlin Conference, attended by Turkey, the United States, and all of the European
States except Switzerland, was also "a collective... legitimization of the partition process
as a whole." Id; see also Mutua, supra note 55, at 1127. Of course, the African peoples
and political entities who were the subjects of the conference did not participate or have any
input regarding the legality of this land-grab or the resulting loss in sovereignty. Rather,
"Europeans felt they knew what was best for the natives." Id
145. See SAID, CULTuRE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 23, at 8. Ten percent of Africa
was colonized in 1870. By 1900 it had risen to 90%. The years 1900-1914 were a period of
consolidation. UMOzuRuK, supra note 14, at 30. Britain had authority over Australia, Ccy-
Ion, Hong Kong, Malaya, New Guinea, New Zealand, all of the Asian subcontinent, most of
the Middle East, all of East Africa from Egypt to South Africa, a large area of Central West
Africa (including Nigeria), Guiana, some of the Caribbean Islands, Ireland and Canada.
France's empire comprised a mass of islands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as the
Caribbean (including Madagascar, New Caledonia, Tahiti, and Guadeloupe); all of Indo-
china; the western half of the African continent from the Mediterranean to the Equator and
French Somaliland; and Syria and Lebanon in the Middle East. Belgium, Holland, Spain,
Portugal, and Germany also held possessions. 1 MICHAEL, TIDY & DONALD L-E. n G, A
ISTORY oFAFRICA, 110-177 (1980).
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Undoubtedly a multiplicity of motives lay behind the colonial enterprise. There
were profits to be made,'46 strategic military concerns to be considered," 7 and a
sense of power and prestige in empire. 4 ' The heart of this justification for empire,
however, was European racism,'49 which expanded to include a paternalistic civi-
lizing mission 5' "undertaken in the cause of religion and enlightenment."'' The
prevailing cultural ethos allowed people to accept the notion that distant territories
and their native peoples should be subjugated and that there was an obligation"2 to
The degree of sovereignty retained by the people in these areas seemed to be directly cor-
related to their race. Thus colonies, which had no international legal personality and over
whom authority was plenary, were in Africa and the Melanesian Islands; dominions were
much more independent and were typically white countries, such as South Africa and Aus-
tralia, who both later became League of Nations mandataries themselves; and protectorates,
located in the Middle East, were a separate class of territorial entities with a distinct legal
personality that did not amount to statehood. Subject to the terms of the agreement, protec-
torates were assimilated to the protecting state. See CRAWFORD, supra note 143, at 197;
Gordon, supra note 1, at 339-43.
146. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1126; MARGALrrH, supra note 106, at 1-2 (stressing
the economic motivation in the rivalry for colonies in the "backward" areas of Asia and
Africa). Margalith notes that the colonies were viewed primarily as sources for raw materi-
als, and secondarily as markets for manufactured products. See id. The African continent
offered new cultivable land for food production and provided many of the raw materials
needed as a result of the industrial revolution, such as cotton, palm oil, palm kernels, rub-
ber, timber, ivory, hides, and skins. Africa was also favored as a dumping ground for infe-
rior manufactured goods. UMOZURIKE, supra note 14, at 18.
147. See CHOWDHURI, supra note 124, at 1 (explaining colonial territories were potential
causes of conflict and were part of the larger struggle for power, authority, and markets).
148. This prestige derived its force from nationalism. EL-AYotrrY, supra note 141, at 4;
TIoy & LEEMING, supra note 145, at 134 (stating "colonies were sometimes established or
expanded for reasons of... national prestige"); WILSON, supra note 126, at 116 (claiming
that "in the late 19th century Europe's imperialism was locked in a symbiotic relationship
with its intense nationalism").
149. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1127.
150. As the nineteenth century unfolded, the social distance between Europeans and Af-
ricans widened. In earlier centuries, Europeans "had sometimes been able to deal with black
Africans as equals. [But during this period they increasingly] came to perceive of Africans
as objects either of exploitation, or of curiosity and compassion." Bull, supra note 143, at
100. Moreover, with such inventions as the steamboat and railway, the technological gap
between the respective societies widened. See id. It was rarely contemplated that Europeans
and the indigenous population might "co-exist on terms of mutual respect and equality."
UMOzUlUKE, supra note 14, at 17.
151. Neta C. Crawford, Decolonization as an International Norm: The Evolution of
Practices, Argument, and Beliefs, in EMERGING NoRMS OF JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION 37, 38
(Laura W. Reed & Carl Kaysen eds., 1993).
152. See Vincent, supra note 126, at 239 (noting that the age of European ascendancy
was characterized by concepts of "biological hierarchy among different human types that
justified and even required the subjection" of others). "[I]n some accounts of the need for
European ascendancy, it was above all race, not religion, or civilization, or mere Europeans,
that imposed the duty of empire." Id. Race was not, however, the official justification for
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rule subordinate, inferior, and less advanced peoples.' The vocabulary of the
nineteenth century imperium abounded with such words and concepts as inferior
or subject races,"M subordinate peoples, dependency, expansion, and authority. 155
While the idea of racial inequality is now viewed as racist, such beliefs were
presumed to have a scientific basis in the nineteenth century. '" It was considered
European empire, rather the imperial mission was to civilize "the non-European popula-
tions over which they ruled." Id British grounds for empire included "the idea of trustee-
ship over backward races, [that were to] ... be civilized and educated." Id at 240.
153. See SAiD, supra note 23, at 10. Said notes that there was very little domestic resis-
tance to empire, even when its maintenance was costly. He quotes Jules Harmand, a French
advocate of colonialism:
It is necessary then to accept as a principle and point of departure the fact that there is a hierarchy
of races and civilizations, and that we belong to the superior race and civilization, still recogniz-
ing that while superiority confers rights, it imposes strict obligations in return. The basiclegiti-
mation of conquest over native peoples is the conviction of our superiority, not merely our me-
chanical, economic, and military superiority, but our moral superiority. Our dignity rests on that
quality, and it underlies our right to direct the rest of humanity. Material power is nothing but a
means to that end.
I1 at 17.
154. See Vincent, supra note 126, at 240. Racial superiority was embodied in popular
culture as part of European imperialism, and affected the relationship between European
settlers and non-European "natives," and between imperial states and their non-European
dependencies. See id. "In the early 19th century, an intellectual discourse about the 'natu-
ral' and 'inherent superiority' of 'white' peoples over 'black' peoples gained popularity and
acceptance.... Combined with the insular development of international law as the exclu-
sive domain of Christian nations, such discourse served as fodder for states ready to expand
for economic reasons; it certainly added to the zealotry for colonization." Mutua, supra
note 55, at 1127-28.
155. See SAID, supra note 23, at 15-19.
The advocates of this discourse... declared that Africa had no history prior to direct contact with
Europe. Therefore the Africans, having made no history of their own, had clearly nde no devel-
opment of their own. Therefore, they were not properly human, and could not b- left to them-
selves but must be 'led' towards civilization by other peoples: that is, by the peoples of Europe,
especially of Western Europe, and most particularly of Britain and France.
BAsIL DAvIDsoN, AFRICA IN HIsToRY xxii (1966). The following early quotation is typical:
"generally speaking, [Non-European Africans] still exist in that stage of society which is
denominated barbarian; being only elevated above the hunting or savage state by the power
of subjecting the lower animals, and by a certain rude agriculture that the fertility of the soil
renders productive." HUGH MURRAY, THE CONTINENT OF AFRICA, A NARRATrVE OF
DiscovERY& ADvENTuRE 436 (1853).
156. See DELIA J. AKELEY, JUNGLE PORTRAITS 3 (1930) (carrying this view into the
twentieth century). Akeley notes: "For all of us who belong to civilized worlds, the very
simplicity of savage life must always remain its greatest mystery... I honestly tried to
view the natives with whom I came in contact as naturally as I viewed the specimens I was
collecting for the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences. This, I feel, is the only way to
understand them." Id C.W. HOBLEY, KENYA, FROM CHARTERED COMPANY TO CROWN
COLONY 180 (1929) ("The African native, is, I am inclined to think, usually dominated by
the impulse of the moment.... This outlook on life includes a cheerful and happy disposi-
tion, and he usually has a great sense of humor, albeit of a simple character, a saving grace
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possible to distinguish and classify hierarchically three clearly marked races: the
black, the yellow, and the white.' There could not be immediate equality because
Europeans and non-Europeans were at "different stages of civilization, and noth-
ing was to be gained by equating the more-advanced with the less-advanced, the
superior with the inferior." 5 ' Indeed, sharp legal distinctions were drawn in colo-
nial legal codes between Europeans and their colonial subjects. Europeans, of
course, were accorded a privileged status.
Because the white race was deemed superior, it became the obligation of Euro-
peans to civilize the natives, to take up the white man's burden. 9 As Neta Craw-
ford notes:
[I]ndigenous inhabitants were viewed by the colonizers as less civilized, less in-
telligent, and less human than Europeans. Colonialism and all of its constitutive
practices ... were acceptable because the natives were thought to be less deserv-
ing than the European settlers. Anyone could see, from the European perspective,
that European political, social, and economic organization, not to mention relig-
ion, were far superior to those of the indigenous cultures; the clearest evidence
was that even though indigenous populations resisted colonialism, the imperialists
generally won. Thus colonialism was not only the international norm, it was a re-
gime (rules, norms, and procedures) that codified and reflected the inferior status
of the conquered.
Since European cultures, systems of government, administration, law, order,
and education were viewed as inherently superior, they invariably became the
governing system within the colonies.'' Thus, although European colonialism
which helps to counterbalance many defects."); WALTER FITZGERALD, AFRiCA: A SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC AND POLIrICAL GEOGRAPHY OF ITS MAJOR REGIONS 137 (3d. ed. 1940) ("It is
agreed that Negro and European Civilizations cannot remain mutually exclusive while ex-
isting side by side on the same continent .... It seems inevitable that the infinitely weaker
civilization of the Negro should ultimately pass away.").
157. See Vincent, supra note 126, at 241. "[T]he lowest the negro, being hardly more
than a mere brute, the yellow race committing none of the strange excesses so common
among negroes but tending to mediocrity in everything, and at the top the white race gifted
with energetic intelligence, perseverance, an instinct for order, and a love of liberty." Id.
Later nineteenth-century concepts of social evolution, which were influenced by Darwin's
accounts of survival of the fittest in the animal world, were more sophisticated versions of
this dogma. See id. "The weaker races disappeared before the stronger." Id.
158. See id. at 249.
159. See EL-AYOUTY, supra note 141, at 3. The Final Act promulgated at the Berlin
Conference included a commitment by colonial powers to preserve indigenous tribes and
improve their moral and material well-being. See Bull, supra note 143, at 110. There was
also an obligation to suppress the slave trade and slavery, and to guarantee freedom of con-
science and religious toleration. See id. These concepts were quickly abandoned, however,
in favor of egregious exploitation. See id.
160. See Crawford, supra note 151, at 50.
161. See Ibrahim J. Wani, Cultural Preservation and the Challenges of Diversity and
Nationhood: The Dilemma of Indigenous Cultures in Africa, 59 UMKC L. REv. 611, 618
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lasted in Africa for only seventy or so years, "it had a profound impact on indige-
nous African cultures and institutions." 62
2. International Law and the Colonial Enterprise
Given the nineteenth century ethos on race and culture and the prevailing posi-
tivism of the day,"m perhaps it is not surprising that international legal principles
generally rationalized and supported European colonialism and its underlying pre-
cepts and accorded few, if any, rights to the people who were subjected to colonial
rnle."6 A clear division of the world into European and non-European realms
marked international law, and this division was explicitly based on cultural differ-
ences.'65 "International law existed only among the civilized nations of Europe and
only European states were fully sovereigni6 s .... The non-European world became
(1991). Another reason for utilizing European systems was familiarity with these institu-
tional arrangements. See id Professor Wani notes that European culture was favored to the
detriment of traditional African cultures. See id at 619. He also notes the differences be-
tween French and English approaches to colonial rule, but concludes that the end result was
the same. See id at 619-29.
162. See id at 618. For a brilliant analysis of the difficulties in discerning tradition in
the wake of the overlay of European systems, see L. Amede Obiora, New Skin, Old Wine:
(En)gaging Nationalism, Traditionalism and Gender Relations, 28 INDIANA L. REv. 578
(1995). Several authors, however, believe that the impact on African culture has been
minimal. For example, Mazrui and Tidy postulate that the Western impact was inconse-
quential because African culture is deep. Au A. MAzRui & M CHAEL TroY, NAONAULz!
AND NEw STATES rN AFIUCA xii (1984). Moreover, contradictions such as Christian charity
and capitalist greed; freedom and repression; and equality and racial inferiority also made
cultural penetration more difficult. See id Professor Chibundu asserts that in most spheres
of life, colonial rule had only marginal effects on the practices and beliefs of the vast ma-
jority of the African population living outside the urban centers and their immediate sur-
roundings. See Chibundu, supra note 46.
163. See Anghie, supra note 23, at 493 (noting that at the height of colonial expansion in
the latter part of the 19th century, positivism was the primary legal philosophy). Thus, in-
ternational law was based on sovereign will rather than natural law. See id.
164. Positivism meant international law reflected state practice, which was to conquer
these territories by one means or another. One early treatise discussing the evolving nature
of international law to meet new conditions and challenges, noted that many of the rules
apply to:
[R]aces which cannot be said to be Subjects of International Law, but whose welfare is becomlng
so increasingly the concern of the advanced peoples who constitute the International Family that
those peoples are making the protection of the backward races the subject of legal rules which are
binding upon and between themselves.
M.F. LiNDLEY, Tm AcQuisroN AND GovEm NT OF BACKWARD TEIRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW vi (1926).
165. See Anghie, supra note 23, at 493. This shift replaced "transcendent principles
based on religion or reason." Id
166. See id. For example Lindley maintains:
It is, of course, true that International Law has in the main, been evolved out of the mutual rela-
tions of the advanced States who are considered to form the International Family. It is equally
true that most of its rules are inapplicable to the conditions of backwards peoples.
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incorporated into this exclusive legal system only by virtue of its engagement with
the European world." 1
6 7
Existing outside of the realm of law, non-Europeans could not legally oppose
the sovereign will of European states. 68 Thus, international law owes its origins to
European cultural norms which maintained that nations owed duties to others of
the same race.'69 " [I]nternational law was a distillation of European cultural norms
into a system of rules" 70 and was a product of a European cultural context, norms,
and the hope of perpetuating supremacy.'
LINDLEY, supra note 164, at 46. People of color lacked sovereignty. UMoZURIKE, supra
note 14, at 19-21; JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
136, 138 (1894) (implying that the "uncivilized" world does not have sovereignty); Robert
Williams, On the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of
Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, in 1990 INDIGENOUs PEOPLE'S RTS. 660, 666-
67.
167. See Anghie, supra note 23, at 494.
168. See LINDLEY, supra note 164, at 47. Lindley notes the degree to which international
law recognized the territorial rights of backward peoples:
International law should and does recognize the rights of independent backward races to the ex-
tent necessary to distinguish those territories to which title may be acquired by the legally and
morally legitimate method of Occupation from those which, in the absence of consent on the part
of the inhabitants, can be obtained only by Conquest-or through Prescription-it does not, at
present go further and say that an acquisition by Conquest is not legitimate. On the contrary, once
a Conquest become a [fait accompl], International Law recognizes its results.
Id.
169. See Note, Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the Essentiali-
zation of Culture, 106 HARv. L. REv. 723, 733 (1993) [hereinafter Aspiration and Control];
see also Anghie, supra note 30; Robert A. Williams, Encounter on the Frontiers of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples's Survival In the
World, 1990 DuKE L. J. 660, 674-5 (describing how international legal scholars did not re-
gard indigenous peoples as civilized members of the western community of nations and
thus the titles to their lands were also invalid).
170. Id,
171. See Aspiration and Control, supra note 169, at 733-34. The discipline ordered the
relationship between the European and non-European world by giving content and signifi-
cance to the boundaries of European culture. See id. at 735. Civilization was elevated to the
status of a term of art, a legally imperative category. "Civilization" meant "possession in
greater or less abundance of such things as palaces, museums, ships, forts, arsenals, arms,
ammunition, pictures and jewels." Id. Even if not a precise definition, international law re-
assures the reader that intelligible distinctions between Europeans and non-Europeans could
be found. See id. At a number of levels this polemic led to:
[The creation of an essentialized and coherent European community defined in dichotomous op-
position to the non-European savages. This portrait of European identity demanded the suppres-
sion of internal contradictions and differences in favor of a picture of unity around essential char-
acteristics. For example, the concept of statehood built around and reinforced this bounded and
essentialized conception of culture. States related to each other as unitary sovereigns while indi-
viduals, corporations, communities and tribes had no standing to participate in international legal
discourse. The State was an unproblematic stand-in for society because society was a bounded




Thus, in defining the principles of imperial expansion, indigenous peoples gen-
erally played a limited role, if any, in the execution of colonial conquest and were
denied sovereignty under international law."r Legal rationales were found to le-
gitimate the exclusion of non-Europeans in the international system." Interna-
tional legal doctrine sanctioned colonialism, defined as the acquisition of "back-
ward" territory" by a recognized state and the imposition of sovereignty over
172. See UMozuRuE, supra note 14, at 19. The major legal technique for the imposition
of colonialism was the denial of sovereignty to Africans. Early international jurists, such as
Bodin (1530-1596) and Gentili (1552-1608) maintained that non-Christian states were sov-
ereign and that international law, derived from natural law, was applicable to all men. Thus,
the principal of sovereignty was universally applicable. Similarly, Hugo Grotius (1583-
1645) believed that "infidel" rulers were legitimate rulers and masters of their own prop-
erty. See id at 19-20; LINDLEY, supra note 164, at 14. Vattel (1714-1769) on the other
hand, did not believe that "infidel" rulers were legitimate. Instead, he "would only allow
sovereign rights to backward peoples with limitations or under conditions." Id at 17. While
pre-colonial communities were regarded as fully sovereign under international law, in many
cases an extensive system of capitulations and concessions was established. CRA WOPRD,
supra note 143, at 176. NV. Michael Reisman, Reflections on State Responsibility For Vio-
lations of Explicit Protectorate, Mandate, and Trusteeship Obligations, 10 MIC. J. INT'L
L. 231, 236-40 (1989) (discussing treaties concluded between the British Government and
various Somali Chiefs in the Hom of Africa). Reisman notes that these treaties were gener-
ally violated by the British, and discusses the difficulties entailed in addressing such viola-
tions by a superordinating state under international law). Nonetheless, international legal
philosophers who denied extending sovereignty to non-Christians had a far greater influ-
ence on Europeans in their dealings with non-Europeans. UMOZURME, supra note 14, at 20;
LINDLEY, supra note 164, at 24.
173. See CRAWFORD, supra note 143, at 176. It had to be determined whether communi-
ties that were established in a territory, but did not possess a sufficiently coherent and or-
ganized government to be termed a sovereign state in European terms, were nonetheless
legal occupants of their territory so that the territory could be acquired only by cession or
conquest, rather than simply by occupation. Classic international law classified these peo-
ples as legal occupants, but late nineteenth century writers believed that only sovereignty
was sufficient to preclude occupation, and Non-European territories did not possess sover-
eignty. See supra notes 140-168 and accompanying text. The Berlin Conference established
that African territories could be occupied merely by public notice of annexation or the es-
tablishment of protectorate status. CRAVORD, supra note 143, at 178-G0. Sufficient
authority also had to be established in the territory to protect acquired rights and freedom of
trade meaning it was not necessary to consult "the natives" See Id. This was an improve-
ment on terra nullius, however, which applied if"an unsettled horde of wandering savages,
not yet formed into civil society," or in more polite terms, nomadic tribesmen lacking all
political organization, were present. Id In such a case, the inhabitants were not regarded as
territorial occupants. See id at 180 (quoting WHEATON, ELEMMNTs OF INTNTIONAL LAW,
§ 2(3), at 54 (3d ed. 1846)).
174. See LINDLEY, supra note 164, at v. Lindley believed it was impossible to precisely
define "backward territory." He noted:
At the one extreme, it may perhaps be said to be marked by territory which Is entirely uninhab-
ited; and it clearly includes territory inhabited by natives as low in the scale of civilization as
those of Central Africa. On the other hand, all that can be said as to its upper limits probably is
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such a territory.'75 In the case of such territories, rights were acquired through oc-
cupation, 76 subjugation,'" cession,' and prescription 79 or through inter-
European bilateral treaties.8 0 In colonizing Africa, Europeans utilized several of
these methods.' Wars of conquest and fraudulent treaties with African rulers
that it is obviously intended to exclude territory which has reached the level of what is sometimes
known as European or Western civilization. The term is a relative one, and as civilization ad-
vances it may cease to apply to territory which would today be said to be included within It; or It
may conceivably become applicable to countries which would not, in the circumstances of the
present time, be called backward.
Id.
175. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1128.
176. See id. Occupation occurred when a recognized state acquired territory which was
uninhabited or was inhabited by a people or an entity that international law did not consider
a state. Only a state could occupy territory. See id. With European settlements, rule by the
home state was extended to the settlers. Thus, the Cape of Good Hope fell to the Dutch, Al-
geria to the French, Angola to the Portuguese and Kenya to the British. UMOZURIKE, supra
note 14, at 22.
177. See UMOzuRIKE, supra note 14, at 22. Subjugation arose through the conquest of
enemy territory in war and its subsequent annexation by the conquering state. The defeated
state disappeared into the vanquished state, but title did not vest in the conqueror until an-
nexation was affected. Territories were cleared either for European settlement or to place
Africans under European rule. Aggressive wars included those in Algeria, the Kaffir war,
the Zulu wars, the Ashanti war and the Maji war. See id.
178. See id. Cession was the acquisition of territory by a bilateral arrangement where
states lost or gained territory by agreement or acquiescence through war, See id. "Treaties
were concluded with African Kings and Chiefs in which they were forced to surrender their
sovereignty or to 'request' European protection. Some territories were bought, but fre-
quently at a trifling cost." Id. at 22 (citation omitted).
179. See D.P. O'CoNNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 487 (1965). "Prescription" occurred
when a state exercised sovereignty over a territory to which another state had abstract title.
Prescriptive claims entailed two elements: an assertion of sovereignty exercised for a long
period of time and acquiescence in the claim by the other state. See id. at 488. The doctrine
did not apply when a colonizing power took possession from a non-state entity because
such entities were not themselves sovereign. See Matthew M. Ricciardi, Title to the Aouzou
Strip: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 17 YALE J. INT' L. 301, 414 (1992); MALcOLM
SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IssuEs 283 n.149 (1986)
(noting that prescription was not used in Africa during the colonial period).
180. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1130 n.57 (quoting L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A TREATISE 455 (4th ed. 1928)). In the nineteenth century, European powers entered
into treaties with each other recognizing spheres of influence and solidifying claims to ter-
ritory. For example, the United Kingdom entered into treaties with Portugal (1890), Italy
(1891), Germany (1886, 1890), and France (1898).
181. See WILLIAM E. HALL, INmERNAIoNAL LAW 100 (5th ed. 1904) (noting that in
nineteenth century international legal theory, occupation was sufficient because no recog-
nized states existed in Africa). "If those deprived of possession were not states, and conse-
quently did not possess sovereign rights, the territory was terra nullius and the acquirer
took possession by occupation." Ricciardi, supra note 179, at 414 (explaining that the doc-
trine of prescription was not used in Africa). The concept of terra nullius is problematic,
however, because many of the entities colonized met the criteria for statehood. Mutua, sit-
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were both means by which to impose European sovereignty." As to "savage, bar-
barous tribes," there was a right of discovery belonging to civilized and Christian
nations;" thus, European publicists generally concluded that much of Africa was
a no-man's land that could be brought under legal occupation.'8 These territories
pra note 55, at 1129 (stating that "Most African societies were organized in cthno-political
states, some highly centralized, others less so"); see also BASIL DAVIDSON, THE SEARCI
FOR AFRICA 258 (1994). African Kings and Chiefs were often forced by treaty to surrender
their sovereignty or to request European protection. UiOZURUCE, supra note 14, at 23.
182. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1131-1132 (noting that treaties were overwhelmingly
one-sided and were written in the "idiom of jurisprudence prevalent in Europe at the
time").
183. See id at 1130. Some states, such as Ethiopia and Liberia, were Christian states, but
were not considered "civilized." The qualifications for being subjects of international law
were to be white, Christian, and civilized, although the first two were later dropped to in-
clude Japan and Turkey, which had demonstrated their military strength. UriozURmE, supra
note 14, at 21. By the latter portion of the nineteenth century, most publicists regarded Af-
rica as terra nullius to be occupied by European states. See id at 21. "Primitive" peoples
were objects of the law and thus their land, property and person could be possessed by civi-
lized European states. See id Some European publicists categorically denied sovereignty to
what were termed "backward peoples." LINDLEY, supra note 164. Writing in 1926, Lindley
noted that these publicists principally belonged to a comparatively recent period. See id For
example, Westlake maintained that the only territorial titles recognized by international law
were those held by members of international society, not by "uncivilized nations."
WESTLAKE, supra note 166, at 136; see also HALL, supra note 181, at 100 (noting that if a
territory was "unappropriated by a civilized or semi-civilized state" it could be acquired
through occupation"); I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW A TREATISE 276 (1905) (ex-
plaining that occupation applied to land which was entirely uninhabited, defining "unin-
habited land" to include land "inhabited by natives whose community is not to be consid-
ered as a State"); T. J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 148, 151 (6th
ed. 1910) (extending the class of"territorium nullius" to all territory not in the possession
of states who were members of the family of nations and subjects of international law).
184. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1130. Indigenous peoples were deemed barbarians,
infidels or sinners, but were not prevented from owning their land, and "did not give the
Spaniards a right to occupy their lands." LINDLEY, supra note 164, at 12. Vitoria asserted,
however, that if the Indians "hindered the preaching of the Gospel, or obstinately refused
the Spaniards such natural rights as the right to trade with them and to journey in their
lands, the Spaniards, as a last resort, had all the rights of war against the Indians and could
take possession of their lands." Id Vitoria also suggested that if the Indians were incapable
of forming a state then, in their own interest, the King of Spain might acquire sovereignty
over them in order to raise them in the scale of civilization, treating them charitably and not
for his person profit. See id. Consequently, writers like Vitoria, believed possession re-
quired conquest, rather than mere occupation. See Anghie supra note 30, at 323-7 (de-
scribing how the encounter with non-believing Indians led to a new jurisprudence in inter-
national law based on secular natural law).
Whether the acquisition was just was a separate question. Some writers believed that a
state could engage in war if the natives would not engage in commerce, or to recover do-
minions that might be useful to Christendom. Others hypothesized that no nation ,as
authorized by its qualities, notably not by "a higher degree of culture," to take from an-
other nation its property, even if from "savages or nomads." LINDLEY, supra note 164, at
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were deemed to be occupied by persons who did not belong to the family of states
to which international law applied.
The resulting colonies were not separate juridical institutions. Metropolitan
governmental authority in these territories was plenary.' International law classi-
fied such colonies as a part of the metropolitan state;'86 they, therefore, possessed
no international personality.' Thus, under international law, colonies were non-
existent; all international personality resided in the imperial power. While the
move toward international supervision for selected territories accorded them a
greater degree of international personality, in some cases, these entities were still
classified as part of the metropolitan state that continued to exercise a large meas-
ure of international personality on their behalf. The rationale for the supervision of
such territories was that these entities were incapable of acting on their own behalf
in the international arena.
B. THE MANDATE SYSTEM
The 1919 settlement of the colonial question following World War I.8 intro-
duced the League of Nations Mandate System, which for the first time imposed a
12, 15 (noting the discussions of various scholars who maintained that peoples regardless of
"their degree of barbarism," exercised rights of sovereignty sufficient to render their occu-
pation wrongful).
Lindley summarized these views as follows: "whenever a country is inhabited by people
who are connected by some political organization, however primitive and crude, such a
country is not to be regarded as territorium nullius and open to acquisition by Occupation."
Id. at 17. A second view propounded by publicists gave limited or conditional recognition
to the sovereignty of "backwards people" explaining that their territory was to be occupied
provided the native did not resist their occupiers with force. See id,
185. See CRAWFORD, supra note 143, at 199. Protected states were an earlier form of
subordination. Reisman maintains that although the protected state continued to exist as an
international subject, it could not act on its own behalf. See Reisman, supra note 172, at
233.
186. See CRAWFORD, supra note 143, at 199. When the U.N. pushed for decolonization,
the colonial powers claimed this was an attempt to intervene in their domestic matters. See
EL-AYOUTY, supra note 141, at 32-37; Ruth E. Gordon, United Nations Intervention in In-
ternal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519, 523-25, 530-31, 533-
37 (1994).
187. See Gordon, supra note 1. Publicists distinguished the protectorates of non-
Christian nations, including Madagascar, Tunisia, and Zanzibar, from the "so-called pro-
tectorates over African tribes." Id. The latter were not states and could be legally occupied
despite treaties of protection with local rulers. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1130. As weak
states, non-Christian protectorates had a higher status even though they did not belong to
the family of nations. Sovereignty over them could only be acquired through cession or
conquest, but not by occupation. Nonetheless, the end result was a loss of sovereignty and
the brutal exploitation of human and natural resources. See id.
188. See SAID, supra note 23, at 197 (noting that although World War I had a very lim-
ited impact on Western control over colonial territories, these territories furnished Europe
with manpower and resources).
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form of international control over metropolitan powers with respect to a limited
number of territories 89 The creation of the Mandate System was a normative
turning point that embodied a combination of continued colonialism and a fore-
shadowing of decolonization."r Mandates are defined as a "modified form of in-
ternationally lawful superordination." 'l The League of Nations Covenant did not
outlaw colonialism. Rather, the Covenant strengthened existing law regarding co-
lonial dependencies and provided a firm basis for accepting the new global map.
Mandates sanctioned and affirmed the concept of wardship over natives, but the
civilizing mission was now to be undertaken by the League of Nations.1r3 Manda-
taries undertook, as a "sacred trust of civilization," to promote the well being and
development of those peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the
strenuous conditions of the modem world.'" Tutelage of such peoples was en-
trusted to advanced nations which would act as mandataries on behalf of the
League. 9 s The League, in turn, established the Permanent Mandates Commission
189. See William Roger Louis, The Era of the Mandates System and the Non-European
World, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SocErY 201, 202 (Hedley Bull & Adam Wat-
son eds., 1984) (explaining the Mandate System applied only to the colonies and posses-
sions of Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and Italy). International supervision was chosen
over annexation, indicating the beginning of international interest in colonial matters.
CHOWDHURI, supra note 124, at 22-24.
190. See Crawford, supra note 151, at 40. Crawford theorizes that because of President
Wilson's idealist views regarding self-determination and democracy, it was viewed as un-
seemly to simply transfer the spoils of war to the victors of the First World War without at
least a nod to self-determination. See id Instead of annexation, the Mandate System was a
form of international oversight imposed over territories although these territories were still
acquired by foreign powers. Thus, mandates dealt with the problem of expanding empires,
"without blatantly adopting a policy of [wholesale] annexation." Louis, supra note 189, at
202.
191. See Reisman, supra note 172, at 234.
192. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1138. While the system confirmed that mandate terri-
tories possessed some of the qualities of international persons, the imperial powers were
ultimately accountable for their affairs. See ido at 1138-1139; see also MAROALrHr, supra
note 106, at 163-170 (describing the debate over sovereignty in the mandate territories,
which eventually resolved that these areas were not sovereign states).
193. See Anghie, supra note 23, at 494-95.
194. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para.1 reprinted in J.A.S. GRNu.Lx,
THE MAJOR INrERNATIONAL TREATiES, 1914-1945, at 63-64 (1974). Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations provides in part:
To those colonies and territories ... which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by them-
selves under the strenuous conditions of the modem world, there should be applied the principle
that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that
securities for the performance of this tust should be embodied in this Covenant.
Iad
195. See id
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples
should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their
geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and
that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandataries on behalf of the League.
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to exercise some degree of control over the mandataries."
While discussions of international supervision focused on opening mandate ar-
eas to commerce and on developing their resources," there was also some ac-
knowledgment that colonialism might result in abuse, pillage, and exploitation." 3
Hence, the civilizing mission was not left to the totally "unfettered discretion of
sovereign states"'" but was undertaken in part by international institutions.2" Al-
though it recognized the principles of non-annexation and international account-
ability,2"' the mandate system was not a policy of decolonization,0 2 but rather, the
Id.
196. See Reisman, supra note 172, at 236 (noting that the Permanent Mandate Commis-
sion, which began operating in 1920, along with the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice, supervised the Mandatory System).
197. See MARGALrrH, supra note 106, at 4-5 (quoting C.F. FAYLE, THE GENERAL
SETrLEMENT 194 (1915)).
198. See Anghie, supra note 23, at 494.
199. Id.; see also U. 0. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INERNATIONAL LAW 27
(1972). Reformers became more critical of the treatment of non-Europeans and advised that
it would be beneficial if the natives were in good physical and moral condition. See id. For
instance, J.A. Hobson believed that "while natives were not to impede the exploitation of
natural resources, they were to be well treated with minimal interference in their way of
life." Id. at 29. The British Labour Party found annexation by force incompatible with so-
cialism and suggested the colonies either have administrative autonomy or participate pro-
gressively in local government. See id.
200. See Anghie, supra note 23, at 494; MARGALrrH, supra note 106, at 5, 7 (noting that
African colonies were administered by a trained staff under the auspices of the League of
Nations because "it was impracticable in the case of the African colonies to leave the vari-
ous peoples concerned to settle their own destinies"). The PMC collected reports and ad-
vised the Council on mandate subjects. See id. at 76 (quoting the League of Nations Cove-
nant, art. 22). Most PMC members acquired their expertise in Africa as administrators,
diplomats, or scholars. According to Professor Louis, PMC decisions on Issues such as land
tenure, commercial monopolies, taxation, justice, and education "set the standard for the
entire colonial world as well as the specific mandate territories." Louis, supra note 189, at
211. "The mandate system acted as a negative check [of sorts] against economic exploita-
tion and religious discrimination, and the Permanent Mandates Commission insisted on
minimum standards of colonial administration .... [it] encouraged economic and political
progress in order to enable the 'child-like' races of tropical Africa eventually to climb the
colonial ladder and become fully developed children of the parent state." Id.
201. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS CovENANT art. 22. Article 22 was a compromise between
President Wilson, who sought trusteeship, and representatives of the British Dominions
(such as South Africa, Australia and New Zealand) who sought annexation of South West
Africa, New Guinea, and Western Samoa. Arguments in favor of annexation included cur-
rent possession of these territories, geographic proximity and security considerations made
annexation desirable, and that the interests of the "natives" would be best protected under a
policy of direct annexation because the Dominions were democracies. The mandate com-
promise indicated some acceptance of the principles of non-annexation and international
accountability, as well as the consent of the governed in the Turkish dependencies. In ex-
change, the occupying Powers were recognized as mandataries with mandates. In address-
ing the legal status of Namibia, the International Court of Justice held that whatever the
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underlying theme was tutelage. 3 Despite its very limited application,2 the system
was primarily a method to monitor the treatment of the subjects of mandate territo-
ries through regular reports to the Mandates Commission.P
While there were ethical and strategic aspects 05 to the concept of "sacred
trust," the question of race is essential to understanding attitudes of the mandate
era.2" 7 Groups were classified as backwards races in descending categories of civi-
lization: 2 3 the "A" peoples of the Middle East, who in a relatively short period of
strong annexation tendencies were at the time, the language contained in the League Cove-
nant precluded annexation. See Legal Consequences For States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolu-
tion 276, 1971 ICJ 3, 30 (Jan. 26) [hereinafter Status of Namibia]. In an earlier case on Na-
mibia, the Court also found that two principles were of paramount importance with regard
to these territories: "the principle of non-annexation and the principle that the well-being
and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization." International Status of
South West Africa, supra note 106, at 13 1.
202. See Crawford, supra note 151, at 40. For example, the C mandates were regarded
as colonies in all but name, and the mandataries expected to keep and eventually perma-
nently integrate these territories into their empires. See id. (quoting William Roger Louis,
The Era of the Mandates System and the Non-European World, in THE EXPANsIoN OF
INERNATIONAL SocIEmTY 201, 212 (1984)).
203. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1138.
204. The vast majority of Non-Self Governing Territories were not part of the mandate
system.
205. See Crawford, supra note 151, at40.
206. See supra notes 187-191 and accompanying text. For example, it was generally un-
derstood that "[t]he A and C mandates ... were makeshift solutions, the former to be con-
verted into semi-independent states as soon as possible, [and] the latter to be transformed
into permanent acquisitions as soon as international circumstances permitted." Louis, supra
note 189, at 210. The C mandates, with the exception of Samoa, were regarded as strategic
possessions. They were all administered as integral parts of the mandatory power which
"possessed complete control over immigration, commerce, and defense policies." Apart
from being required to submit annual reports to the League of Nations, the C mandatory
powers held their mandate territories as their own territories in all but name. See id at 212.
Secret treaties between the allies and others delimited interests in various territories, in-
cluding German colonies in Africa.
207. See Louis, supra note 189, at 207.
208. See MARGALrn-, supra note 106, at 27 (noting that Article 22 provide[d] for three
distinct types of mandates based upon the development of the peoples, geography, and eco-
nomic conditions in the mandate areas). This discourse also identified national races, such
as the British race. See Louis, supra note 189, at 207. Japan proposed that the League
Covenant embrace racial equality, but such a declaration would have had profound reper-
cussions on the domestic policies of many countries, including American treatment of its
black citizens and Australian policy toward aboriginals. These practices militated against its
approval. See Vincent, supra note 126, at 245 (noting that "Hughes of Australia pro-
nounced the theory of racial equality nonsense and President Wilson deemed that the mo-
tion failed for want of securing unanimous approval"). The Charter of the United Nations,
as compared to the League of Nations Covenant, contains declarations of racial equality.
See id at 252; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 73 (stating that people lacked self-government,
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time would be able to stand alone; the tribal "B" peoples of tropical Africa, who
would require an infinite number of years or decades of economic or political ad-
vancement under European tutelage; and the "C" primitive peoples of the Pacific,
"who probably would remain European subjects at least for a period of centuries,
if not forever."2 The nature of the Mandate varied according to the perceived de-
velopment of the people." 0
Class A mandates were the first to achieve nominal independence, although the
colonial powers retained a large measure of control over military and foreign poli-
cies of these new states.2 ' The Class B and C mandates remained in place upon
the demise of the League" 2 and were expected to be transferred to the trusteeship
rather than that they lacked the ability for self-government as stated in the League of Na-
tions Covenant).
209. See Louis, supra note 189, at 201; LEAGuE OF NATIONs COVENANT art. 22, para. 4-6
(describing the developmental stage of the Mandates which were eventually labeled A, B,
and C and noting that these "paternalistic distinctions held good for the leaders of the anti-
colonial movements as well as for supporters of empire"). The A Mandates included Iraq
and Palestine (administered by Great Britain); and Syria (France). The B Mandates were
Cameroon (Britain, France); Tanganyika (Britain); and Ruanda-Urundi (Belgium). The C
Mandates were South West Africa (South Africa); New Guinea (Australia); Samoa (New
Zealand); and the Marshall, Carolines, and Marinas Islands (Japan). See id. at 202.
210. See Louis, supra note 189, at 201. "A" mandates reached a stage of development
where their existence as independent nations could be provisionally recognized, subject to
administrative advice and assistance by the mandatory until they could stand alone. See
MARGALrrH, supra note 106, at 27-28. Mandatories had considerably more powers in B
mandates. They were completely responsible for administering territories, subject to speci-
fied limitations, such as respecting freedom of conscience and religion. See id. Mandataries
were urged to take strong measures against various evils and abuses such as trafficking in
slaves, liquors, and arms. See id. Mandate agreements also dealt with open door policies
and provided for equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of all members of the
League of Nations. See id. Territories such as Southwest Africa and German islands in the
Pacific fell into the "C" group. Given their sparse populations or their size, their remote-
ness from centers of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the
Mandatory, they were to be governed by the laws of the Mandatory, but subject to the same
initiatives that applied to B group mandates. See id. at 29.
211. See Crawford, supra note 151, at 41. On the complex situation surrounding the
conclusion of the mandate over Palestine, see for example, CHOWDHUi, supra note 124, at
105-112; CRAWFORD, supra note 143, at 247 n.2, 340, 426. Many of what Crawford defines
as international protectorates were in the Middle East, British protectorates in the Arabian
Gulf included Kuwait, Qatar and the Trucial States of Oman (now United Arab Emirates).
See id. French protectorates included Morocco and Tunisia. See PHILLip C. JESSup, THE
BIRTH OF NATIONS 93, 155 (1974). These states were subject to protectorate agreements
which substantially restricted their independence in matters of international relations and
the conduct of foreign and internal affairs. See CRAWFORD, supra note 143, at 196-98.
Class A Mandates included Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Transjordan. See id. at 426.
212. CRAWFORD, supra note 143, at 337 (noting the "A" Mandates declared independ-
ence before the League of Nations dissolved. The "B" and "C" mandates (except South-
west Africa) were transferred to the Trusteeship system. See id. at 341. The League of Na-
tions Assembly acknowledged that mandataries would continue to administer their
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system under the auspices of the nascent U.N.P Thus, there was an overall theme
of eventual inclusion and incorporation of "backward" territories into interna-
tional society.21 4 The goal of the civilizing mission was to eventually make man-
date territories sovereign. This was to be achieved through the League of Na-
tions.1 5 Anghie notes:
The conquests of the nineteenth century were replaced with the census, education
systems, the systematization of land tenure, and the modification of legal systems.
Civilization was no longer a vague idea haphazardly introduced in disparate ways
by colonial powers within their own territories. Rather it became centralized
within the mandate system. Civilization was not so much imposed by force as it
was implemented through administrative techniques aimed at making the natives
internalize a new social reality and regulate their own behavior accordinglyY 5
mandates pursuant to the terms of the Mandate agreements until new agreements were
reached with United Nations. See CHAnfMAN E. ToUSSAINT, THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF
THE UNrrED NAIONs 46, 47 (1956) (noting that the General Assembly's resolution did not
suggest what would happen if new treaties were not concluded). While there were no spe-
cific provisions in the League Covenant on termination of mandates, the Permanent Man-
dates Commission (PMC) believed the system was temporary and formulated conditions for
termination. Whether a people had become fit for self-government was a question of fact,
not principle, settled by careful observation of the political, social, and economic develop-
ment of each people. Suggested qualifications to determine self-government included that
the territory: (1) have a settled government; (2) be capable of maintaining its territorial in-
tegrity and political independence; (3) be able to maintain public peace; (4) have adequate
financial resources; and (5) possess laws and a judicial organization which would afford
equal and regular justice. See CHOWDHURI, supra note 124, at 246-7. The International
Court of Justice found that the obligation to promote the material and moral well-being and
social progress of the inhabitants did not depend on the existence of the League of Nations.
Consequently, a mandate could not be ended merely because this supervisory organ ceased
to exist. See International Status of South West Africa, supra note 106, at 133-4.
213. See Status of Namibia, supra note 201, at 33.
214. See Anghie, supra note 23, at 496 (noting that it was the exclusion of the non-
European world from this society that gave the mandate system its momentum).
215. See International Status of South West Africa, supra note 106, at 132. The ICY later
noted that the League had assumed a position of supervision and control. See id The man-
datory government "was to exercise an international function of administration on behalf of
the League, with the object of promoting the well-being and development of the inhabi-
tants." Id The authors of the Covenant believed effective performance of the sacred trust
required that the administration of mandated territories should be subject to international
supervision. See id at 136. In his separate opinion in the South West Africa Case, Judge
McNair noted that in one of the earliest documents on the mandate system, the authority,
control, or administration of these dependent territories should be vested in the League, but
because joint administration of territories had been found wanting wherever it had been
tried, it was preferable that instead of exercising these powers itself, the League should
delegate them to a mandatory state. See id at 147 (quoting GENERAL J.C. SMUTS, THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS: A PRAcncAL SUGGESTION (1918), reprinted in D. I- MalLE, TIM
DRAFTIG OF THE COVENANT 23-60 (1928)).
216. See Anghie, supra note 23, at 495-96. For example, the B mandate governing the
British mandate of Tanganyika covered such topics as maintaining peace, order, and good
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Thus, the system also required a concept of nation-state against which the devel-
opment of particular territories could be measured. 17
Given the underlying premises and structure of the League of Nations Mandate
system, it is apparent that international law continued to support the concept of su-
perior and inferior races and cultures and the concept that a system was necessary
to elevate certain races and cultures to the European standard of "civilization."
The U.N. trusteeship system incorporated many of these doctrines, but the rhetoric
and, perhaps, the belief that subordinate peoples might eventually reach this pre-
sumed aspiration changed.
C. THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM
At the end of the Second World War, European powers intended to retain their
colonial territories permanently." 8 The United Nations Charter continued, and in
some respects broadened, the concept of international supervision. It also de-
scribed aspirational international standards for Non-Self-Governing Territories.21 9
The Charter did not proscribe colonialism,"0 and it concomitantly established the
government; promoting the moral well being and social progress of the inhabitants; free-
dom of worship and conscience; and the application of general international conventions.
See id. Other topics included slavery and forced labor, land transfer, natural resource con-
cessions, fiscal and administrative unions with adjacent territories, and the obligation to
make annual reports to the Council of the League of Nations concerning measures to apply
the provisions of the mandate. See British Mandate for East Africa (Tanganyika) reprinted
in H. DuNcAN HALL, MANDATEs, DEPENDENCIEs AND TRUSTEESHIP 303-06 (1948). Hall
states that there was a fundamental assumption that the political and social systems fostered
in the mandate territories was the democratic way of life developed in the English speaking
world and France. See id. at 128 (defining "democratic way of life" to include "liberty of
person, opinion, and property; the rule of law; the freedoms of the Magna Carta, the Bill of
Rights, and the Rights of Man; and in due course, self-government with self-determination,
ending in political partnership with the mandatory state or independence").
217. See Anghie, supra note 23, at 495 (explaining how "[t]he absensce of sovereignty
and the engagement of international institutions ... created novel practical possibilites"
necessitating adoption of the nation-state concept).
218. See ADAMS, supra note 143, at 47-48. Given the European Powers' greatly weak-
ened power and other changes wrought by the war, however, this became increasingly un-
tenable. See id.; see also infra notes 222-230 and accompanying text.
219. See ADAMs, supra note 143, at 22 (explaining that the inhabitants in mandate and
non-self-governing territories played no role in writing the U.N. Charter nor constructing
the post-war economic institutions, thus their interests were not considered in forming and
shaping these institutions). Of the 43 participating countries at the San Francisco Confer-
ence, where the U.N. Charter was drafted, only three were from Africa (Egypt, Ethiopia,
and Liberia), five from Asia (India, Iran, Iraq, the Philippines, and China) and 19 from
Latin America. See id
220. See Mutua, supra note 55, at 1139-40 (advocating that the U.N. Charter outlawed
colonialism). This assertion is highly doubtful because the validity of colonialism as an in-
stitution is not challenged in any of the articles of the Charter. Moreover, no such intent is
reflected in the legislative history of the Charter. See C.J.R. Dugard, The Organization of
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trusteeship system = ' to replace and expand upon the mandate system.t The rela-
tionship of these developments is premised on trusteeship as another form of colo-
nialism." Trusteeship, however, is the model proposed for administering deterio-
rating states because it guided the territories to self-rule under the auspices of the
U.N.M4
The trusteeship system applied to mandate territories (those detached from en-
emy states after the Second World War) and territories voluntarily placed in the
system by the states responsible for their administration. The system only ap-
African Unity and Colonialism: An Inquiry into the Plea of Self-Defence as a Justification
for the Use of Force in the Eradication of Colonialism, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 157, 172-73
(1967) ("The Charter of the United Nations, as framed in 1945, implicitly recognized the
legitimacy of colonialism, but in Chapter XI it introduced the principle of international ac-
countability for colonial administrations, for colonial Powers undertook to transmit infor-
mation concerning their territories to the Secretary-General of the United Nations."). By
"imposing the duty of accountability to the U.N. for the administration of colonies, [the
U.N.] recognize[d] the legitimacy of colonialism." Id at 172-73 n.86. However, colonial-
ism eventually came to be viewed as contrary to international law and was ultimately
deemed contrary to "jus cogens rules of self-determination and respect for fundamental
human rights." UMOZURIKE supra note 14, at 85; see also 1995 (Spec. ed.) U.N.Y.B. 181,
U.N. Sales No. E.95.1.50 (emphasis added) (noting the General Assembly's later view that
decolonization became a legal requirement because the domination and exploitation of peo-
ple denied fundamental rights contrary to the U.N. Charter).
221. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 75-91; GOODRICH & HAhmRO, supra note 14, at 232-56;
LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: CO.,ENTARY AND
DoCUmEN's 465-78 (3rd ed. 1969) [hereinafter DoCUMENTs] (describing the creation and
objectives of the trusteeship system); RUTH RuSsELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNTED NATiONrS
CHARTER, supra note 14, at 337-40 (describing the need for total development of dependent
areas and the need for the trustees and the inhabitants of the territories to work for the goal
of independence).
222. See GOODRICH & HA~mRO, supra note 14, at 232-35 (describing how the Trustee-
ship System replaced and expanded the Mandate System); DOCUmmNTS, supra note 221, at
464-67.
223. See TOUSSAINT, supra note 212, at 17 (describing the Trusteeship System as "the
most comprehensive and recent system of international colonial control"). Only the trust
agreement for Somaliland specifically referred to the goals of self-government or independ-
ence and established dates to achieve the objectives of Article 76(b). See also DocUmms,
supra note 221, at 470; JAMIES N. MURRAY, JR., THE UNrrED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM
216 (1957) (noting trusteeship modified, rather than departed, from the colonial policies of
administering states). Moreover, "[n]either mandates nor trusteeships can, quite obviously,
be considered as isolated from the general picture of colonialism at any given time." Id. at
213.
224. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 75-91.
225. See id art. 77. Placing mandate territories under the trusteeship system was not
compulsory, rather the Charter makes the system capable of application by means of Trus-
teeship Agreements. See id at 102; see also Clive Parry, The Legal Nature of The Trustee-
ship Agreements, 27 Brr. Y.B. INT'L L. 164, 164 (1940); U.N. CHARTER arts. 75,77; Inter-
national Status of South West Africa, supra note 106, at 139-40. The Drafters of the Charter
were faced with either a consensual system or no system at all. See RUSSELL, supra note 14,
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plied to those territories placed in it pursuant to a trusteeship agreement. 226 Eleven
such agreements were concluded.227
The progressive development of trust territories toward self-government or in-
dependence was an express Charter objective." Unlike article 73b, which applied
to Non-Self-Governing Territories aspiring toward self-government, self-
government and independence became equal objectives within the trusteeship
system.229 Factors used in determining which objective to pursue included: the
at 825-26. Nonetheless those mandates which had not achieved independence by the time
the League of Nations dissolved (B and C mandates excluding the South African mandate
over South West Africa (Namibia)), were placed in the trust system. See Status of Namibia,
supra note 201, at 31. Goodrich and Hambro note that "[w]hile the door [was] open to any
Member which possesse[d] a colony to place it by agreement under the trusteeship system,
there [could] be no allegation of breach of faith or violation of the spirit of the charter if it
refuse[d] to do so." GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 14, at 239. While it was hoped that
colonial powers would place at least some of their colonies under the trust system, none
actually did. See UMOZURIKE, supra note 199, at 98.
226. See DocuMENTS, supra note 221, at 488-92 (noting that trusteeship agreements
were concluded between the administering state and the U.N.). For ordinary trust territories,
the trust agreement defined the terms of administration and was approved by the General
Assembly, whereas the Security Council approved strategic trust territory agreements. See
CHOWDHURi, supra note 124, at 84-85; see also Parry, supra note 225, at 184 (contending
that it may not have been the intent of the drafters of the Charter to make the U.N. a party to
these agreements).
227. The following Non-Self Governing Territories were placed within the International
Trusteeship System:
Administering Trust Territory Agreement Approved Population
Authority by UNGA as of 1938
Australia New Guinea December 13, 1946 587,625
Belgium Ruanda-Urundi December 13, 1946 3,752,742
France French Cameroon December 13, 1946 2,609,508
France French Togoland December 13, 1946 370,327
New Zealand Western Samoa December 13, 1946 57,759
United Kingdom British Cameroon December 13, 1946 857,675
United Kingdom British Togoland December 13, 1946 370,327
United Kingdom Tanganyika December 13, 1946 5,287,929
United States Trust Territory of April 2, 1947 121,128
the Pacific Islands
UK, NZ, & Aus. Nauru November 1, 1947 3,400
Italy Italian Somaliland December 2, 1950
HALL, supra note 216, at 295. The Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands included the Mar-
shall, Mariana, and the Caroline Islands, which totaled more than 2,100 islands and atolls.
WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 2, at 683.
228. See U.N. CHARTER art. 76(b). Other objectives included promoting the political,
economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants. See Id.
229. See GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 14, at 235 Article 73(b) entreated Members
to cultivate self-government and help the peoples of NSGTs develop free political institu-
tions, but this did not oblige colonial powers to grant independence. See id. Colonial pow-
ers were obliged only to develop self-government and free institutions which could take the
form of independence resulting in severing all political ties with the colonizing state.
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specific circumstances of the territory, the freely expressed wishes of the indige-
nous population, and the terms of the trusteeship agreement."0 These agreements
were more detailed and extensive than Mandate agreements, with more emphasis
on gradually cultivating self-government and independence."'
Provisions governing the administration of the territories were contained in
trusteeship agreements implemented by the administering power." The inhabi-
tants of the territories were not consulted about the terms of these agreements, and
during the negotiation process, all parties ignored their objectionsY3 The Charter
also permitted the administering authority to be more than one state or the U.N.
itself 4
230. See id
231. See CHOWDHMI, supra note 124, at 98 (explaining that the mandate agreements
concentrated on prohibiting abuses in such territories).
232 See id at 95 (stating that these agreements constituted the over-arching legal struc-
ture that applied to the day-to-day administration of the territories).
233. See id at 83-84. There was considerably more scrutiny by various committees of
the U.N. than was the case with mandate agreements. Disagreements arose over private mo-
nopolies in the territories, the establishment of military arrangements, whether trust territo-
ries could be administered as integral parts of administering authorities, and the termination
and revision of agreements. See id at 88-92. For example, Members of the General Assem-
bly generally favored including clauses that would terminate trust arrangements by a certain
date, and guaranteed that the trust would be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants,
meaning that public property should be returned upon expiration of the trust mandate. See
id at 91. The colonial powers resisted such provisos and usually prevailed because the sys-
tem was consensual, and they could simply pull out if they found the terms too onerous. See
id Moreover, it must be noted that despite the additional oversight, it was the United Na-
tions Organization and the administering state that made decisions, not the people of the
territory on whose behalf all of the parties purported to act. See ToussAiNT, supra note 212,
at 203, 78 ("The inhabitants of the trust territories had no hand in choosing the authority
that was to administer them, nor in approving the governing trusteeship agreements.").
While the United Nations Charter permits any "state directly involved" to participate in the
drafting of the agreement, there is no mention of trust territories as a "state directly in-
volved." 1946-47 U.N.Y.B. 186, Sales No. 1947.1.18. The inhabitants did object to the
agreements and the methods used to reach them, such as undiscussed drafts. See
CHowDHulu, supra note 124, at 83 (citing the French draft agreement for Togoland is one
such example). There were also objections to "the British drafts which ignored Ewe aspira-
tions towards a united administration." Id Although the West Samoans were consulted, the
administering authority did not truly listen to the people given that the draft agreement was
processed by the General Assembly while a Convention on the agreement was held in West
Samoa. See id at 83-4. Africans "protested against the partition of Togoland and the Cam-
eroon between Britain and France... and demanded unification of these territories under
the Trusteeship system as [the territories] existed before 1913." Id at 83. Not permitting the
participation of the inhabitants led to severe criticisms of portions of proposed trusteeship
drafts. See id at 84.
234. See U.N. CHARTER art. 81. Proposals that the UN be the trustee were based on the
belief that the Organization would be more impartial, have a broader outlook, and the in-
habitants would make rapid strides toward self-government. See DoCUmETrs, supra note
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The trusteeship system entailed broader and more effective international super-
vision than had been the case under the League of Nations Permanent Mandates
Commission." s The Trusteeship Council, established in 1947,fl6 requested infor-
mation on such matters as developing governmental organs, implementing univer-
sal suffrage, training inhabitants for administrative responsibilities, and developing
adequate revenue. 7 The Council examined reports from administering powers,
considered petitions from the inhabitants,"8 and aranged periodic visits at ap-
proximately three-year intervals. 9 Visiting missions from the Trusteeship Coun-
cil, the General Assembly, and special bodies established to specifically ascertain
the wishes of the inhabitants, generally terminated trusteeship agreements. 2 0
221, at 501. The mandatory powers unanimously opposed this idea, however, and the U.N.
has never been an administering authority. See TOUSSANr, supra note 212, at 208. In 1947,
the Trusteeship Council drafted a trust agreement for the City of Jerusalem designating the
U.N. as the administering authority, with the Trusteeship Council administering the terri-
tory on behalf of the U.N. This agreement, however, never entered into force. See id.
235. See Status of Namibia, supra note 201, at 33.
236. See CHOWDHUM, supra note 124, at 69. The Trusteeship Council was created under
Chapter XIII of the Charter as the principle U.N. organ responsible for the trust territories.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 86-91. The Council operates under the authority of the General Assem-
bly. See id. art. 87. Its membership is comprised of members administering trust territories,
the permanent Members of the Security Council, and a sufficient number of additional
member states to ensure that the total number of Council Members is equally divided be-
tween members that administer trust territories and those which do not. See id. art. 86.
Given this membership scheme, trust agreements were concluded and approved before the
Council was established. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 14, at 252.
237. See DOCUMENTs, supra note 221, at 470, 535-536; 1946.47 U.N.Y.B. 578, Sales
No. 1947.1.18. By 1952 the General Assembly also expected target dates for independence.
See CHOWDHURI, supra note 124, at 248-9.
238. See U.N. CHARTER art. 87; UMOZURIKE, supra note 199, at 101. According to the
administering powers, the right to petition and the creation of visiting missions ensured
protection of inhabitants' interests. See CHOWDHMRI, supra note 124, at 243-44. Yet ad-
ministering powers vehemently opposed representatives from the trust territories taking part
in the work of the Trusteeship Council. See id. at 240-6. The League Covenant did not dis-
cuss the right to petition. See International Status of South West Africa, supra note 106, at
137. But in 1923, the Council of the League of Nations adopted rules permitting petitions to
the League from communities in mandate territories. See id. They were to be submitted by
the mandatory governments, which could attach any comments they considered desirable.
See id.
239. See UMOZURwKE, supra note 199, at 101. These visits were arranged and agreed to
ahead of time by the administering states and were usually preceded and followed by in-
tense political activity by the inhabitants. See id. A proposal that would have authorized the
Trusteeship Council to designate U.N. representatives as liaisons between the U.N., admin-
istering authorities and the peoples of the trust territories was opposed by the colonial pow-
ers and never adopted. The rationale was to secure communication between U.N. visits,
which were brief and at lengthy intervals. See CHOWDHURI, supra note 124, at 252.
240. By 1975, ten of the eleven trust territories had either (1) achieved the goal of inde-
pendence or self-government or (2) united with an adjoining territory after a U.N.-
sponsored plebiscite. Trusteeships were terminated by an agreement between the General
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While administering states had moderately different opinions regarding their
trust territories, all shared the underlying assumption that they should bring these
territories to a point where they possessed the capability to govern themselves. The
Administering Authority, with U.N. oversight, was largely to control this proc-
ess.24 The inhabitants, however, gradually gained more control over their daily
affairs.242 Administering states generally modified, rather than departed from, their
Assembly and the Administering Authority, usually after a U.N. directed plebiscite. See
CRAWFORD, supra note 143, at 341. Given this arrangement, the issue of "states directly
concerned" did not arise. DoctENTms, supra note 221, at 494. Whether the goal of self-
government or independence had been reached was determined by the General Assembly or
Security Council (for strategic areas), the administering authority, and the "states directly
concerned." See ToussAINT, supra note 212, at 135. There were difficulties in determining
whether self-government or independence had been achieved because there were few
guidelines in the Charter or in the agreements themselves. See id at 136. African trusts
were terminated between 1957 and 1962. See CRAXWFORD, supra note 143, at 426-28 (dis-
cussing details regarding the achievement of independence by African and other trust terri-
tories). From 1975 through the early 1990s, the trust status of the Trust Territory of the Pa-
cific Islands gradually ended. The Northern Mariana Islands voted to become a United
States Commonwealth and the three other jurisdictions including the Federated States of
Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau approved association agreements through U.N.
plebiscites, that provided "local autonomy while leaving defense responsibilities with the
United States." ROBERT E. RIGGs & JAcK C. PLANO, THE UNrrED NAmroNs: INTEamO%,o L
ORGANIZATION AND WORLD PoLmcs 191 (2d ed. 1994); see also Ou GLOBAL
NEIGHBOURHOOD: THE REPORT OF THE CONZUSSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 251 (1995)
(explaining the last trust territory, Palau, "became a self-governing territory in free associa-
tion with the United States" in 1994).
241. See 1947-48 U.N.Y.B. 736-37, 750-51, U.N. Sales No. 1947.1.18 (noting that in the
early years of the trusteeship system, the inhabitants remained voiceless. If they had posi-
tions in government, it was in low level posts that were without much authority). The U.N.
stressed the need for education during this period. See id at 738-39, 747-48. Working con-
ditions improved slightly, but not enough to make a true difference in the standard of living.
See id at 736, 745-46. Furthermore, the Administering Authorities usually controlled real
property and natural resources. See id at 743-45, 751-52. The Administering Authorities in
many of the territories continued to use corporal punishment rather than imprisonment. See
id at 740, 755. The biggest U.N. effort was to urge Administering Authorities to set a date
for independence or self-government. See 1956 U.N.Y.B. 338-39, 341-42, 351, 357, 362-
63, U.N. Sales No. 1957.1.1. Unfortunately, most Administering Authorities believed that
setting a date for independence or self-government hindered development in the Trust Ter-
ritories. See id at 338, 341, 357.
242. See MURRAY, supra note 223, at 219-20. As the trusteeship era progressed, the in-
habitants gained more power and control over their internal affairs. Economies improved
and many Territories had co-operatives of some type to allow more inhabitants to partici-
pate in the economy. 1956 U.N.Y.B 336-37, 340, 350, 359, U.N. Sales No. 1957.1.1.
Moreover, economic diversification was encouraged and viewed as a means to reach self-
government or independence. See id at 340, 359. Small industries also began to develop.
See id at 341, 350. The U.N. continued to focus on the need for education and also empha-
sized improving the status of women. See id at 343, 347, 357. The emphasis on education
progressed from primary education to a focus that included the need for secondary and uni-
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general colonial policies.243
The French envisioned association, rather than assimilation, in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica and sought to create a "gallicized elite among Africans,"'2 which was accul-
turated to French civilization.245 These educated individuals were to return to Af-
rica to hold administrative positions, thereby "Africanizing" governmental
structures and advancing the French goal of political development toward associa-
tion. Over the long-term, France also hoped to assimilate the masses and promoted
three alternatives for its trust territories: "(1) legal union with France, (2) associa-
tion with the French Union, or (3) complete independence." 46 Trust policies,
however, encouraged adoption of the first two options and discouraged independ-
ence.
247
Paternalism was at the heart of Belgian social and economic trusteeship poli-
cies.248 Although the objective was to civilize the "primitive people," the Belgians
did not emulate the French by attempting to turn the indigenous inhabitants into
Europeans. 249 Belgium sought to educate the populace about "the fundamentals of
morality and the requirements of earning a living in some trade," 250 without creat-
ing a European educated elite.25'
versity-level educational opportunities. See id. at 337, 341, 347, 350-51, 355, 360, 362.
Another focal point of U.N. activity was encouraging universal suffrage and elections in
several Trust Territories. See id. at 338, 340, 342, 346, 356, 359. By 1956, there were sub-
stantial differences between the Trust Territories as some prepared for independence while
others failed to progress toward this goal. Political uprisings, such as the 1955 uprising in
Cameroon began to occur. See id at 349; see also 1959 U.N.Y.B. 353-4, U.N. Sales No.
60.1.1 (concerning problems of violent outbreaks in Ruanda-Urundi). The U.N. quickly
condemned uprisings because they reversed political development. See 1956 U.N.Y.B 349,
U.N. Sales No. 1957.1.1. Peoples of the Trust Territories submitted petitions to the U.N.
concerning problems in the Territories, and thus the inhabitants slowly developed a voice
on the international stage. See id. at 351-52. Additionally, the inhabitants were granted
more authority and greater representation in government and as a result slowly began to
gain more power. See id. at 342, 346, 350, 356, 359, 361.
243. See MURRAY, supra note 223, at 211-238.
244. See id. at 216. The main component of French colonial policy was to create a cen-
tralized and uniformly governed empire. Indigenous inhabitants of the colonies would be
gradually absorbed into French culture and, in time, become Frenchmen. See id.
245. See id. at 217.
246. See id.
247. See id. At the beginning of the trusteeship era, France sought trust association
through representation in the Assembly of the French Union or in the French Parliament
because local autonomy was not desirable. See id.
248. See MURRAY, supra note 223, at 217.
249. See id. Thus in Ruanda-Urundi, Belgium preserved domestic organization that did
not interfere with Belgian control of the territory. Western reforms such as voting, which
accorded the local population more power, were avoided. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 217-18. This educational policy stemmed from the fear that foreign edu-
cation created a wave of undue hope among such an elite. The British and French policy, on
the other hand, was to educate indigenous elites. See id.
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British administration was superimposed on local political institutions. 2 The
British, in theory, did not destroy local political structures but only sought to
"gradually improve them." " This policy endeavored to give complete control to
local peoples whose territories remained harmonious with British interests. Brit-
ain did not try to Anglicize local populations except to the extent it taught them
good administration, which entailed Western standards of good government. So-
cial equality was not an aspiration. Rather, the aim in mixed territories was the
parallel political development of Europeans, Asians, and Africans without elimi-
nating legal distinctions based on national origin. 5
It is evident that the Administering Powers remained intent on preparing their
charges for civilization. Take for example the following quotation:
The trusteeship system has not, it is true, been devised in the interests of the ad-
ministering authority,.. . nor has it been devised as an instrument with which to
belabour those governments who have often, at substantial cost to themselves,
and with a genuine and encouraging honesty of purpose ... undertaken the
lengthy and laborious task of assisting and guiding the development of a back-
ward people towards enlightened self-government.2
While the methods of imposing "civilization" differed among powers in some
respects, the underlying premises were in harmony. Despite the intentions of the
colonial powers, independence became the ultimate goal.' This transformation
was undoubtedly due to the changes taking place in the rest of the colonial world.
V. DECOLONIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
A. DECOLONIZATION
On the eve of the Second World War, nine colonial powers controlled 150 ter-
ritories that were inhabited by 650 million people." In the ensuing twenty years
after World War II, this vast configuration was almost totally dismantled. Profes-
sor Crawford proffers several theories to explain the pace and timing of this his-
toric change, 9 including: indigenous efforts toward national liberation,' which
252. See id at218.
253. See MURRAY, supra note 223, at 218 (noting that the British undertook to harmo-
nize British and African institutions so that their territories could stand on their own).
254. See id
255. See id. at219.
256. See CHOWDHuR, supra note 124, at 94 (quoting Sir Carl Berendsen of Nev Zea-
land).
257. See DocUmTmS, supra note 221, at 469-471.
258. See EL-AYoUTY, supra note 141, at 4.
259. See Crawford, supra note 151, at 46-48.
260. See SAID, supra note 23, at 196 (quoting Basil Davidson as noting that "African
cultural responses after 1945 were as varied as one might expect from so many peoples and
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embraced both peaceful movements by the intelligentsia and guerilla wars for self-
determination;26' the growing and ultimately unsustainable expense of empire; 62
an increasing inability to maintain empire in the face of both movements for lib-
eration and weakened metropolitan economies;263 a growing distaste for empire
among political elites and the mass public within the colonial powers;" and a shift
perceived interests").
261. See EL-AYOuTY, supra note 141, at 5 (explaining that the Second World War de-
stroyed the myth of white supremacy and exposed the numerous shortcomings of the colo-
nial powers). Colonial powers were defeated or greatly weakened by Nazi Germany and
therefore could not protect their colonies. Consequently, contact between rulers and ruled
were severed, leaving colonized people to be self-reliant during the war. Nationalist leaders
filled the resulting power vacuums in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. See id. Colonial
territories also played an active part in the war effort, further exposing colonial inhabitants
to other lands, cultures, ideas, and to the imperfections of their rulers. See id. Improvements
in communication and transportation also meant decreasing isolation. See id. at 6. Nation-
alist intellectuals proclaimed that colonialism was a form of foreign exploitation that em-
bodied the worst form of racial discrimination. See id. at 5-6. These leaders were influenced
by axis propaganda, concepts of liberty expounded by the Western camp, and communist
denunciations of oppression and colonialism. See id. Edward Said contends that imperial
powers consistently misrepresented that Western concepts of freedom led to the struggle
against colonial rule and, consequently, the war against imperialism was one of imperial-
ism's major triumphs. See SAm, supra note 23, at 199. Said maintains that this view over-
looks the cultural reserves that always resisted imperialism. See id.
262. See EI-AYotrrY, supra note 141, at 6 (noting that many of the economic and mili-
tary motives behind colonialism diminished over time). Colonial powers were no longer
dependent on the raw materials extracted from their possessions, and new weaponry made
the need for colonial military manpower largely obsolete. See id. at 7. The greatly weak-
ened economic position of the colonial powers after the war was also a factor. ADAMs, su-
pra note 143, at 47-48. During World War II, the U.S. mobilized its industrial resources to
support its own war effort, and those of its European allies, through lend-lease and other
programs. This support increased the indebtedness of European allies to the U.S. and fur-
ther reinforced the overwhelming dominant economic and political position of the U.S. in
the post-war era. See id. at 46.
263. See EL-AYOUTY, supra note 141, at 6-7; ADAMS, supra note 143, at 48-49. The
collapse in commodity prices during the depression led to continued economic strain
throughout the 1930's and even civil unrest in some instances because wages, employment
and income depended on revenues generated by commodity exports. These developments
led to increasing dissatisfaction with the status quo and provided "a natural breeding
ground for political agitation and anti-colonial nationalism." See ADAMs, supra note 143, at
48-49. Adams suggests that the military weakness of France and Britain during the 1956
Suez crisis also demonstrated that these powers were no longer able to operate as great
powers in the colonial world. See id. at 51-52.
264. See SAm, supra note 23, at 199-200, 276 (noting that "[w]ithout metropolitan
doubts and opposition, the characters, idiom and very structure of native resistance to impe-
rialism would have been different"). Said argues that " j]ust as culture may predispose and
actively prepare one society for the overseas domination of another, it may also prepare that
society to relinquish or modify the idea of overseas domination." Id. at 199-200. Others
view decolonization as a policy reached unilaterally by colonial powers, however:
Decolonization suddenly became the settled policy of the British, the French, and the Belgians, a
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in opinion and international norms, regarding the legitimacy of colonialism among
non-colonial powers.26 The anti-imperial struggle "was universalized and the rift
between Western (white, European, advanced) and non-Western (colored, native,
underdeveloped) cultures and peoples was dramatized.""ze Demands for universal
democracy, human rights, and self-determination emerged in the U.N. era, forcing
international law to address these issues in order to remain relevant.,
Although the U.N. Charter did not espouse decolonization, it included a chapter
on Non-Self Governing Territories (NSGTs),6 pertaining to colonial territories
policy precipitately and thoroughly applied whatever the costs and the consequences. The policy
was, by and large, the outcome of a unilateral decision taken by the metropolitan authorities,
rather than a response to some overwhelming or irresistible pressure exerted by the African
populations. The decision was based on a judgement [sic] about the worth to the metropolitan
countries of administering these colonies. It was taken in the light of assumptions about the future
tendencies of world politics, of the world balance of power, and of the manner in which this bal-
ance--military as well as political-would be affected by the metropolitan countries relinquish-
ing control over Africa.
Elie Kedourie, A New International Disorder, in THE ExPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL
SocIEry 347,351-2 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds., 1984).
Finally, if racial attitudes were an element in the age of European ascendancy, they also
accompanied its passing. The seriousness with which Europeans took their supposedly in-
comparable genetic endowments at the zenith of imperial enthusiasm in the late nineteenth
century meant that when they realized their own mortality, the shock was more severe. See
Vincent, supra note 126, at 240.
265. See Lam, supra note 33, at 615 (discussing how the Soviet Union supported de-
colonization, which also became imperative to the Third World/Socialist majority voting
block that eventually coalesced at the U.N. after World War 11). There were also emerging
demands for universal democracy, human rights, and self-determination. See Anghie, supra
note 23, at 496. The United States was unwilling to lend military support to maintain cxclu-
sivist colonial regimes. See ADAMS, supra note 143, at 53. Continued European control
over colonial possessions in Africa and Asia would have denied America access to trade
and investment opportunities and the exploitation of raw materials abundant in the colonies.
See id at 48. Decolonization was also due in part to cold war imperatives; Moscow's strong
condemnation of colonialism and its support for radical movements encouraged Western
powers to bring the colonial era to a close. See Fred Halliday, The Third World and the End
of the Cold War, 33, 37, in GLOBAL CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE THE NEw
INTERNATIONAL CON-m r OF DEvELoPmNT (Stallings, ed.).
266. See SAID, supra note 23, at 199. Thus there were Pan-African, Pan-Arab, and Pan-
Asian Congresses, as well as solidarity conferences such as the Bandung Afro-Asian Soli-
darity Conference in 1955 where African leaders met with leaders from Asian states that
also experienced European colonialism and faced similar problems of colonialism and ra-
cism. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 51.
267. See Anghie. supra note 23, at 498. This trend eventually led to decolonization and
the admission of non-European states into international society. See id. Five African colo-
nies achieved independence betveen 1956 and 1958, sixteen in 1960, and another seven by
1962. See ADAmS, supra note 143, at 52.
268. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 73-74. NSGTs were "territories whose peoples had not yet
attained a full measure of self-government" Ia art. 73. Chowdhuri maintains that the term
NSGT "implie[d] a curious admixture of historical, juridical, sociological, political and
economic realities which [was] the product of the incoherence of the dependent world."
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administered by U.N. members.269 The Charter signified the first time that interna-
tional obligations were proclaimed concerning colonial territories, and their ad-
ministration was narrowly brought within the purview of the international commu-
nity.27 Chapter XI imposed, as a "sacred trust," an obligation to promote the well
being of colonial inhabitants and to ensure their political, economic, social, and
educational advancement. It also provided for their just treatment, protection
against abuse, and progressive development of free political institutions.27'
CHOWDHuRi, supra note 124, at 6. Because "full measure of self-government" could not be
defined, the term NSGT was interpreted in several ways. Id. at 4. According to the Belgian
government, the term NSGT was applicable to "distinct ethnic groups representing a less
advanced civilization than the administering Power." Id. NSGT was also viewed as "syn-
onymous with [a] 'colony' inhabited by peoples of a different race, language and culture
from that of the peoples of the Powers who rule[d] them." Id. There were two distinctive
features in all NSGT's of this type. The first feature was a non-homogeneous social struc-
ture. The inhabitants and rulers did not form a society united on a common basis, rather
they belonged to different races, countries, religions, and environments, both geographical
and psychological. See id. These societies were the product of two diverse courses of his-
tory and their respective inspirations, goals, and aspirations were viewed as continual con-
trasts. See id. The second feature was that dependent communities lived under non-
indigenous governments, which were foreign to the great mass of the population. Outside
sources held supreme control of the destinies of these countries. See CHOWDHURI, supra
note 124, at 4 (quoting F. M. BARON VAN ASBECK, LE RtGIME DES tTRANGERS DANS LES
COLONIES, RECUEIL DES CouRs 5-7 (1937)). Both interpretations emphasized that the peo-
ples of the colonies were "the other," that was at best different, if not simply subordinate or
inferior. Thus, even where inferiority was not explicitly declared, it was implied since one
group was entitled to rule and dominate the other. Chowdhuri settled on the following defi-
nition of NSGTs: "a territorial unit, geographically separated from the metropolitan coun-
try, and occupying a subordinate political and economic status which has been unilaterally
determined by the Powers concerned without the consent of the freely expressed wishes of
its people." Id. at 5-6.
269. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 73-74. This article applied to the vast majority of NSGTs
because relatively few came within the Article 77 definition of trust territories, and no colo-
nial possessions other than mandates were voluntarily placed in the trusteeship system.
270. See Frank Abdulah, The Right of Decolonization, in THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1205, 1206.
271. See U.N. CHARTER art. 73. But see ADAMs, supra note 143, at 50 (explaining that
this language is patronizing). Yet Article 73 was the legal vehicle utilized to push for more
rapid decolonization until the 1960 adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc A/4684 (1960). Reports submitted pursuant to Article 73 were for
informational purposes only, and there was no criteria to determine when a NSGTs attained
self-government. Nor were there procedures to monitor colonial power compliance. See
Abdulah, supra note 270, at 1206. Consequently, there were disagreements regarding the
obligation to convey information, the type of information to be transmitted, and the use of
collected material. There were also debates on which territories should be termed NSGTs.
In 1959, the General Assembly decided that, prima facie, there was an obligation to transmit
information about a territory which was geographically separate and distinct, ethnically
and/or culturally, from the state administering it. See id. (citing Principles Which Should
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Chapter XI was non-binding and embodied aspirations rather than legal obliga-
tions.2" It only obligated imperial powers to develop self-government tm rather
than giving colonial peoples the right to realize political independence. The Chap-
ter XI strategy as employed in Africa, suggested a leisurely approach to political
change in the colonies.274 Nonetheless, Chapter XI was wielded as a legal tool
within the U.N. to push for decolonization. Despite the initial intention of its draft-
ers, Chapter XI became quite relevant in the struggle against colonialism.
While the League of Nations Covenant did not refer to racial equality,"' the
U.N. Charter affirms respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without
distinctions as to race, sex, language, or religion. 6 Principles of equality, includ-
ing racial equality, became part of the international legal discourse.m Racial
equality as orthodoxy, however, did not lead to its uniform acceptance in interna-
tional society, nor to its universal realization.278 Equality was part of the official
Guide Members in Determining Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit Informa-
tion Called for Under Article 73(e) of the Charter, G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th
Sess., Supp. No. 16., U.N. Doc. A14651 (1960)). NSGTs achieved independence by three
methods: (1) emergence as a sovereign independent state, (2) free association with an inde-
pendent state, and (3) integration with an independent state. The decision was reached by
ascertaining the preferences of the territory's people through an impartial democratic proc-
ess based on universal suffrage. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A14684 (1960).
272. See Russell, supra note 14, at 819-20 (noting Chapter XI is the only Chapter in the
U.N. Charter that is a declaration and was apparently meant to be voluntary); cf. Reisman,
supra note 172, at 236-37.
273. See ANTONIO CASsEsE, SELF DErERhMiATION OF PEOPLES 42 (1995). The language
of Article 76 of the Charter, which applied to trust territories, contemplated progressive de-
velopment toward self-government or independence, indicating that the terms self-
government and independence were not synonymous. See id
274. See ADAMs, supra note 143, at 50. For example, the British planned to consolidate
white rule in colonies with large white settler populations and to eventually turn over total
political power to those whites. In colonies without significant white communities, the in-
tent was to build a "coterie of native political and administrative cadres on whom appropri-
ate doses of self-government could devolve." It at 51. This is yet another example of the
general conviction that native peoples were incompetent and thus, only capable of slowly
acquiring some measure of self-government, while whites would soon be accorded full po-
litical rights and would be entitled to rule native peoples.
275. See supra notes 191-99, 207 and accompanying text.
276. See U.N. CHARTELr arts. 1(3), 55, 76(c). This change in perspective may have
stemmed in part from the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany during World War H, ac-
tions which were based on notions of racial superiority. See Vincent supra note 126, at
252. The emergence of two anti-colonial powers, the United States and the Soviet Union as
hegemons undoubtedly had some impact, although their anti-colonialist views did not nec-
essarily stem from a belief in racial equality. See it
277. See Vincent, supra note 126, at 252.
278. The uneven acceptance of such doctrines should not be a surprise, for the racism of
imperialism varied somewhat with time and place. French ideas about integration, for ex-
ample, differed from the British model of indirect rule. Nehru saw the independence move-
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canon and inspired non-Europeans to demonstrate that they were the equals of
Europeans, while also precipitating a desire to be different.279 Indeed, Third World
Liberation struggles were a part of the rising demands for inclusion in a world
community whose dominant powers perceived them as "other," "object," "mar-
ginal," "inferior," and "subordinate." 28 0 Hence, the question is the extent to which
the official dogma referred to reality.
Much of the resistance to colonialism was conducted under the banner of na-
tionalism,2"' and these movements adopted many of the precepts of European na-
tionalism. Nationalist movements were usually led by the national bourgeoisie and
specialized elites who, to a great extent, were the products of colonialism. 82 The
ment as a national, rather than a racial movement. Racial rhetoric played a more prominent
part in the African independence movements. See Vincent, supra note 126, at 252 ("The
search for an African personality reflect[ed] the quest for dignity of a race that had always
been at the bottom of the European list."). Racial discrimination and segregation in the
United States received increasing attention after the Second World War. See Mary L. Dud-
ziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61, 62 (1988). Given the
United States' objective of promoting democracy and the ideological battle against commu-
nism, racial segregation became increasingly embarrassing. See id. at 62-63. Thus, by driv-
ing the federal government to adopt a pro-civil rights stance, the war against communism
may have contributed to the success of the civil rights movement in the United States See
id. at 62-67.
279. See Vincent, supra note 126, at 250 (noting that the insistence of Europeans on
their essential European nature, may have led Asians to respond with a common feeling of
an essential Asian nature; similarly African celebrated negritude and searched for an Afri-
can personality)." 'We are as good as you,' [became] 'we are different from you and we do
not necessarily have the same values as you."' Id. Equality, as interpreted in an African
context, came to mean that races "have the right to decide for themselves who is to belong
to the separate units and the institutions that will rule them." Racial equality came to mean
preserving the integrity of a race, a doctrine that was alarming in the hands of colonialists,
but was less so when deployed in the defense of the subordinated. See id. Such concepts as
"negritude" proclaimed that there was an African personality, personifying the distinct
cultural values of the black world. See Leopold Sedar Senghor, Negritude: A Humanism of
the Twentieth Century, in COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND POST-COLONIAL THEORY 27-35 (Pat-
rick Williams & Lauren Chrisman eds., 1994).
280. See Anthony E. Cook, Reflections on Postmodernism, 26 N w ENO. L. REv. 751,
764 (1992). Second world resistance to communist and capitalist imperialism and first
world domestic struggles for freedom and equality were also part of this rising chorus. See
id.
281. See SAID, supra note 23, at 223. Said defines "nationalism" as the mobilizing force
that coalesced into resistance against alien occupying empires by peoples with a common
history, language and religion. See id. But see NATIONALIsM 4-5 (John Hutchison & An-
thony Smith eds.) (noting that nationalism is a difficult concept to define, although its main
themes have been "autonomy, unity and identity"). Nationalism encompassed liberation
from external constraints (namely from European colonial powers), a sense of unity by dis-
solving internal divisions, and legal equality represented by a single culture in a homeland.
See id. at4.
282. See SAID, supra note 23, at 223; see also BASIL DAVDSON, LET FREEDOM COME
209 (1978) (discussing a "modernizing elite" among Africans and the influence of Western
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leaders and members of the nationalist organizations that spearheaded the thrust
toward independence often led newly independent governments. 28 These leaders
were usually educated in the West and supported in government positions by the
former colonial powers.' Consequently, there was a strong tendency to replace
discarded colonial administrations with class-based and ultimately exploitative
structures, which replicated the old colonial configurations.' Thus, even as de-
colonization represented a step toward African self-determination, the government
Africans chose to adopt replicated Western modes of governancep' which were
accepted as appropriate and necessary even as colonialists themselves were re-
jected.' Western political systems were adopted with little deference to internal
cultural values.
cultures, particularly the United States); DAVIDSON, supra note 181, at 258 ("To the West-
em-educated few, nationalism on the European model acquired the status of manifest des-
tiny"); KWA5ENKRUMAH, REVOLUTIONARY PATH 38 (1973) (viewing the development of a
colonial intelligentsia as one of the inevitable results of imperialism). Most nationalist
movements have been founded and inspired by intellectuals. See HUtnCHNsON, supra note
281, at 5.
283. See JUUuS K. NYERERF, FREEDOMAND UNITY 106 (1973), stating:
The same nationalist movement, having united the people and led them to independence, must in-
evitably form the first Government of the new state; it could hardly be expected that a united
country should halt mid-stream and voluntarily divide itself into opposing political groups just for
the sake of conforming to what I have called the 'Anglo-Saxon form of democracy' at the mo-
ment of independence.
Id
284. See CLAUDE AKE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPmNT IN AFRICA 3-4 (1996); JOHN D.
HARGREAVES, DECOLONIZATION IN AFRICA 108, 109 (1988) (describing the need to educate
inhabitants to be leaders); MAzRUi & TIDY, supra note 162, at 31 ("lestern education af-
fected an elite minority which led the emerging nationalist political movements.");
MuURRAY, supra note 223, at 217, 218 (describing the reasons why Britain and France en-
couraged Western education for some members of their trust territories and why Belgium
opposed this educational plan).
285. See SAID, supra note 23, at 223 (noting that imperialism claimed to be an educa-
tional movement that set out to modernize, instruct, and civilize, but over time it established
modernizing trends which muted the harsher aspects of imperialist domination while still
preserving the nineteenth century divide between native and Westerner). Colonial schools
taught the native bourgeoisie the history of France or Britain, which demoted native history.
See id
286. See AKE, supra note 284, at 10; see also DAVIDSON, supra note 181, at 251 (quot-
ing Nigerian economist and reformer, Jigeria I. Ode in Bulletin, AFRICAN CEMTRE FOR
DEVELOPMNT AND STRATEGIc STUDIES [ACDESS] 8 (1992)) "[V]hen the opportunity
came to cast aside the yoke of colonialism, no effort was made to reassert Africa's self-
determination by replacing the inherited foreign institutions.., and the flawed European
models of nation-states." Id
287. See NYERERE, supra note 283, at 188-194; DAVIDSON, supra note 25, at 106, 168;
DAVIDSON, supra note 181, at 250, 258.
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B.THE DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE
Post-Colonial theories of development continued the trend of replicating West-
ern paradigms.2"' Racial terms were omitted, but the discourse of subordination
continued under the guise of "development." The theories of modernization,
elaborated after World War II, largely reflected the ideological hegemony of
Western capitalism.289 Accordingly, what emerged was "development as an evolu-
tionary movement from an original state of underdevelopment to an idealized ver-
sion of the United States or Western Europe." 2 o
Thus, despite some shift in thinking by Western powers, many underlying as-
sumptions remained the same. Developing Western style institutions and govern-
ing bodies remained the primary objectives. 29 ' African nations were expected to
"develop" in an effort to attain the technology and living standards of the West.
21
Prior to the Second World War, the West equated development with progress
for Africa, and Europeans were the "agents of change and the chosen standard-
bearers." 293 During the Cold War, the West equated development with "moderni-
288. Perhaps there is a need to think about the terms "development," "developing" and
"underdeveloped." Do they not indicate some kind of hierarchy, and is that hierarchy based
solely on economic development or industrialization? Perhaps. We certainly do not refer to
Japan, South Korea, or Singapore as developing countries. Japan is firmly in the industrial-
ized First World, while Singapore and Korea are Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs).
There are few non-industrialized white countries, although there are several relatively poor
ones, such as Ireland, Portugal, and some eastern European nations. A book on the Third
World, GLOBAL RiFr by L. S. STAvRiANos, begins by describing the role of Eastern Europe
in the global system.
289. See Paul Krugman, Cycles of Conventional Wisdom on Economic Development, 71
INT'L AFF. 717 (1995) (discussing the changing and ultimately unreliable theories of devel-
opment).
290. Francis G. Snyder, Law and Development in Light of Dependency Theory, 14 L. &
Soc'Y REv. 723, 726 (1980).
1. Development means advancement towards certain well-defined general objectives which corre-
spond to the specific condition of man and society to be found in the most advanced societies of
the modem world.
2. Underdeveloped countries will progress towards this model as soon as they have eliminated
certain social, political, cultural and institutional obstacles.
3. Certain economic, political and psychological processes can be singled out as allowing the
most rational mobilization of national resources and these can be categorized for the use of eco-
nomic planners.
4. To all this is added the need to co-ordinate certain social and political forces in support of a de-
velopment policy and to devise an ideological basis which organizes the will of various nations In
the "tasks" of development.
Id. (quoting dependency theorist, Theotonio Dos Santos) (omissions in original).
291. See AKE, supra note 284, at 10 (1996). DAviDsON, supra note 25, at 197-209.
Crawford Young, Democratization in Africa: The Contradictions of a Political Imperative,
in ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN SuB-sAHARAN AFRICA 230, 234
(Jennifer A. Widner ed., 1994).
292. See Chopra, supra note 9, at 15.
293. See id. (noting that Europeans were the standard toward which progress was di-
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zation," which amounted to "Westernization." '  Development was to be achieved
via international aid, which was often greatly influenced by strategic, ideological
battles 5 In the post-Cold War era, capitalism and democracy emerged as the
paradigms of development." 5 Although the jargon has changed, the models advo-
cated continue to represent Western modernizationP ideologies, which the South
(Third World) must adopt and against which its progress will be judged. The un-
derlying assumption remains that the WestP exemplifies development and, thus,
is the ultimate arbiter of which counties have "developed."
For the most part, the African post-colonial state assumed the contours of the
previous colonial state.' Once in power, the newly installed African leaders'"
adopted development policies similar to those proposed by colonial powers after
World War 11.301 Their strategies advocated modernization and conversion to
European-style economies. 2 African leaders also argued that their countries must
produce wealth before it could be redistributed 30 3 Further, they insisted that unity
was the precursor to development, and, thus, the pursuit of development often pro-
vided an excuse to silence opposition and further entrench those in power.3
Yet, Western-fashioned development plans for post-colonial Africa often failed
to account for African social or cultural realities.305 Rather, the emphasis was on
rected, as well as the means of getting there).
294. See id (explaining that the terms which the Western powers used to describe colo-
nization emphasized both aspects of development: "for the French it was une mission civi-
lisatrice; for the British, a White Man's Burden; and for the United States, Manifest Des-
tiny").
295. See id at 18 (stating that throughout the Cold War assistance wvas used as a strate-
gic tool, and ideological differences permeated development aid). The United States advo-
cated capitalism as the path to development while the Soviet Union promoted communism.
See id; see also Halliday, supra note 265, at 39-42.
296. See Chibundu, supra note 46; THOMAs BmRsTEKER, THE "TRU MP" OF LBEmAL
ECONOmiC IDEAS IN THE DEVELOPiNG WORLD (Global Studies Research Program, Univ. of
Wis.-Madison Working Paper Series No. 6, 1993) (discussing predominance of liberal mar-
ket-economy discourse in the post-Cold war era and appealing to development scholars to
evaluate which aspects of the discourse are most helpful).
297. See Chopra, supra note 9, at 15-16.
298. See Halliday, supra note 265, at 36 (noting the term "Third World" originated in
the late 1950s to denote a group of countries that were distinct from the capitalist "First
World" and communist "Second World"). Today, the "West" is often called the North as
opposed to Third World "South" countries. See itd
299. See YOUNG, supra note 37, at 9. Chibundu, supra note 46.
300. See AKE, supra note 284, at 3-4.
301. See Young, supra note 291, at 231.
302. See id; see also AxE, supra note 284, at 9-10; DAVIDSON, supra note 25, at 199-
200, 216.
303. See AXE, supra note 284, at 9. Young, supra note 291, at 231.
304. See AKF, supra note 284, at 9 (explaining that development may have become sec-
ondary to establishing a power base); Young, supra note 291, at 235.
305. See AKF, supra note 284, at 9-10. There was little belief that African peasant soci-
ety had any developmental potential. See DAvIDsON, supra note 25, at 198. For example, it
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modernization, which is equated with Westernization. If social or cultural realities
in Africa failed to accommodate Westernization, then those realities had to be al-
tered.3" Development theories also failed to integrate indigenous political or social
institutions. Thus, only economic development was considered, not ways in which
changes in governing structures might affect economic development.3 Not only
did development plans fail to integrate or account for African societies, many so-
cial scientists believed that however unfortunate colonization had been, it made
rapid development possible because institutions could be completely recon-
structed, presumably in the image of the West.3"'
Law and development scholars prescribed institutionalizing the rule of law to
encourage investment from the West and to facilitate the development of an effi-
cient economy.3 9 A general belief that a Western rule of law, based on Western
institutions and government, will bring desired Western-style success permeates
discussions of Third World development.3"0 Strategies to develop law or institu-
tions rarely consider the cultural setting of the targeted country.3t" ' Those advocat-
ing the rule of law as a means of ensuring accountability often fail to recognize
that accountability in non-Western societies may take different forms."2 Thus, de-
colonization and development continue to perpetrate any of the underlying prem-
ises of colonialism, albeit in a different form and with different rhetoric.
VI. CRITICALLY APPRAISING MODERN TRUSTEESHIP
Having examined the historical and cultural context surrounding colonialism in
its various forms, the next step is to evaluate trusteeship in the modern era. Be-
cause the West views certain peoples as different and perhaps inferior, solutions
that would never be appropriate for sovereign industrialized democracies somehow
become suitable and acceptable for these very different beings.3"3 Thus, a system
was not until the 1980s that those charged with development policy began to think that per-
haps African farmers might know more about farming in Africa than westerners did. See id
at 217-218.
306. See AKE, supra note 284, at 9-10.
307. See id. at 12-13.
308. See DAVIDSON, supra note 25, at 199-200.
309. See Chibundu, supra note 46, at 50, 53 (noting that examples of model rules of law
came from Western societies).
310. See id. at 63-64.
311. See id. at 65-66.
312. See id. at 75-76, 89. Social scientists posit that African relationships and account-
ability are based on "reciprocity," encompassing exchanges based on trust and need, rather
than market values. See id. at 89-90. Thus, perhaps the focus should shift to assuring ac-
countability when different cultural values are at stake.
313. See EDWARD SAID, ORmNTALIsM 97 (Vintage Books 1979) (1978) (quoting Anwar
Abdel Malek, Orientalism in Crisis, 44 DIOGENES 107-08 (Winter 1963)). Said defines "the
other" in discussing the "Orient":
[Tihe Orient and Orientals [are] an "object" of study, stamped with an othemess-as all that is
different, whether it be "subject" or "object"-but of a constitutive othemess, of an essenttalist
character.... This "object" of study will be, as is customary, passive, non-participating, en-
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that is firmly grounded in racism and cultural inferiority is a possible solution in
the late twentieth century, where democracy now supposedly reigns.
The concept of "othemess" stems from a distinct Western cultural and racial
motif,31 4 which is also the perspective that continues to shape and dominate the
construction and implementation of international law."' Western legal theory
views law as an autonomous, abstract, and rational entity distinct from the society
it regulates? 6 Law is presumed universally applicable and objective.3  Conse-
quently, international legal theory generally fails to take account of or acknowl-
edge its underlying paradigms of racial and cultural inferiority. Yet for most of its
history, international law explicitly excluded non-Christians and non-Europeans
from its purview"
Contemporary doctrine and rhetoric proclaim racial and cultural equality.1 9
With decolonization and the emergence of numerous new nation-states, most hu-
man beings have been formally admitted to the international system and are bene-
ficiaries of the accompanying rights, duties, and obligations that emanate from this
dowed with a "historical" subjectivity, above all, non-active, non-autonomous, non-sovereign
with regard to itself- the only Orient or Oriental or"subject" which could be admitted, at the ex-
treme limit, is the alienated being, philosophically, that is, other than itself in relationship to it-
selt posed, understood, defined-and acted-by others.
Id.; see also Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Finger-
pointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAmIu L. REv. 127, 140 (1987) (noting
that "[v]ery little in our language or our culture encourages or reinforces any attempt to
look at others as part of ourselves").
314. See FRAmZ FANON, THE VRETCH D OF THE EARTH 212 (1963); Anghie% supra note
23, at 447.
315. See Aspiration and Control, supra note 169, at 728-29, 732-33, 735-37 (1993).
This is especially true in the post Cold War era because Vestern democracy and capitalism
won the international ideological battle, meaning the last remaining super power can essen-
tially impose its ideological and cultural will.
316. See Charlesworth, supra note 18, at 613; David Kairys, Introduction, in THE
PoLrrcs oF LAw 1, 2 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
317. See Charlesworth, supra note 18, at 613.
318. See Anghie supra note 23, at 498 n.279 (noting that Vitoria and Gess provide the
"native" with just enough sovereignty to make international law binding on him); Robert
A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Lm: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 VIs. L. REV. 219, 222 (1986)
(arguing that "white man's law denies respect to the vision of the American Indian.").
319. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2, 3; art. 2, para. 1; International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3;
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 1, 2, U.N. Doc. A1810
(1948); see also Douglas Lee Donoho, Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights:
The Search for Meaningful Standards, 27 STAN. J. INTL L. 345, 386 (1991) (discussing
whether human rights are examples of cultural relativism and explaining that "[t] he inter-
national community should generate only those minimum elements necessary to satisfy the
values reflected in each right").
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system.32 ° Yet, this inclusion has been on Western terms3 2' and has been unequal;
many emerging states have found it nearly impossible to adhere to the Western
model."2 The international system fails to permit non-western ways of existence,
conceiving, or believing. People must organize themselves into nation-states,
thereby conforming to the prevailing system if they are to participate in the inter-
national system.3" Alternative systems simply have not been considered,324 nor are
they contemplated now if the intention is to resurrect the colonial past.
Having "failed" to live up to the Western construct of the nation-state, the in-
320. There are still Non-Self Governing Territories, indigenous peoples, and others who
do not fully represent themselves in the international system. Current Non-Self Governing
Territories include: American Samoa; Anguilla; Bermuda; British Virgin Islands; Cayman
Islands; East Timor; Falkland Islands (Malvinas); Gibraltar; Guam; Montserrat; Pitcairn; St.
Helena; Tokelau; Turks and Caicos Islands; United States Virgin Islands; Western Sahara.
See International Trusteeship and Decolonization, (Spec Ed.)1945-1995 U.N.Y.B. 181,
U.N. Sales No. E.95.I.50; Trusteeship and Decolonization, 1993 U.N.Y.B. 152, U.N. Sales
No. E.94.I. 1; see also Anghie, supra note 23, at 497 (discussing the use of sovereignty to
deny colonies standing and how later decolonized countries, by entering the international
community, gave "something akin to consent.., to all that had occurred in the past").
321. See Brownlie, supra note 25, at 367 (noting the limited impact of the Third World
on the law of nations, which Brownlie attributed to effective Western diplomacy, the con-
servation of new states, and the ability of Western states to use technical expertise and pres-
sure to determine the formulation of agreements); see also Aspiration and Control, supra
note 169, at 728-29, 732-33, 735-37. For instance, it is widely acknowledged that the Third
World lost the debates on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, and the New
International Economic Order. See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A.
Res. 3281 (XXIX 1974), 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975); General Assembly Resolution on Perma-
nent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII) (1973), 13 I.L.M. 238
(1974); General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources,
G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII) (1962), 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963).
322. See Jackson, supra note 50, at 5-6, 9-11 (analyzing the respect for national borders
and sovereignty as mechanisms to permit the worst excesses in sub-Saharan African coun-
tries). Moreover, concepts such as "sovereignty" and "domestic jurisdiction" are applied
differently to Third, versus First, World countries. See Anghie, supra note 23, at 497.
323. See Anthony Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of In-
ternational Law, 3 EU. J. INT'L L. 66 (1992)); Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Pub-
lic International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 81, 100-01 (1991) (defining "liberalism" as a
concept which proffers a total world view that delimits our ideas about society and possible
ways to revise our thinking); Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in
THE PoLrrlcs oF LAW: A PROGREssrvE CRTQUE 413, 420 (David Kairys ed., 1990) (defin-
ing "liberal legalism" as a belief structure "that abstracts particular relationships between
real people ... into relations between entirely abstract categories of 'individuals' playing
the abstract social roles of 'owner,' ' employee,' etc.").
324. See Philip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order and Critical Legal Studies,
42 STAN4. L. REv. 811, 815 (1990) (book review) (noting that the New Haven approach to
international law assumes a single international community that has values reflecting




temational community must find a way to make these peoples competentYm Trus-
teeship is posed as the model to achieve this goal?' Trust states would essentially
be divested of the vestiges of sovereignty, a crucial aspect of statehood?32 Interna-
tional law will have come full circle and once again the natives will not be sover-
eign.3 '
A. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF STATEHOOD AND SOVEREIGNTY
Two contrasting theories of international law have been postulated: interna-
tional law as a culturally grounded system and international law as a rational uni-
versal system detached from any particular culture?' A number of postmodem o
scholars have applied critical theory to international law3" and challenged preten-
325. See Richardson, supra note 1, at 6-8, 13-15.
326. Indeed some advocates of trusteeship utilize language and images that speak to this
incompetence. Trusteeship is analogized to conservatorship which is imposed to care for
those who are incapable of caring for themselves. See Helman & Ratner, supra note 1, at
12; Johnson, supra, note 1, at 22.
327. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 312-13, 315-17.
328. See Anghie, supra note 23, at 494-97 (describing natives' lack of sovereignty under
colonialism and the mandate system). This appears to be the logical and extreme conclusion
to the decline of sovereignty theories. Of course the declining sovereignty construct is not
applied to Western nations which are more interdependent, but remain capable of exercising
basic control over their affairs.
329. See Aspiration and Control, supra note 169, at 723 explaining that:
[I]ntemational law is a product of culture; its rules are created and interpreted in a cultural envi-
ronment that shapes their purpose and their meaning. On the other hand, [international lawyers]
argue, international law is bound to no particular cultural context and applies its pure principles to
disputes among cultures just as ajudge might apply legal rules to factual problems.
Id
330. See Cook, supra note 280, at 753 (noting that postmodernism is "characterized by
an extreme skepticism of systems' theories or master narratives like orthodox Marxism and
Liberalism that delegitimize certain ways of knowing and living while offering suspect jus-
tifications of others"). Cook continues to explain that:
Postmodern critique might be thought of as a strategy for bringing to the surface suppressed nar-
ratives and voices drowned out by the univocal projections of master narratives.... [It] illumi-
nates the underside of master narratives, thereby exposing the subordination and marginality of
alternative social visions whose relegation to the status of exceptions to the rule... can no longer
be objectively justified.
Id at 754.
Professor Cook further notes:
[1]t carves out space for formerly subordinated narratives. No longer can we treat the stories told
by Blacks, women and other subordinated groups of their oppression and suffering asapiphe-
nomenal, tangential to a more central narrative of class conflict or of the formal equality of rights
bearing citizens. Postmodernism rejects this kind of privileging by both the left and the right as a
social construction of illegitimate hierarchy.
Id. at 758.
331. See Carty, supra note 323, at 66. On the relationship between critical legal theory
and international law, Carty states:
"Critical" international legal studies ... opposes itself to positivist international law, as repre-
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sions of abstract rationalism. They argue that "legal analysis cannot be separated
from the political, economic, historical, and cultural context in which people
live."332 Nor can legal analysis be divorced from its cultural and historical roots,
which partly explain current biases and the implementation of law in the current
international milieu.33
Critical legal theorists 334 and feminist legal theorists35 exposed the distinct cul-
tural grounding of international law and debunked the myth of its presumed uni-
versalism. 336 International law is firmly grounded in the liberal tradition 37 and has
a universalist compulsion.33' Liberalism views sovereigns as the center of interna-
sentative of an actual consensus among States. [It asks] whether a positive system of universal
international law actually exists, or whether particular States and their representative legal schol-
ars merely appeal to such positivist discourse so as to impose aparticularist language upon others
as if it were a universally accepted legal discourse. So post-modernism is concerned with un-
earthing difference, heterogeneity and conflictas reality in place offictional representatives of
universality and consensus.
Id.
332. See Charlesworth, supra note 18, at 613.
333. See Anghie, supra note 23, at 446.
334. See id. at 496-99; see also Carty, supra note 323; Sunhee Juhon, CLS: A Pathfinder
into the Gospel of Radical Reform, 8 LEGAL REFEmRCES SERvicEs Q. 107 (1988) (de-
scribing the CLS movement). Termed "New Stream Scholars" by Professor David Ken-
nedy, critical legal scholars "incorporated insights from normative philosophy, critical the-
ory, structuralism, anthropology, prepositional logic, literature, sociology, politics and
psychiatry" as methodological approaches to international law. Purvis, supra note 323, at
88-89. The application of critical theory to international law is largely a European and
American inspired undertaking. See id. One notable exception is Antony Anghie's utiliza-
tion of critical theory to analyze various aspects of colonialism. See Anghie, supra note 23,
at 490-98.
335. See e.g., Charlesworth, supra note 18; Hilary Charlesworth, Alienating Oscar?
Feminist Analysis of International Law, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND
INTERAnONAL LAW 1, 6-7 (Am. Soc'y Int'l L. ed., 1993); Gunning, supra note 18, at 190-
93; Catherine A. MacKinnon, Comment: "Theory is Not a Luxury, " in RECONCEIVING
REALrrY, supra, at 83, 85, 90.
336. See Cook, supra note 280, at 758-59 (noting the post-modem approach "chal-
lenge[s] the ways in which knowledge is produced and constituted.., and explore[s] the
ways in which we are socialized into seeing the world and its possibilities in a certain way
and dismissing other visions as unreasonable or impossible").
337. See Purvis, supra note 323, at 93-94, stating:
Liberalism in international law, as elsewhere, can be understood as a philosophy that combines an
atomistic psychological assumption with a radical epistemology about morality. The liberal psy-
chological understanding of international law conceives of sovereignty as being the foundation of
international life .... [lInternational life is sovereign-centric. Sovereigns are both the subjects and
objects of international life. No "natural" world pre-exists the sovereign's appearance. . . In
sum, the liberal psychology about our world portrays sovereignty as being all there is to Interna-
tional life.... [L]iberalism must claim that decisions about morality can only be made by the in-
ternational order's atomic components, its sovereigns.
Id.
338. See Carty, supra note 323, at 68 (" Critical jurisprudence has sought to expose po-
litical choice, discredit the 'rights' discourse of legal liberalism, demonstrate the indetermi-
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tional society, and liberalism combined with universalism generates a bias against
recognizing a broader pluralized perspective or the "very partial, multilayered and
fragmented nature of international society." '339 Instead, to be part of international
society, peoples must adhere to the universal ideal of being part of a sovereign
state. When such conformity is lacking, the resulting systems must be modified to
fit what is the norm.34
If international lav is sovereign-centric, 41 a total loss of sovereignty, as meas-
ured by that system, produces an entity that is no longer a primary subject of inter-
national law.34' Thus, "failed" states, and presumably their inhabitants, would no
longer be accorded all of the rights and obligations accorded to sovereign states:"
Having "failed," these states must be rehabilitated if they are to remain a part of
the international system. Colonialism is posed as a viable vehicle by which to
achieve this goal; although, for those states previously subjected to the system,
colonialism proved to be an unmitigated disaster from its inception.' There ap-
pears to be no alternative means for inclusion in the absence of statehood, and
statehood's essential element, sovereignty, is determined in accordance with the
international system itself.
B. THE CONTINUING PERVASIVENESS OF RACISM
Critical Race Theory (CRT) utilizes race consciousness to expose the falsity of
universalism and neutrality; it assists in explaining racialization and its place in
international discourse. 4 Moreover, CRT explains that our perspectives are inti-
mately bound to our unique cultural heritage and are anything but neutral or uni-
nacy of law, and reveal the bias of liberal ideology."); Purvis, supra note 323, at 89 (noting
that critical legal jurisprudence "aim[s] to demonstrate how law, through its capacity for
'reification,' 'mystification,' 'legitimization' and 'obfuscation' reinforces social injustice").
339. See Carty, supra note 323, at 68.
340. See Gunning, supra note 18, at 193 (explaining that scholars have broached "[T]he
inherent bias within international law against non-\Vestern cultures and women, whatever
their cultural background"). Western feminists have criticized international law as "em-
bodying a male (white, heterosexual, middle to upper class) perspective... [that is] biased
against women." Id at 192; see Charlesworth, supra note 18, at 621-34 (discussing human
rights law as "the embodiment and imposition of Western values on other parts of the
world.").
341. See Purvis, supra note 323, at 93 ("The liberal psychological understanding of in-
ternational law conceives of sovereignty as being the foundation of international life.").
342. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Aavisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.L 174, 179 (Apr. 11) (supporting the notion that although states are no
longer the only subjects of international law, they are still the only entities which possess
the full panoply of rights and obligations accorded to international actors).
343. The state, of course, is comprised of individuals and myriad groups of people rep-
resented on the international stage by the state. Thus, the loss of sovereignty is a loss of
voice, unless we make room for alternative visions of international society.
344. See Mutua, supra note 5, at 520-24, 527-28, 531; Sylvester, supra note 1, at 1314
n.49.
345. See supra notes 126-62 and accompanying text.
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versal. Professor Aleinikoff postulates that "race-consciousness ... [is] an en-
trenched structure of thought that affects how we organize and process informa-
tion." '346 Race does matter, and is one of the first things we notice about each
other.347 Racism is often unconscious,34 but the pervasiveness and persistence of
racism and race consciousness in Western culture, makes its influence omnipres-
ent. Professor Lawrence opines:
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has
played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also
inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an
individual's race and induce negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To
the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all rac-
ists. At the same time, most of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize
the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or
the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other words, a large
part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by uncon-
scious racial motivation. 4 9
346. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case For Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 1067 (1991).
347. See id. at 1066. Whites often assert that they are colorblind because they do not no-
tice or act on the basis of race. But of course we all notice race. Aleinikoffnotes:
Perhaps what is being said is that the speaker does not begin her evaluation with any precon-
ceived notions. But this too is very difficult to believe given the deep and implicit ways in which
our minds are color-coded. To be truly colorblind... requires color-consciousness: one must no-
tice race in order to tell oneself not to trigger the usual mental processes that take race into ac-
count.
Id. at 1079.
348. See The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 27, at 322-24 (explaining
that there are several reasons why racially discriminatory beliefs and ideas are usually un-
conscious).
mhe human mind defends itself against the discomfort of guilt by denying or refusing to recog-
nize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conflict with what the individual has learned Is good or
right. While our historical experience has made racism an integral part of our culture, our society
has more recently embraced an ideal that rejects racism as immoral. When an Individual experi-
ences conflict between racist ideas and the societal ethic that condemns those ideas, the mind ex-
cludes his racism from consciousness.
Second ... the culture-including, for example, the media and an individual's parents,
peers, and authority figures-transmits certain beliefs and preferences. Because these beliefs are
so much a part of the culture, they are not experienced as explicit lessons. Instead, they seem part
of the individual's rational ordering of her perceptions of the world. The individual is unaware,
for example, that the ubiquitous presence of a cultural stereotype has influenced her perception
that blacks are lazy or unintelligent. Because racism is so deeply ingrained in our culture, It is
likely to be transmitted by tacit understandings.
Id.
349. See id. at 322. There is often resistance to the idea of unconscious racism because
individuals hear this as branding them racist, rather than as describing a cultural milieu in
which racism is an integral part of the culture. Even in the current environment of overt ra-
cism, where the racist attitudes of many Americans are explicit and out in the open, it is still
not acceptable to think of oneself as racist, at least not in middle class circles, See Patricia J.
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Western views of African peoples cannot help but be shaped by American (and
broader European) views of race and by the ubiquity of racism.31° Racism perme-
ated the entire colonial enterprise, in both its purely exploitative and more "en-
lightened" phases."' Indeed, racism shaped the formation of the entire interna-
tional legal system 52 American and European perspectives on African and other
colored people generally are negative, having been shaped in European states by
the colonial experience,"' and in America, by the presence and subordination of
African-Americans and other people of color." While the United States was not a
colonial power in Africa, it did have trust territories in the South Pacific, and thus,
shared in the colonial experience.3 " The prevailing American view in this context
was similar to European views of racial and cultural inferiority and superiority?'
Moreover, at home, the worst forms of an often violent racial oppression of blacks
Williams, Radio Hoods, in THE ROOSTER'S EGG: ON THE PERSISTENCE OF PREjuDICE 42
(1995) (discussing the popularity of openly racist and inflammatory radio show hosts such
as Howard Stem and Rush Limbaugh). Racism is in some sense unavoidable; we do notice
the color of the other person's skin, whether we want to or not. How we act upon this
knowledge is the second question, and an important one.
350. See FANON, supra note 314, at 41-43, 215 (noting the similarity of treatment ac-
corded to American blacks by American whites and Europeans toward Africans; whites
generally put "all Negroes in the same bag" with respect to culture and a lack thereof).
351. See Part IV, supra. Racism also influenced the ensuing national movements toward
self-determination and nation-building. See id.
352. See Anghie, supra note 23, at 447-48, 497-501 (1993); Williams, supra note 318,
at 223-26; Williams, supra note 130, at 51-52.
353. See SAID, supra note 23, at xiv, xxi; Kevin Gaines, Black Americans' Racial Uplift
Ideology as "Civilizing Mission." in CULTURES OF UNrrM STATES IMPERIALISM 435 (Amy
Kaplan & Donald E. Pease eds., 1993). Fanon states:
Native society is not simply described as a society lacking in values. It is not enough for the colo-
nist to affirm that those values have disappeared from, or still better never existed in, the colonial
world. The native is declared insensible to ethics; he represents not only the absence of values,
but also the negation of values.... Monsieur Meyer could thus state seriously in the French Na-
tional Assembly that the Republic must not be prostituted by allowing the Algerian people to be-
come a part of it. All values, in fact, are irrevocably poisoned and diseased as soon as they are
allowed in contact with the colonized race. The customs of the colonized pmople, their traditions,
their myths--above all, their myths--are the very sign of that poverty of spirit and their constitu-
tional depravity.
FANON, supra note 314, at 41.
354. See Richardson, supra note 1, at 9; Priscilla Vald, Terms of Assimilation. In
CULTURES OF UNrrED STATES IPEmALISM 59, 59 (Amy Kaplan & Donald E. Pease eds.,
1993); see also Dudziak, supra note 278, at 77-81 ("Concern about the effect of U.S. race
discrimination on cold war American foreign policy led the Truman administration to con-
sider a pro-civil rights posture as part of its international agenda to promote democracy and
contain communism"); Vicente L. Rafael, White Love: Surveillance and Nationalist Re-
sistance in the US. Colonization of the Philippines; in CULTURE OF UNIED STATES
ImPERiALISM, supra note 353, at 185 (stating that Americans viewed their role in the Philip-
pines as one of"benevolent assimilation" and that this role required a paternal attitude).
355. See Rafael, supra note 354.
356. See id
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and other ethnic minorities continued unabated.357 The notion of bringing civiliza-
tion to the natives continued in the concepts of mandate and trusteeship, as well as
in the development discourse.35
If race in part shapes Western views of the "other," and the prevailing view of
black people is and has been overwhelmingly negative, perhaps it is not surprising
that colonialism would be proposed as a solution to the problem of disintegrating
states. Part of this vision of "the other" has been incompetence?59 As Frantz
Fanon noted, colonialism not only imposed its rule on the present and future of a
dominant country but also sought to destroy the past by distorting, distancing and
destroying it. The total result of colonial domination was to convince natives that
colonialism came "to lighten their darkness.""6°
It seems the West plans again to come and lighten "the darkness." Having
found that a number of African states "failed" or "collapsed" as nation-states, the
West stands ready to put them back together again by governing until they are
taught to govern themselves. It is much like parents taking care of their children
357. See Dudziak, supra note 278.
358. See supra notes 188-217, 288-312 and accompanying text.
359. See, e.g., ROBERT M. KAPLAN & DENNIS P. SACCUZZO, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING:
PRINCIPLES, APPLICATIONS AND IssuEs 258 (3d ed. 1993) ("Critics charge that intelligence
tests not only are biased against certain racial and economic groups but also are used by
those in power to maintain the status quo") (emphasis added); Linda S. Gottfredson, Re-
considering Fairness: A Matter of Social and Ethical Priorities, 33 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV.
293, 297 (1988) ("Current black-white mental test score differences reflect a black-white
difference in the distribution of [the factor of general intelligence]. IQ differences between
racial-ethnic groups are the rule, not the exception."); John L. Rury, Race, Region, and
Education: An Analysis of Black and White Scores on the 1917 Army Alpha Intelligence
Test, 57 J. NEGRO EDUC. 51, 52 (1988) (describing validation of white superiority in terms
of intelligence by Army intelligence tests of 1917: "Whatever anyone else said about the
matter, no one could argue with the fact that a national sample of black men had scored
substantially lower on a standardized test than had whites"); J. Phillippe Rushton, Race
Differences in Behaviour: A Review and Evolutionary Analysis, 9 PERSONALITY &
INDIVIDUAL DIrFERENCES 1009, 1010-17 (1988) ("First, despite major environmental at-
tempts to ameliorate the situation, the difference between black and white Americans in
mean IQ remains as large today as it was at the time of the First World war."); Pat Ship-
man, Legacy of Racism; Race and Intelligence; 'The Bell Curve': A Symposium, NAT'L
REv., Dec. 5, 1994, at 34 ("As The Bell Curve suggests, whether low intelligence is fos-
tered by genetic inheritance or nurtured by a culture of poverty, it is nonetheless passed
from generation to generation.").
360. See FANON, supra note 314, at 210-11 ("Colonialism... never ceased to maintain
that the Negro is a savage... [and] the vast continent was the haunt of the savages, a coun-
try riddled with superstitions and fanaticism."). The response to this racialization has been
continent-wide and racial, rather than national. The culture sought to be created by African
intellectuals was an African culture that stands opposed to European Culture. See id. at 212.
Those "most responsible for this racialization of thought are Europeans who have never
ceased to set up white culture to fill the gap left by the absence of other cultures." Id.
Fanon's point is that Africans have not thought in terms of "national" cultures. See id. He
also notes how different struggles of black Americans and Africans are. See id. at 215-16.
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until the children learn to stand on their own two feet. Indeed, scholars proposing
modem trusteeship invoke this very analogy."'
Perhaps it is time to turn this process on its head and assume that people are
quite capable of governing themselves. Indeed, part of the difficulty associated
with effective government lies in being compelled to adopt governing structures
that do not work within the context of a given culture. No definitive answers are
posed, rather a new way of looking at the problem is urged. Such an approach be-
gins with believing in the dignity and worth of every human being and assuming
that the ability to construct an appropriate social contract exists. It means devising
structures that allow the West to listen and then assist, if called upon to do so.
VII. TOWARD A SOLUTION
No single paradigm can purport to resolve a perplexing and multilayered prob-
lem such as the one. before the international community, and no such attempt is
made here. Rather, what is urged is a change in viewpoint. Professor Gunning re-
minds us that the alleged neutrality and objectivity of the most commonly accepted
perspective is, in reality, just one perspective out of many.3 Professor Barnes
postulates that social reality can be "understood only if a plurality of voices ar-
ticulates different points of view; understanding suffers when some voices are si-
lenced."363 Critical scholars call for including and respecting "all 'voices' or per-
spectives, and counsel against the tendency 'to treat one's own perspective as true
rather than as one of many possible points of view."' "I Thus, the first step might
be to question our assumptions about other peoples, and our arrogant belief in the
supremacy of our knowledge and institutions. The focus must be "on multicultural
dialogue and a shared search for areas of overlap, shared concerns, and values." 1
International law focuses on institutions and the privileges and powers of states;
the silence of the peoples of these communities, in transforming international law,
is deafening.366 Shifting the focus to people emphasizes justice and change?'
361. See Helman & Ratner, supra note 1, at 12; Johnson, supra note 1, at 22.
362. See Gunning supra note 18, at 190 (noting that the "common perspective" usually
represents the view of white heterosexual middle to upper middle class males).
363. See Barnes, supra note 137, at 1870 ("Minority scholars are uniquely positioned to
assist in the goal of breaking this silence... [T]he realization of one's 'otherness' in rela-
tion to American culture ... create a valuable prism through which the ideals and reality of
this country can be examined.").
364. See Gunning, supra note 18, at 190 (quoting Martha Minnow, Feminist Reason:
Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 47,48 n.1 (1988)). Gunning discusses the ten-
sion between the notion of "universally valid moral beliefs and right and wrong rules and
modes of conduct." Id (quoting MARvIN HARRIS, THE RISE OF ANTHROLOLaGrCAL THEORY:
A HiSTORY OF THEORIES OF CULTURE 13 (1968)).
365. See Gunning, supra note 18, at 191.
366. While many African scholars have been heard on these issues, I am not sure this is
enough because African-American or leftist intellectuals cannot be presumed to speak for
an entire group of people. Many scholars are educated and often live in the West, speaking
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Critical Race Theory has "insisted on the need to incorporate the concrete, practi-
cal realities of oppressed people into agendas for reform."' 68 This premise helps
work toward finding new mechanisms that allow communities to organize them-
selves in their own images.
Trusteeship is the epitome of a top down approach that is at the apex of the state
paradigm, and involves taking over the state for the purpose of rehabilitation.
Trusteeship also puts the West at the center of the process. A different approach
begins not at the apex, but at the other end of the spectrum-at the foundation of
the state. A necessary part of this change in perspective entails dialogue across ra-
cial and cultural lines and inquiries into the life experiences of the people we as-
sist. 69 This inquiry might generate new theories of justice based on "intuition,
guided by reason, [and] tested against the lives of real people." 7o Matsuda reasons
that "[t]he normative intuitions of those on the bottom are often different from the
intuitions of those on top,"3 ' and these intuitions are useful in making normative
choices. 72 Of course, this also means removing ourselves from the center of the
discussion and the process. 73
for the entirety of African-Americans is even more difficult than the contradictions facing
first world scholars who deal only with the differences that arise from class. This is not to
vilify or degrade these scholars, but only to suggest that we dig deeper and directly consult
those whose lives are affected by the decisions made by the international community.
367. See Vale, supra note 3, at 290.
368. See Barnes, supra note 137, at 1867. Critical Race Theory also "refused to ignore
the difference between race and class as a basis of oppression." Id. at 1868. Critical Legal
Studies (CLS), on the other hand, views the poor as "disempowered, helpless and noncul-
pable co-conspirators in their own oppression." Id. There is a tendency by CLS scholars to
"imply that the focus upon race is misplaced because it hampers efforts to foster class-
based resistance to what they view as economic oppression." Id.
369. See Matsuda, supra note 17, at 359 (maintaining that "those on the bottom know
how bad life is without the substantive and intangible goods the philosophers ponder").
Matsuda postulates that the "expanded consciousness of the actual experience of racism is a
method of theoretical inquiry available to CLS scholars in responding to the problem of
normative priority." Id. at 359-60.
370. See id. at 360.
371. See id. For example, black Americans are quick to detect racism, to distrust official
claims of necessity, and to sense a threat to freedom. Matsuda also believes that the "mi-
nority perspective cuts across class lines." Id.
372. See id. (supporting looking to the bottom, taking advantage of and using our multi-
ple consciousness). Matsuda suggests that those who experience discrimination speak with
a special voice that we should heed and maintains that "looking to the bottom-adopting
the perspective of those who have seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise-can assist
critical scholars in the task of fathoming the phenomenology of law and defining the ele-
ments ofjustice." Id. at 324.
373. See Grillo & Wildman, supra note 131, at 402, observing:
[Miembers of dominant groups assume that their perceptions are the pertinent perceptions, that
their problems are the problems that need to be addressed, and that in discourse they should be the
speaker rather than the listener. Part of being a member of a privileged group Is being the center




International law plays a role "by demonstrating a concern with the develop-
ment of people as opposed to the preservation of states, which often prey on their
citizens.""7 4 Other ways of organizing mankind beyond the nation-state may ex-
ist,375 and new forms of reference are needed. 76 The use of intervention to impose
our view of the world is generally hypocritical and rarely successful.' Moreover,
the U.N. is structured in such a way that it excludes those outside the main-
stream 7
Professor Vale argues that U.N. reform has "favored established routines over
innovation by entrenching the interests of those who already enjoy power." 37
Thus, "the interests of the nation-state are preferred over those of the world's citi-
zens." 390 But Vale notes that the institution of the nation-state alienated those at the
margins who, faced with poverty and stagnated reform, turned away from inter-
course with the state.38' Moreover, this focus on the nation-state reflects the
"'might-is-right' calculus." 31
Thus, to rebuild "failed states," perhaps we should start at the bottom rather
than the top by focusing on the peoples themselves, without preconceived ideas of
the answers or the solutions?' While the West can contribute much to the dia-
Id
374. See Vale, supra note 3, at 290.
375. Seeid. at290-91.
376. See id at 291.
377. See Richard Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for
the United Nations, 36 HARV. INT'L LJ. 341,345- 351 (1995).
378. See Vale, supra note 3, at 291 (noting that the select international agencies, such as
UNICEF, the FAO, and the WHO, have made great efforts to reach the people of the
world). These agencies are dependent on the "U.N. system, which, in turn, is dependent on
the nation-state, and thus even their successes have remained riddled with deficiencies. For
the world's marginalized, the effect of emphasizing the nation-state over the individual has
been catastrophic." Id
379. See id at 286.
380. See id at 286 (noting the complex labyrinth of mandates, resolutions, and creden-
tials of the Security Council and General Assembly utilize to ultimately protect and fortify
the nation-state).
381. See id.
382. See idi at 287 (citing the example of the Security Council which he characterizes as
having a "narrow, top-down, masculinized, Anglo-American analysis of international
events," and whose prime preoccupation is "the security and well-being of states, rather
than of ordinary people").
383. There may be severe problems with solutions viewed as "given." There is a need to
carefully examine proposed solutions, such as democratization and large scale humanitarian
intervention by the U.N. For instance, difficulties may arise in attempting democratization
in certain situations, unless we greatly broaden our view of the concept of "democracy." In
reality, the initial movements toward democracy in Africa and Eastern Europe have some-
times fueled nationalism and actually undermined democratization. Nationalism also has the
potential to become narrowly based and destroy whatever viability is left. See Ottaway, su-
pra note 84, at 235, 243.
The expectation that democracy will act as an integrating force capable of consolidaing collaps-
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logue, perhaps it should only suggest, rather than insist on, the acceptance of its
views. Westerners should attempt to discern how peoples would prefer to organize
themselves and heed those voices by making room for them in international soci-
ety regardless of the form that voice takes. This solution entails reconceptualizing
international institutions that are presently based on the nation-state as the repre-
sentational unit. But the nation-state is a relatively new entity in historical terms" 4
and is currently fraying at the margins.3"5 Perhaps it is time to contemplate new so-
cial formations that are more in line with the wishes of the peoples our present in-
stitutions purport to serve and represent. Whatever the new emergent formations,
international law should make every effort to make space for them.
ing states or of creating viable new ones is largely based on the experience of nineteenth-century
Europe. That period saw the crumbling of the Austro-Hungarian empire but also the merger of
small principalities and city-states into large entities.... The nationalist movements that led to
the collapse of the empire and the disappearance of smaller states were also democratic move-
ments.
Id. at 242.
Moreover, in many of these countries, the economy is not a separate sphere where people
exercise power and enrich themselves and thus there may be little to fight over except po-
litical power. See id. at 243. "[T]he international community is encouraging democratiza-
tion, and occasionally forcing [elections] on reluctant governments by withholding aid.
Democratization, however, has been interpreted very narrowly as the holding of elections..
. But elections, or the prospect of elections, are highly destabilizing in countries threatened
with collapse." Id. at 245. Perhaps a different approach to democratization is needed be-
cause "[e]lections held under the wrong conditions can be a real set-back for democratiza-
tion" Id. at 245. Thus, this process may "accelerate rather than prevent the collapse of an
already weakened state." Id. at 244.
384. See YOUNG, supra note 37, at 32.
385. Many do not identify with the state, therefore it is no longer capable of taking care
of citizens by itself, and must rely on new supranational formations such as the European
Community to effectuate state roles.
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